Will you be upset with me?

Normativity, framing and complex educational address

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Abstract

This philosophical inquiry found its inspiration in how Judith Butler places a humanist notion of a "self" at the center of a problem for ethics, for its role in the constitution of its other(s) in a structure of *address*. This notion of a "self" is also what normative truths and realities currently lean into, and conversely support – ways of reading, speaking, feeling, thinking, being and knowing that are premised on this type of subject, foreclosing everything else.

It is a thesis that pursues two main interests: First, *how may we most usefully imagine normative and framing functions of teachers reiterating educational discourse?* And second, *what might the way we reappropriate Butler's concept of constitutive address mean for the possibility of allowing for less ethically violent ways of becoming in educational relations?*

The issue is neither of specific norms nor specific effects to be countered, but of better grasping the underlying power of address and how our dependence on normative citationality implicates us all in the foreclosure of others' lives and relations.

There are two parts, where the first one sets the stage. Three central discourses in teacher education are considered – reflection, psychology and social justice – to exemplify a shared function as demands students are addressed with. This part also concerns conversations with students about these aspects of their studies; drawing support from the work of Butler, but also Jacques Derrida, I develop an argument about performative writing – about how and why insert transcribed exchanges from these conversations throughout the thesis.

With added perspectives from other theorists, Butler's concept of address is re-argued in the second part as a more complex, and ultimately unstable, dynamic, stretching her notion of framing and ethics to apply differently as well.

This thesis is concerned with how these re-conceptualizations may open up for ways to interrupt – through teacher education – how normativity and framing in educational address currently entail a blanket movement of ethical violence in the reiteration of humanism.

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A big thank you to the students that participated in the group conversations that were part of this project. As I told you afterward, the focus of this philosophical thesis is on the function of normative discourses spoken in education, not on you. This is reflected in the way exchanges can be found throughout the thesis, disconnected and without analysis; I explain this much further in Chapters 3 and 4. Still, I must emphasize that that the words you spoke, in opinions and stories you shared, have been an invaluable contribution to the thesis!

To my mother, a formidable teacher, who passed away during the time of this project: if it wasn't for you, I would not have been inspired to follow this path and engage with both the trouble with, and the potential in, the most important profession in the world. Thank you.

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1. Introduction

The concern of this philosophical thesis is with education[1] as a normative societal institution, but not in the sense of what is politically and culturally willed. I hold that education works normatively in ways that can be seen as deeply problematic, ethically speaking, and I am interested in how we can best grasp what is involved in the sort of insidious, *underlying* power normativity yields, so that we may imagine ways to interrupt it.

The topic of education and normativity is especially important to me for two reasons that may appear contrasting in terms of perspective. One is that I for many years have worked with activism, support, training and politics with and for people who tell of horrible consequences of a normative society. For them, schooling in particular is labelling, shame, loneliness,

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[1] I use the term education here to include teacher education, schools and early childhood, the practice of teaching, as well as the research and theory that concern these educational fields. Much of the thesis is concerned with how becoming recognizable *as teacher subject* involves citing appropriate discourses, but the more general interest is in how, in a complex relational discursive dynamic, teacher becoming constitutively affects much more. I pursue "education" as such, as fully interconnected at the level of discourse, constitution and ethics, but in some parts of the thesis indicate specific aspects, groups or programs.

exclusion and bullying, encountered in both informal and structural ways, and the narrowness of possible ways to be and lives to live is absolutely stifling – and sometimes even lethal.

The other reason is a strong conviction that normative functions are involved in *all* ways and aspects of *being, knowing* and *feeling*, including what are called *experiences, identities, expressions, fears* or *desires*. Normativity first of all happens at the level of how meaning comes to be, through excluding – *foreclosing* – other meaning; nothing just *is,* whether called lovely, normal *or* shameful. We cannot *think, feel like, recognize, understand, act like,* or *describe* anything, except through turning to some normative system of meaning that is outside of us and serves this purpose.

To make this kind of point, I find it is important to right away line up a few varied examples of normative function. For example, "skin color" can be "observed", and yes, there are hues to our skins, but it *could* have been irrelevant; *relevance* is a normative effect. We can consider normative demands regarding how to be a teacher, as I do in this thesis. It is not demanded or responded to in a uniform way, but *some* demands have to be met. Further, I believe people also become meaningful for themselves and others in ways that are much more unaware and unstructured; I am convinced that something as seemingly *natural*, and *felt,* as what most would call "my sexuality", comes to be, *for absolutely everyone,* in relation to normative functions. It is not about "choice", but infinite encounters and moments of making meaning, in *arbitrary* and *complex* ways, happening also at the *embodied* level of desire.

Judith Butler, the primary scholar I engage with, argues that "[t]he idea of iterability is crucial for understanding why norms do not act in deterministic ways" (2009, p. 168). *Iterability*, Jacques Derrida (1978) tells us, means there is no foundational meaning, there are only *citations,* repetitions, of linguistic and cultural convention, in speech, writing or otherwise. I should reemphasize that this does not mean *following* a norm, it means being/doing/reading in contexts of various systems of meaning intersecting; infinite citations ensure that variation of, for example, desire happens and cannot be determined. What possibly lasts, then? Given this perspective, re-citation, or rather *reiteration,* maintains norms, discourses, and their premising

conditions, *relatively speaking*, and material effects may certainly last, but whatever citations may pretend to refer to has no lasting *meaning*.

My point here is that *observing* skin color, *being* "straight", *knowing about* child development or *speaking as* a teacher, involves citing normative meaning – with more or less indeterminable effects – and all of them also imply someone who is/does/knows, as a *subject*. In the teacher example, there is some sense that demands have to be met, whether or not someone questions these, while reading skin color categorically, or "being straight", perhaps involves no awareness at all of this being anything but given and natural. While normativity does not work in streamlined ways, neither for behavior, truths, or bodies, nor among types of noticed or unnoticed effects, my concern here is a relational and discursive dynamic that both necessitates and destabilizes normativity's function, and how diverse and vague citations in education still have powerful implications in terms of subjects, ethics and politics.

I would say the "brilliance" of our contemporary paradigm is that it works through a dynamic that quite silently maintains its own humanist premises – its "intelligibility". The dynamic of *address* (Butler, 2005), central to this maintenance, is one of the most important and exciting terms discussed in this thesis. Constitutive address, for Butler, is about the iterable *making* of the coherent subject, the "*self*"[2], as knowing and knowable, in a basic condition of being addressed by an *other*[3], with the normative and moral demand to be – at a primary level – an answering "self". Whether one rejects or responds, it *acknowledges* and functions as part of the

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[2] Butler uses quotation marks around the "I" when written about *as* a problematic notion, but not around the "self". I will move with her perspective, but also somewhat away from it, as I develop my own questions, and I have chosen differently: to use quotation marks around both, as well as the plural "selves", to visibly emphasize this *as* an invisible but deeply troubling center of meaning, ethically speaking, a critique-worthy notion that is key in this whole thesis pursuit. Its constitutive function remains as the thesis moves through articulations of it.

I have chosen to *not* use quotation marks in related wordings, like *myself*, *oneself*, *self-reflection*, *self-improvement, self-insight* and *self-account*. This is simply for the reason that it is visually an unnecessary amount of "noise" in your reading; I assume the point is being made with the "self"/"selves" alone. I of course also do not use it when quoting, or referring to an argument where no particular issue is brought up around this as a notion.

[3] Butler clarifies in the opening of *Giving an Account*, that: "In this book, I use the notion of the "other" to denote the human other in its specificity except where, for technical reasons, the term needs to mean something slightly different. In Levinas, for instance, "the Other" not only refers to the human other but acts as a placeholder for an infinite ethical relation. In the latter case, I've capitalized the term" (2005, p. x).

I extend the way I employ this term, of a demanding other, *beyond* the human other, as I later read Butler alongside other theorists to rethink the dynamic of address, but I maintain the spelling "other". Except where referring to an argument where someone capitalizes Other.

address, and is as such a self-*constitutive*[4] response. Further, and crucially, the other is forcefully made *as* a knowable other, in that same moment of address.

Here we reach a central concern, as argued by Butler through the concept of *framing* (2009): because responding to address as a coherent subject is a *precarious* achievement, fully indeterminable and temporary, there is a form of "affect" *in* address that is geared toward trying to secure coherence. This affectivity manages to make each subject *as* one that not only constitutes its others, but in that also *differentiates* among them, and the material and structural effect is substantial for lives near and far. It is important to consider how we are all implicated in, and affected by, this, but also how even utterly incoherent citations reiteratively prop up the very truths of humanism and the dynamic of address it entails.

Normative citations, framing, and address are best seen as aspects of one constitutive function, and exposing and undermining how it currently works in education may allow for our universally shared precariousness as subjects to potentially have different implications, to be "countered" with less panic-like affect. As foreclosure and differentiation affect everyone, although in different ways, it is this sort of *function* of discourse I take aim at, and what a radical solidarity should be premised upon: our precariousness, and our implication in others' lives, in constitutive relations. It should be approached as a deeply concerning wide net of foreclosing effect, especially in the crowded fields of education, but also as a function that holds potential for openness.

I want to emphasize that this perspective does not take away from the serious trouble faced in many lives, but my particular concern with the problematic role of education and educational discourses in our societies, as well as an imagined potential, reaches beyond which bodies are, and are not, calling out in distress within the narratives of what is "real" in their lives. I do not think we can properly lessen this either though, without undermining its grounds, its driving

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[4] When I only write "self", I do so with quotation marks to indicate this is crucially a constitutive *event*, and a meaning cited that only seemingly *refers* to reality, but rather "produces" it. I write *self-constitute/ive* without quotation marks as they are *not* needed – inversely – for that same reason.

demand for meaning, and my preoccupation is with how this works and connects us all, fully. We address, read and make ourselves and each other through citing and embodying the unquestioned, the "neutral", the "given" of our contexts, as well as discourses loaded with explicit value, and thus my thesis pursues how this works in and as our paradigm of truth and being, instead of only certain effects. Can we imagine retaining the necessity of normativity in the very function of discourse, while deconstructing *how* and *to what end* such a function currently "operates" in and through education? I think we must look toward how education may do and be differently so that it is possible to realize this kind of implication in each other's lives, near and far, and what this may let us offer each other.

1.1 The initial idea

The thesis was initially inspired, or triggered, by Butler's *Giving an Account of Oneself* (2005). In this book she reiterates earlier work on subject formation, here too developing an interest dating back to the late 1980's. As in all of her earlier texts, such as *Gender Trouble* (1999 (1990)) or *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (1997b), any pre-discursive subject is time and again – albeit differently, and for different purposes – troubled and dismissed. Engaging with diverse philosophers such as Theodor Adorno, Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Adriana Cavarero and Emmanuel Levinas, Butler asks in *Giving an Account* what happens to ethics when a knowable, undivided "self" is destabilized. She thoroughly argues why it is *impossible* to give an account of oneself and tells us that what goes on when attempts are made, are rather self-constitutive responses, in a structure of address, to moral and normative demands.

From this she discusses the limitations and potentialities in contemporary ethical thought, saying that an impossibility of "self"-knowledge forms the very *basis* in her perspective on ethics, where impossible knowledge of the other stands at the center of ethical relations. She develops a concept of *ethical violence* that concerns the constitutive site of the "self" in a

structure of address because this where foreclosure in the constitution of others happens. On the other side of this, Butlerian *Responsibility*[5] to the other is equally situated in the structure of address, and is about responses that rather allow for constitutive *openness* – for the becoming of all involved as both temporary and incoherent.

With this exciting landscape in mind, and a keen interest in teacher education[6], I was inspired to turn my reading of *Giving an Account* toward three curricular demands/discourses in teacher education pedagogy, namely the discourses and practices of *reflection, educational psychology*[7], and *social justice education*[8]. Certainly, here in Norway, as in many other countries, these have for a long time saturated curriculum, research, and mandates and debates in and around teacher education.[9] This particular choice was inspired by the way they so very intimately, but also explicitly – for the sake of visibility here – rely on and ensure a knowing and knowable "self" and its other. I wanted to develop an inquiry that *starts* from how I see responses to these exemplary demands as affective self-constitution as teacher students[10].

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[5] Butler does not capitalize the R. I do so to differentiate and make a clearer argument; this thesis builds theory through emphasis on what I come to "gather" under an umbrella of educational *discourses of responsibility* – as a problem I try to engage with precisely through employing a Butlerian – and in ways I will get to also Derridean and Levinasian – ethics of openness as a Responsibility to the other/Other.

[6] The theoretical argument I pursue *applies* to pre-service teacher education for teaching in school, as well as early childhood; it is about how normativity works constitutively and the age bracket is irrelevant. Some of the writers I refer to have focused on the latter field of practice, but I happened to be inspired by demands I knew were toward teaching school and engage mostly via that, in written and spoken words – to make general points about educational address, and ethics.

[7] The term in use is "Elevkunnskap", which translates directly to "Knowledge of pupils", the term for the subject area based in educational psychology. You will notice this in the inserted parts of conversations with students. I translate to *pupil* to ensure a clear distinction from teacher *students*. All translations, unless otherwise specified, are my own.

[8] The English research/theory/practice term "social justice education" covers more, but as example of discourse/curriculum/program from Norway, the title of course units in pedagogy useful to mention is translatable to "Diversity in the classroom" (OsloMet, 2019a, 2019b; UiR, 2018). This is focused around notions of *diversity and inclusion,* which you will notice in the inserted parts of conversations with students.
      Whichever type of program, local/global focus, or age bracket; it will become apparent, in Chapter 2 especially, that the critical *ethical* argument applies regardless.

[9] Chapter 2 offers a brief consideration of these, historically and today, which includes some scholars' critiques, and my argument, on their premises and function.

[10] Outside any notion of a foundational subject, how to "refer to" is tricky, regarding constitution through citation of these discourses, in a theoretically consistent but also readable way. Theorizing professional education hardly simplifies this issue; the meaning/becoming of student and teacher overlap. I later consider this as a *temporal* issue, and an issue of connectivity and implicitness. In the first part of the thesis though, the focus is on these discourses as dominating *in* teacher education, and on conversations, and I choose to merely write *student*. I complicate the

'The knowledge of pupils' is about the pupils' conditions coming in! It is knowledge about the pupil, well what is *in* the pupil, what *they know* already, and everything else, including the personal. And about strategies for learning!

You have to know there are many factors there! In that pupil doing well or not, or how it behaves!

And as a teacher you are part of the pupils' conditions coming in! Because you represent something in relation to the pupil! So that is a condition, as a context!

Yes, because you have a way of being. And that will not be the best or most appropriate way of being for all pupils! And so you have to know, or think about this when you work with pupils. And look at oneself too. In one's role in influencing the pupil or not. [1]

An exchange uttered in conversation among teacher students [11]

1.2 Some sense of direction going forward

Based in this idea, and my interests in an approach to what drives and allows normative functions, I have written what is essentially a two-part thesis. The three curricular demands play an important role in the theorization of normativity, framing and address, but do not structure the rest of the thesis. Yet, they are the main point of entry and are discussed more fully in the whole next chapter. I choose to illustrate their status as cultural, political and institutional discourses by including a few historical and contemporary perspectives, and I also offer some very critical writings that have undermined and challenged the role these discourses play. I do this to be able to argue their centrality and givenness, to place myself in a field of well-established critiques, and most of all to emphasize an intimate connection between the curricular demands in terms of premises, and discuss how citation of these discourses imply a

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articulations later in the thesis, along with the way the argument increasingly emphasizes complexity and connectivity etc.

[11] The original Norwegian transcription of these and the other sentences that are formatted the same way in the many insertions throughout the thesis, can be found as an appendix of numbered endnotes.

shared constitutive function. Further readings of Butler's work at the end of this introduction, will provide a more thorough ground necessary to better narrate this interest and these implications.

> **Well, we have our subjective opinions, and… it is hard to be objective. We will not go into this profession, as blank sheets of paper! When it comes to inclusion! And the more we think about, and emphasize, both diversity and inclusion, the more we may perhaps learn techniques that make us more objective! Which will give the possibility to relate more objectively! [2]**

The first part of the thesis also considers why and how I had conversations with teacher students about these demands. I introduce Derrida's and Butler's overlapping but different perspectives on performative utterances in speech, writing, and politics, to develop an argument on how I choose to insert transcribed sentences, without "analyzing" them, to offer a juxtaposing layer within an inquiry on the very constitutive function I have argued that citing these discourses is an example of. There are also some considerations on the tension between established research ethics in social and educational sciences and my own theoretical perspective's radically different type of ethical consideration.

In Chapters 5 – 7, I mostly leave behind the three demands as an explicit concern, but those inserted utterances remain just as visible, as I pursue more closely how demands play out their framing function in a dynamic of address. To do this I interact with other scholars' work and extend previously engaged perspectives to allow the development of a new approach to what drives and allows normativity and the reiterated assumptions of a "self" in, and through, the interconnected fields of teacher education and schooling. I think the constitutive address, as powerful as it is, is still more unstable than we can even imagine, and it is necessary to expose its dependencies to move toward somehow less violent educational relations and consequences.

One aspect of both power and dependence is the particular role of temporal assumptions of linearity surrounding what teachers and education do, including their central role in progress; this reinforces the very subject thought to be foundational and knowing. With the help of Elizabeth Ellsworth (1997), I show how reflection, like dialogue, is a demand centered around the continuity of address itself, as necessary for a just society. Further, I find Butler's concept

of address insufficient to grasp the constitutive complexities that education involves, and reconsider this to encompass whatever a student or teacher body *reads* meaning in, including everything from established policy to textbooks, and implicit pupils: each demand a "self" that gives meaning to it, and so *is its others in terms of function*. Each event of constituting as a professional means responding to such varied others, and the vagueness, the overall incoherence of such a plurality of arriving demands further undermine linear influence and development.

To further rethink this unstable, complex dynamic, I engage with the work of Marg Sellers (2010). For her, meanings of early childhood curriculum and child *become* fully "together", simultaneously. A co-reading provides an interesting route, furthering conceptualizations from previous chapters, where I develop a view – a theoretical tension perhaps – between thinking milieu(s) of becoming as *curricular performativity*, and primary address with its normative demands. I come to call this *webs of address*. Sellers' work contributes with a concept of *connectivities* that are particular to becoming of subjects and other meanings, like curriculum, *becoming together,* uniquely in each moment, in and through education, while Butler's work lets us maintain the focus on the "self" and moral and normative demands, and what such a web-like dynamic may imply ethically. The way Sellers argues this also inspires my discussion of the idea that contemporary education centrally ensures performativity of not only specific curricular demands, but much more widely *the curriculum of humanism*.

After building this argument, which interconnects the "becoming" of so many aspects of meaning, I return to read it in relation to the becoming of teachers. Here I draw on Ernesto Laclau (1996) to consider how indeterminable effects of citation across webs of address can still be seen to work for plural bodies as recognizably the same. In his words, we should see it as happening in an unwilled but affective reiterative "negotiation" of an impossible, but paradoxically powerful, community. *All* citation – however varied, vague or "neutral" – that leans on being and knowing, performs a humanist curriculum, and maintains the "self" – the center of violence. Yet, a vast community of those who through citations continuously negotiate the meaning of *teacher*, as they also demand the becoming of pupils, is particularly problematic.

I suggest that *responsible* is the most comprehensive, or over-arching, meaning of teacher today; would say all normative demands fit under this umbrella, including those so visible in this thesis. Within Butler's perspective on morality (2005) this is a particularly strong and problematic demand due to how accountability as a "self" is not just a norm but a *relation* that is a premise of the humanist subject. Finally, on the other side of affective becoming as a responsible "self", is the *crisis* it entails to *lose* that "self". With inspiration from the arguments of Cristina Delgado Vintimilla (2012) and Lisa Taylor (2012), I believe the field of teacher education must seek out facilitating such crises among students, seek their realization of universal precariousness as subjects, and of the framing of people inside and outside education that teachers are so heavily implicated in. A pedagogy that is Responsible may entail a shared crisis that in indeterminable ways work to upset, and undermine, both singular and collective coherence and violence, in a negotiated refusal of demands for responsible teachers.

1.3 The problematic "self", with its constitution of others

Before I am able to more properly argue the significance of my focus on the three teacher education demands in the next chapter, and narrate their shared function, a further reading of Butler's work on normativity, subject constitution and ethics in *Giving an Account* (2005) and *Frames of War* (2009) is needed. I expand on the brief points I made in the initial pages to explain the theoretical position behind the choices I make, but the section serves a dual purpose as it also lays the groundwork for how I later go on to expand on Butler's conceptualizations.

Butler opens the critique of the moral "self" of moral philosophy in *Giving an Account*, by denying Theodor Adorno's point in his lecture ´Problems of Moral Philosophy´: that it is "obvious … that all ideas of morality or ethical behavior must relate to an "I" that acts" (Adorno 1963, in Butler 2005, p. 7). Butler begins her inquiry from the ability to answer questions of morality such as *what have I done,* and *what should I do?* These can only be answered, she holds, by asking another question first: who is this "I" who is obliged to give an account of

myself and to act in particular ways? Answering this, she insists, necessarily involves telling the social conditions of my formation, and as such her considerations of ethics are arguably within social theory.

Butler maintains, drawing on Foucault, that Adorno failed to consider "the very operation of norms in the very constitution of the subject, in the stylization of its ontology, and in the establishing of a legitimate site within the realm of social ontology" (p. 9). In responding to moral and normative demands, as a coherent, accountable "I" or "self", what goes on is rather a *self-constitution* – an "instituting [of] a narrative 'I'" (p. 39). In Butler's words, there "is no 'I' that can stand fully apart from the social conditions of its emergence" (p. 7). Normative discourses are always *prior to,* and necessary in the ensuring of, the becoming of any subject *at all*. Holding up this argument, as I have said, is her perspective on the temporal aspect of citation, drawing on Derrida's work; the constituted effect is only possible, or only becomes "reality", *in* each moment, and the subject can never "arrive" as any lasting "I". The interpellated responses to moral and normative demands, in this case in teacher education, to do, be and know in professional ways, are always different, functioning *as sites* of becoming, in citational chains. In this sense we can say that rather than there being an "I" that can know and be known, any notion of a coherent, lasting "self" is impossible. Importantly though, for Butler, this failure to "be" the ethical subject in Adorno's sense, is simultaneously the very *condition* for the subject to temporarily be; it is the function of an aporetic condition, of simultaneous possibility and impossibility.

> **Well, I think that pupils come in with different experiences and knowledge, and it's important to be open to the reflections they offer too! Be open to receive what they have to say! And encourage them to be able to… stand up for what they are saying! And teach them to be reflective! [3]**

In an interrelated thesis on *primary* conditions *to* normative demands even functioning, Butler tells us that not only can the "I" not stand apart from the normative demands, but the site of the "self" happens in "interlocutory conditions" (p. 14) as "I" am "prompted to address myself to the one who addresses me" (p. 15). Primarily with Levinas, she invites us to think about how, as a *function* of being addressed by an Other, the responses to normative demands "institute[e] a narrative 'I'" (p. 39); being addressed, she says, is "the region of existence that is radically

unwilled, the primary, inaugurating impingement on me by the Other, one that happens to me, paradoxically, in advance of my formation as a 'me'" (p. 85). I necessarily give an account *to* someone, she tells us, "real or imaginary (…) No account takes place outside the structure of address, even if the addressee remains implicit and unnamed, anonymous and unspecified" (p. 36). This means we can only know ourselves, and only "be", in relation to a normative world *and* relationality – that primary structure of address. Both precede us and shape us in such complex ways we have no way of even grasping it, making us – at least partially – opaque to ourselves. We could say, with Neil Easterbrook (2008) that for Butler the *alterity* the structure of address entails, is a "dislocation of singular subjectivity into reciprocal otherness" (p. 245).

Accordingly, responding to Butler's invitation, I argue that self-constitution as student or teacher, with mandated reflective competence, and with knowledge and values "about*"* others, is inseparable not only from those demands, but even more than that from the relation to its other(s), because the structure of address always *supersedes* any normative narrative structure an account is offered in. The "I" that these meanings – which signify *professional* – attach themselves onto, "cannot even begin to refer to itself outside the relation to the other by which its capacity for self-reference emerges" (p. 82).

1.3.1 How can there be an ethics without a "self"?

Returning to the question of the moral "self", understanding that we as subjects are opaque to ourselves, the central question Butler pursues in *Giving an Account* is whether, or how, there can be an ethics without a "self"? And if so, what might that look like? With her idea that the "self" only becomes temporarily in a relational structure of address, Butler opens up for foundationally challenging any views on ethics dependent on an undivided subject; the doubly imposed inability to give an account of oneself – to know oneself – is key to Butler's relational conception of it. Engaging with a relationality that conditions and blinds the "self" actually implies a *resource* for "an ethics based in our shared, invariable blindness about ourselves"

(2005, p. 41). This apparent "failure" to cohere as a "self" outside of such formation rather "gives rise to another ethical disposition (…) a possibility for acknowledging a relationality that binds me more deeply to language and to you than I previously knew" (p. 40). The relational structure of address means that in addressing myself *as* being addressed by an other, "I" am necessarily addressing and constituting "it" *as* other in the same moment. Thus, what is *at stake* in ethics is not only what kind of "self" may become in normative discourses, as Foucault tells us, but also the implicit constitutive relation of the "self" to the other. It is this constitutive relation that informs what I see as the problem with the three curricular demands, which in certain concentrated ways are "gluing together" constitutive necessitations of not only the "self" but also the other.

Importantly, for my purposes here, being "impinged upon" in an encounter with the other, "separates the claim of responsibility from the possibility of agency, [and] responsibility emerges as a *consequence* of being subject to the unwilled address of the other" (p. 85, *my italics*). This type of ethics is never, and cannot be, about willed, im/moral acts – it is about how the "I", constrained in normative discourse and relationality, delimits the lives of others. "My" vulnerability gives rise to Responsibility to the other because of the other's equally vulnerable space in the structure. In other words, this *impossibility* of an undivided subject is not only *not* a problem for ethics, as Adorno insisted it was, it is actually the foundation for ethics – for *Responsibility* to the becoming of the other.

Part of Butler's argument on ethics is about a constitutive force of *morality*, in the sense of a *relation* prior to any constitution, a relation that demands – ensures – a subject that is accountable for itself *as* a "self". Butler reappropriates Adorno's term "ethical violence", a term he uses to argue how a collective ethos "impos[es] its violence in the form of an exclusionary foreclosure" (pp. 6 - 7). This, she writes, is about oppressive relations the subject has to morality, while she considers "the force of morality in the production of the subject" (p. 10). As a basic function of constitutive address, morality, as accountability, is ironically where ethical violence happens for her, in a very fundamental foreclosure of openness – of Responsibility. She connects this argument to the work of Adriana Cavarero (2000), referring to her focus on how the question "*Who are you?*" (Butler, 2005, p. 43) is ethically primary; it should on the topic of ethics be *the* primary question, one starting with the other, never with a

"self". This is because, and to the extent, Butler writes, the question cannot ever be answered adequately.

The illusory "self", the givenness of it, hinders our ability to question the terms of recognition through which we address the other and expect to know them as "self"-same and coherent. A "self" can neither *be,* nor be *known*, and logically neither can the other. This is at the center of ethical relations, where *any* forced constitution of an other is a form of imprisonment, of foreclosure of becoming rather in *unknowability*. We may even say that both implicit and explicit insinuations of coherent self-accounts necessarily involve constitutive violence in breaking with the primary ethical relation to the unknowable other (p. 63). And here we have, in my reading, Butler's most exciting and radical perspective on Responsibility. It lies in the response to the demand that we account for ourselves, that we respond as an "I", because at the site of the constitution of "me" Responsibility is directed at the site of the becoming of the "you".

This argument is for me compelling in general but finds special urgency in the practice of teaching with its hordes of others, whether inside or outside the classroom, all conventionally taken to be *known* and *related to* by the teacher. It would seem Responsibility is foreclosed in *many* simultaneous directions in each moment. With this thesis, I stand with Butler's insistence that engaging with an awareness of such violence, in whichever field or part of society, is an ethical stance that fundamentally undermines a common, problematic ethics of accountability premised on the possibility and necessity of the narrativizable "self" (p. 79).

1.3.2 Education as a *framing* field

The consideration of subjects, address and ethics in Butler's *Frames of War* (2009), written with quite a different focus than *Giving an Account*, offers an added perspective for theorizing

education. The concept of *framing* has clear political relevance, and she contends that in order to make broad social and political claims about lives, power and ethics, "we will first have to be supported by a new bodily ontology, one that implies the rethinking of precariousness, vulnerability … interdependency, exposure … and the claims of language and social belonging" (p. 2). Yet, she adds, this does not describe anything fundamental or outside sociality, as "[t]he 'being' of the body to which this (social) ontology refers is one that is always given over to others, to norms." (p. 2). Norms govern acts of recognition, Butler reminds us, but recognition is also regulated in interpretive *frames,* norms of recognizability, which are rather general conditions in which recognition can, and sometimes does, take place, but not used in the sense of the potential of singular people. Behind norms and frames, a knowing and knowable subject occupies center stage of a sturdy, humanist intelligibility, a historically situated schema "that establish domains of the knowable" (p. 6); this is what currently "conditions and reproduces norms of recognizability" (p. 7).

Butler considers implications of media coverage "describing" people in war and conflict. For her the focus is on what is framed – recognizable – as *a life* at all, one that is grievable, and on the differentiated degrees of, or full exclusion from, this. Such frames, she insists "are themselves operations of power. [They] do not in themselves unilaterally decide the conditions of appearance but their aim is nevertheless to delimit the sphere of appearance itself" (p. 1).

Her concern is to thematize how powerful this media address is, in what we should see as "… cultural modes of regulating affective and ethical dispositions through a selective and differential framing" (p. 1). She argues though a two-dimensional conceptualization of the social ontology: *precariousness* refers to dependence on others, in subject formation, which is inseparable from *precarity*, a "concrete" differential that refers to how "precisely because each body finds itself potentially threatened by others who are, by definition, precarious as well, forms of domination follow" (p. 31). Precariousness is compensated for, she explains, through othering, depending on un/available discourse (frames and norms), also by legal, political and social means, with hierarchization and social inequality, locally and globally; precarization is the legitimization and normalization of such differential precarity. What accounts for the differential, othering responses, Butler adds, is described with use of the term *affect,* a sort of

force in the structure of address that works to ensure subject coherence and continuity; there must be othering to be a coherent, undivided subject.

My engagement with Butler on this issue exchanges media for education and reappropriates the term framing to mean how self-constitution involves differentiation of others *as such*, along whichever axes, *including* what a grievable life is. An important direction Butler inspires here, which I pursue later in the thesis, is a differently imagined dynamic and effect of address than in *Giving an Account.* Perhaps we should think of it more as a plurality of address, in ways that include material consequences, both large and small. I lean heavily on both of these articulations in order to think of education this way, where the same principle of violence and Responsibility, is relevant across that what is imaginable as intimate, direct, massive, distant or implicit in a dynamic of address. Framing implies that the precariousness of the subject, whether student, teacher or pupil, is in various ways segmented and striated as, or into, conditions of precarity for both singular and groups of bodies, bodies involved or implied both within educational contexts and in society at large. In other words, Butler's added political emphasis, which I take with me into education, is this "double" threat: all bodies are vulnerable to ethical violence, to othering, but the vulnerability comes to imply different things for different bodies and lives.

We have a mandate on behalf of society, you know! Focus on diversity is important! We are the ones who hold much of the responsibility for the next generation in society! We are supposed to create a future society of people who are tolerant, and who are curious, and who respect a person where that person is, and, in a way, try to adjust to that person!

Yes, and it's important for us, and for them, that we have good knowledge about the diversity we are going to encounter, so we can avoid stepping on other people's feelings – there could be something that is very important to others. For you to be able to meet that person where it is, it is necessary that you don't step on something that then turns out wrong! I feel that it's often ignorance that creates conflict! And fear, even more so!

But I think it is… also as teachers, important that we can *use* that diversity. How can I use it in the classroom?

Well if you for example have pupils with background in Somalia, or… that you have a big project where you or they present the different cultures… yes that is a way of presenting the unknown! Yes, to take in diversity that way!

Yes, but it can be tricky to pull the pupils into it too – and I have probably been very influenced to be careful and everything, but I am thinking – does that contribute to alienate them?

Put them on a stage, like something other, something to learn about…

It shouldn't be uncomfortable if you have created good relations! Created a safe space to *be* that diversity in the classroom! And how else are they going to learn, if you're going to go around being afraid all the time? You can't! you won't reach them!

And if you let it or make it be invisible… well, you have to be able to present a diversity somehow!? They're supposed to become the educated (Bildung!) person, and so they *have* to encounter this stuff! Because it is part of life – they are entering a society that will demand quite a lot from them![4]

The readings I have offered from Butler's work in these pages lay the groundwork for the next chapter which considers the powerful and troubling function of normativity yielded in and through the three curricular demands introduced earlier. In addition to establishing a terminology on subject constitution and ethics, I have invited you to imagine all responses to demands such as those three as having a shared framing function, precisely insisting forth that coherent, other-differentiating "self". This section may also have given the reader a sense of the direction of the thesis; as I have said, I will in the second part of the thesis explore how the ways of normativity, address and framing *in and as* education are better characterized by even more complex conditions of indirectness and plurality than what this reading of Butler currently offers. I do see violence and framing effects, but that it goes on in more dynamic patterns of reiterated othering, which in turn points us toward new perspectives on trouble *and* potential.

2.   Three curricular demands – one violent function

In this chapter, the discourses of educational psychology, reflection and social justice education play the main role in the narrative and illustration of normative demands, culturally, politically and institutionally, historically and today. I also bring in work from a field of critique more or less relatable to my own; various scholarship examines how these discourses function and have ethically troubling consequences, as part of a landscape of premises and conditions. Some scholars focus on one of the discourses, but several on how two or three of these function in intimately related ways. Some of the literature I have chosen to focus on is based in research on curriculum or practice, but most only engage with theory. Sometimes I only acknowledge concerns briefly, while in other cases I offer more thorough readings. The limited selection is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, coming from a large pool of texts on partially overlapping critical projects, but includes some much-cited scholars in each area. My aim is not to challenge, or to say I build from a particular scholar or body of work. It is to place my project in the context

of established concerns, and create a space for my argument on how these three discourses are working together in normative and framing ways as a function of address.

With this focus on their premising intelligibility and the dynamic they function as part of, I must mention that these three demands are not the only ones playing similar roles in and through teacher education, but my aim is not to write on problematic demands there in any exhaustive way[12]. They together have that perfectly illustrative, and perhaps provoking, in quite simplified terms, givenness on commonsensical sociological and psychological knowledge of the individual, the knowledge of groups, and the responsible practice of reflection.

Again, the contribution of this project is not to say *that* these demands are troubling; when I make that initial leap from Butler's take on the "self", relationality and an ethics of the other, to say these demands function within troublesome ontological and epistemological paradigms of thought and consequence, I certainly, as I will show in the coming pages, do not claim to be the first along similar lines. Still, I argue that the way I engage in further inquiry about these premises, as it is reiterated in the dynamic of address in and through education, offers an innovative route not yet pursued in that literature – on aspects I believe I can help bring to light.

Woven throughout this section are some references to Norwegian research, and other local (policy and curricular) text of demanded teacher knowledge, competence and values. All three curricular demands are *most formally* involved, in textbooks and program structure, in one foundational course called "Pedagogy and knowledge of pupils", in both programs[13]. These local articulations are not here to point to anything special about this situation, system or

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[12] For one, in the early phase, I considered involving also what is formalized as principles of *professional ethics,* but found that I do not need this in order to discuss how teacher education makes im/possible *being* in education and society. That discourse is certainly also premised on this ontoepistemology and the role of responsible teacher, but I found the foci of the other three to be sufficient, but also preferable, to be able to develop that argument on *address,* in Chapters 5 - 7, in ways I imagine.

[13] In Norway, elementary school is grades 1-7, and junior high school is grades 8-10. Yet, the nationally regulated teacher education is offered, at most colleges and some universities, in two versions of five-year programs not quite equivalent to that division: for teaching grades 1-7, and for teaching grades 5-10. When I started this project, these were four-year programs; it was adapted to a model with Bachelor and Master degrees in 2017, but one needs both degrees to be certified as teacher. It makes up 60 out of 300 total credits in the teacher education programs, both for those who will teach grades 5-10, and those who will teach grades 1-7 (OsloMet, 2019a, 2019b).

language, to "analyze", or to compare it to another context. The argument I am developing attempts to say something about what education does, *wherever it does so*, in terms of a contemporary humanist intelligibility with social/political and ethical implications, and how to think and approach this in new ways.

The reason then for making this local situation visible, is rather for the sake of affecting your reading. It is to contextualize an important effect you have encountered already, the bits of conversations, recorded locally, in teacher education, inserted as a performative aspect of this philosophical project, an aspect I discuss thoroughly through chapters 3 and 4. In other words, in total, the idea of moving closer not only to *these* three discourses, but partly in *this* one local system, and with several ways of showing how they may be mandated, written or spoken here, is to assist in a philosophical argument on normative demands, citationality, address and framing in and through education.

2.1 "Knowledge of pupils" as problematic assumption

"Knowledge of pupils" is the name of a subject area *within* the foundational course mentioned, mostly presenting research and theory on learning and development from educational psychology. There are separate chapters in the main course textbooks I have looked at[14], and separate lesson units, but of course psychological concepts like *development* and *learning styles* are also used elsewhere alongside text about children and youth in more sociological terms, in the course and program.

> **It's just, like, knowledge *about* the pupil, that has to do with how the pupil learns, how it functions socially. And in a group! But, yeah, it's just everything you can know about a pupil! About a child!**

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[14] (Lillejord, Manger, & Nordahl, 2010; Manger, Lillejord, Nordahl, & Helland, 2009)

Yeah! And it's vital to be a good teacher! It simply is! To have knowledge of pupils! If you don't have it, you have no way of being a good teacher, in my opinion![5]

I reiterate that the presumption of the possibility of even having knowledge about pupils, both singular and plural, as one's other(s), is key in this being one of the discourses considered here. In addition to ensuring you are reminded that these demands play key roles in this professional education, the very most important reason for the upcoming pages, and this goes for all three discourses, is to establish each as working intimately, as one, with the two others. In other words, it is not particularly important to go much into either nuances or this local situation regarding psychology, but please take the term "knowledge of pupils" with you, as a useful reminder about the descriptive and explanatory epistemological function this smorgasbord of research and theory purports to serve in teacher education, both in Norway and abroad, just by being there as given and mandatory[15].

This section acknowledges a few pieces of writing that critically engage psychology in education, including how it may be seen to interact with sociological discourses. I found it appropriate to open with a text that questions the curricular place of psychology – how a demand for it is even *in* teacher education. As for the following two critical texts I briefly consider, they are written in the field of early childhood teacher education; I find such approaches to developmental psychology in particular more common there, as opposed to what concerns grades 1-10, and, as I come back to, the *principle* of the argument holds regardless of age brackets.

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[15] See for example (Fendler, 2012a)

2.1.1 Psychology in teacher education – Why?

Lynn Fendler makes a basic point, in "Psychology in teacher education: Efficacy, professionalization, management, and habit" (2012b), when she critically asks, in her United States context, why and how psychology, as a field of truths, is so deeply ingrained in teacher education. First, she says, this question is appropriate because there is "no research that substantiates – one way or another – the impact of psychology in teacher education" (p. 54). So, she asks, if there is no real reason to think it *works* for anything, why does it conceivably still have a dominant role in teacher education?

Fendler tells the story of how a few psychologists played central roles in developing – indeed defining – the field of teacher education, internationally, starting in the 1890's, through establishing and publishing psychologically founded journals and teacher education textbooks. Then she approaches how the above question is answered today by people in the fields of teacher education and the sub-field of psychology called educational psychology. She proposes four possible narratives that people in either field may lean on to legitimize or explain psychology's given role in teacher education: *efficacy* (better teachers), *professionalization* (status raised by affiliation), *policy/management* (psychology's "research renders the unruly practices of teaching more predictable, rational and manageable" [p. 54] and gives teacher education a voice in policy making), and plain *habit*.

One of the things Fendler finds is that there is *no* questioning or critique of psychology as a necessary knowledge-base *in* the practicing field of teacher education. On the other hand, she can offer us an example of it being seen by some in the field of educational psychology as misguidedly placed. Peterson, Clark and Dickson, as early as in 1990 argue, in her words, that their field should "no longer be considered in terms of a required course for prospective teachers to study, but rather (…) form the intellectual and practical basis for the design of the entire teacher education curriculum" (Fendler, 2012, p. 55). The enormous interdisciplinary and professional restructuring this would entail in a tradition-based institution in society, mandated to maintain cultural truths and values through knowledge-based education and practice – is of course not a matter of simple or quick changes. 29 years later, educational psychology is

certainly still a central part of curricula in teacher education, both the programs preparing for work in schooling as well as that preparing for early childhood education.

> **I have always thought that much of what is in those theories and textbooks, on the psychology and basically sort of knowledge about the pupils, that… is obvious knowledge! It is how you yourself think!**
>
> **Yeah, but it can give you a basis for reflection! Because it's a lot of logical thinking! And then you can see if you agree or not, or partially! And have something to hang your reflections on!**
>
> **But there are things that appear there, that you may not have considered! That gives you deeper insight, and that you might use in your own ways! I find that some of what we've learned here is using the knowledge we have acquired – in our own way!**
>
> **C: Are you encouraged to do that?**
>
> **No, well… It is how we all think, I believe. There are some good points that we like – and then one almost makes one's own theory! But I haven't felt encouraged to do that, no.**
>
> **I don't think the institution has been good at showing us how to use it at all!**
>
> **I feel it's easier to accept the theories if you can just make it yours, have the freedom to use things the way you want! Because we're not the same as teachers, and we're not going to be either!**
>
> **We're not going to act natural if we go around thinking "oh… now Bruner would have thought that…"**
>
> **But we have them with us, in us, and I think that when you are with the child you will see what works, or what may work a little from each theory…?! [6]**

Based in what scholars and professional in the two fields express, Fendler has to discard all four proposed narratives of efficacy, professionalization, policy/management and habit. She comments that the maintenance of the centrality of psychology, even in contemporary times, can almost be likened to a *belief in magic*, a belief that is "expressed in conduct when we persist in doing something even when we have never been presented with any evidence that our actions will produce the effects we want" (p. 63). We could perhaps assume she uses this image of old-fashioned and irrational thinking to illustrate just how baseless and "gullible" it is, for the many people involved to *not* question this demand.

However, Fendler's larger, more serious summary argument holds that once firmly established, given truths, defining what a teacher must "obviously*"* know to become a teacher, are extremely resilient because of how powerfully the iterability of discourse itself involves (relative)

reproduction. The curricular place of psychology, she tells us, is based on systems of meaning holding all those positively loaded notions of possible knowledge, insight, rationality and responsible choices in pedagogical relations. Yet this "applied" field of knowledge has a vague, often even meaningless, function; the attachment to the loaded notions in the definition of professional is what safeguards the curricular place. Psychology in teacher education does little of what it may be assumed to do, Fendler writes, but does plenty to problematically reproduce the status quo in society by maintaining widespread beliefs about how and what children and youth can be – how they can think, identify, learn, do and know.

2.1.2 Essentialist and constructivist truths – foreclosing children's relations

One writer who has focused on normative views on "the child" among early childhood educators, and connected epistemological, ontological and ethical issues as one, is Gaile Cannella. In both *Deconstructing Early Childhood Education* (1997), and "The scientific discourse of education: Predetermining the lives of others" (2000), she argues precisely how essentialist psychological truths about child development, *and* constructivist sociological focus on "normal", "deviant" or "different" in other ways, heavily affect – constitutively – how children are unable to see and relate to the world, their *others*, as more multifaceted, changing and complex. She connects many considerations of how "multiple value structures, knowledges, and views of the world are denied" (1997, p. 159), and holds that teachers being fed mixes of essentialist and constructivist truths in their professional education and development, foreclose children's views of their others, limit children's lives, and their possibilities for socially just orientations.

2.1.3 Developmentality and social justice values hand in hand

In "An 'Ethics of resistance'…" (2008), Hillevi Lenz-Taguchi, writing in a Swedish context, offers another illustrative, timely critique on curricular and political demands in the practicing field of early childhood and its teacher education. She challenges the role of developmental psychology specifically, as an essentialist idea of children's "naturalness" and "truths" about children's development and learning achievable through developmentally appropriate practices, and argues how it works alongside central assumptions in a Nordic notion of a good childhood. She insists developmental psychology is problematically connected to an overall normalization process, together demanding from students an aim to "socialize" every "naturally developing" child into holding "Swedish" values of "egalitarianism, democracy, freedom, cooperation and solidarity" (p. 271). Lenz-Taguchi finds it deeply troubling how such a "developmentality", also in recent years of increasing population diversity, has "been used continuously as inspiration for new ways of normalizing children and families. The aims have been to reduce differences and complexities among them and to bring them into mainstream Swedish society" (p. 271). To most in the Swedish academic and professional field of education, she claims, the taken-for-granted role, the familiarity of these values, and this mix of essentialist developmentality and an emphasis on of "socialization", connected with a normative, *socially just* ethics, makes them "just seem 'right', 'best' and 'ethical'" (p. 271).

We can certainly say that this argument is relevant outside of its Swedish context of moral and normative demands. I would say it is one of several ways a mix of psychological and sociological constructivist assumptions, in culturally naturalized scientific discourses and alongside political aims, can "allow", constitutively, both what children "are" and what good, social justice-oriented culture "is".

Lenz-Taguchi's and Cannella's work dovetails with my concerns about the legitimizing citation of psychological discourse connecting to politics, ethics and justice; sets of truths that are sometimes, at least on the surface, built on conflicting directions of how to describe and explain people and society, here add to each other's strength, as framing, to necessitate other-differentiating "selves".

2.2 The discourses of reflection

The extensive (re-)introduction of a focus on reflection, a "reflective turn" (Schön (Ed), 1991), in teacher education and education in the 1980s and 1990s, was part of a larger movement internationally in many professions, most of all inspired by Donald Schön's 1983 book *The Reflective Practitioner* (2017 (1983)). The drive behind this was a reaction to what he saw as a deeply problematic perspective on professionals as ones who just executed what others had decided for them, referred to as a technical rationality. In education, the perspective on teachers and teaching had for decades been dominated by the scientific truths and strategies of behaviorism, but for Schön a scientific approach to developing professionals cannot work, because a professional context is too full of complexity, uncertainty, uniqueness, and value conflicts. The emphasis Schön set in motion was for professionals to learn through ongoing reflection *in and on* their practice, including self-reflection to become aware of and criticize assumptions and values so that alternative experiences and actions are more available. The process was envisioned as one where students and professionals autonomously assess situations, redefine problems, and exercise professional judgement fully based in a different type of knowledge, developed through practice, to decide anew what should be done; it was also necessarily seen as subjective and imprecise (Schön, 2017 (1983)).

No, but it comes a bit more naturally, because you get so used to talking during those reflection hours! You get used to it, and afterwards you may be sitting in those groups, and… talking… and sometimes there is just natural dialogue, about many things. It depends a bit… if you have a group dynamic that doesn't work it will become a bit forced… I feel for my part that… when I am on the train home, I will sit and think about the day, and… one can't avoid it!

Yes, one thinks even when one doesn't talk to anyone, you know! One sits and thinks and reflects and considers…

I usually think about which pupils I haven't talked with much, enough… In the reflection. For my own part, you know, quietly alone. If I have a guilty conscience about anything. [7]

In 1994, Keneth Zeichner tells us, critically, how reflective practice in education has become a worldwide slogan, and that "everyone, no matter what his or her ideological orientation, has jumped on the bandwagon" (Zeichner, 1994, in Gillies, 2016, p. 148). To this day, in its many forms, this discourse is still "everywhere", playing a particular role in terms of how it is, or at least should be, in the words of Norwegian teacher educator Torunn Klemp, "an integrating element in teacher education" (2013, p. 51), in how to attain, (re-)consider and develop the practices, knowledges and values that are demanded in the education and in the profession.

As for the ideological variation Zeichner points out, it is important to remember how views about reflection have historically, according to many who research this topic specifically[16], been based in many contradictory premises and aims – from long before Schön – and are still today, within education and in other fields. This for example goes for the relation between theory and practice, perspectives on morality, rationality and consciousness, focus on self-improvement, and reflective practices' believed role/potential toward social change. In Fendler's "Teacher reflection in a hall of mirrors" (2003), she engages Foucaultian genealogy in exploring the concept and practice of reflection in teacher education; she investigates central influences in the concept's history, most centrally how it is tied up in Cartesian rationality, the canonizing of John Dewey's aim to achieve social betterment through individual reflection and judgment, the impact of Schön's professionalism, and cultural feminists' influence in terms of opposing "masculinist" expert knowledge with an emphasis on "introspective sources of knowledge" and access to an "authentic" and "trustworthy" "self".

Fendler considers present circulation of the concept thoroughly *ahistorical*, saying that uncritical or imprecise mixing from more or less contradictory historical and contemporary theoretical resources, is typical for today's field of teacher education. Monika Nerland (2006) argues the same about the Norwegian context, that the focus is based in nothing but a patchwork of historical and contemporary meanings, and further that it is very imprecise *in use* among students and educators. In fact, Klemp (2013) writes that now "in teaching we [just] use the concept figuratively about 'to think': 'A thought, idea, or opinion formed or a remark made as a result of meditation. (…) Consideration of some subject matter, idea, or purpose.'" (p. 43).

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[16] See for example: (Fendler, 2003; Gillies, 2016; Klemp, 2013; Nerland, 2006; Ottesen, 2007; Russell, 2013; K. Zeichner, 1996; K. M. Zeichner & Tabachnick, 2001)

It is very limiting that it is so steered by the teachers! They are the ones who decide if they want to have it! Yes, and how the reflection is supposed to happen!

And almost what the correct answer is!

Yes! Because we have experienced in the classroom that someone has tried to say something, to offer their reflections, and they have been picked on, because that's not how it's supposed to be done!

But I can't remember being taught how I'm supposed to do it. [8]

Tom Russell (2013) maintains that how Schön's reflective practices *should* be engaged with has great potential, but points to the problem that in our current situation the tendency in effect is just resting on one's laurels by *calling* one's own or one's institutions' practices reflective – which "may be doing more harm than good" (p. 87). The current extent of practices, without clear meaning and aim, Russell holds, only further reproduces problematic conventions of teaching. On a connected note about unclear meaning, Donald Gillies (2016) comments that "the risk [is] that it becomes a cursory, ill-informed exercise in self-affirmation rather than a central pillar of professional life" (p. 148).

Reflection for me is talking about what you have experienced, and thinking about what has happened. Why did it happen? Getting more points of view. What could I have done differently?

Yeah, and you become safer, more comfortable… you don't put as much pressure on yourself all the time! Because you can do things that you regret and are thinking you should have done differently! But the reflection makes you take experiences and learn from them!

Yes, it's actually a relief...! You become more relaxed! And it's okay to make mistakes! You can just learn from it!

Yes, and not take it so personally! Because you look at yourself more like an object! Or the teacher role more like an object. With regard to getting some distance from yourself. Because you understand and look at yourself from the outside!

I think it simply creates openness! You get more relaxed, because it becomes so… free![9]

Zeichner also argues that there are several ways "the concept of reflection has been employed in pre-service teacher education that undermine the expressed emancipatory intent of teacher

educators" (1996, p. 202). One is a common institutional demand to focus on, and, in effect, replicating what research says are practices that work. Another is allowing disregard for the influential context outside the classroom, and a third is lack of facilitation of reflection with others. The fourth is how *the ways* of teaching are almost exclusively in focus, to the detriment of moral or ethical *implications* of teaching. Similar to Russell and Gillies, Zeichner (1996) holds that the consequence of this combination of problematic interpretations and practices is that it maintains an *illusion* of positive teacher development and autonomy, making it harder to "redirect" this detrimental situation toward potentially better practices. He departs radically from Schön's ideal reflection on and in practice, when he says that for him to see reflective practices as conducive to professional development, the *only* focus reflection should have, is on moral and ethical implications of education, and, as such, ways the teacher(s) can contribute in the important struggles for greater social justice (Zeichner, 1996, p. 206).

A field of research and theory that advocates the focus Zeichner argues, has grown from the 1990s onward. Writers variously critique or dismiss what they may call "powerless", "shallow" or "uncritical" practices of reflection and argue for more emphasis on social justice. Another focus and perspective by many who call for better social justice work in education, or perhaps calling it multicultural- or diversity pedagogy[17], is to insist that it needs, or even implies, more complex, "deeper", or perhaps "core" reflection, or versions of "self-reflection"[18], to assess and challenge one's prejudices. *Critical reflection* seems the most widely used term to *connect* the discourses, the demands, for reflection and justice education. In Australia it is a strong tendency, Russell wrote in 2013, that "virtually every website for a teacher education program seems to mention the importance of becoming a critically reflective teacher" (2013, p. 81). According to him, the importance of critical reflection is generally attributed to Schön's 1983 book, but "Schön did not use the word critical, which seems to have been added when the word reflection alone did not produce the desired results" (Russell, 2013, p. 85). As the term was made necessary by scholars in education, it was increasingly also emphasized in the political, institutional and curricular formulations. Critical reflection became increasingly mainstream; as a demand to students it was a stronger "slogan", connecting meanings of practice, politics

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[17] For example: (Askeland, 2006; Søndenå, 2004; Yost, Sentner, & Forlenza-Bailey, 2000)

[18] For example: (Agarwal, Epstein, Oppenheim, Oyler, & Sonu, 2010; Gay, 2010; Gay & Kirkland, 2003; Hoffman-Kipp, Artiles, & Lopez-Torres, 2003; Larsen, 2009; Santoro, 2009; Thomassen, 2016).

and ethics. In the immense educational field though, this too necessarily came to hold varied, and more or less apolitical, meanings and potency.

In Norway too, it is quite visible in main pedagogy textbooks[19] and in policy documents[20] that reflection is (or should be) a given part of teacher education and of teaching, in general[21]. It is often written in close proximity to words like diversity, inclusion, prejudice or discrimination, but this focus is only sometimes *called* critical reflection. It seems both terms are used widely in writing, and almost interchangeably "cover" the range of vague content, practices, or aims of reflection.

> **C: Can we connect it to the topics we've talked about? Are there times you're supposed to reflect on issues of diversity for example?**
>
> **I can't remember having reflected much on that, no. but like when we are discussing pedagogical issues, there might be a question where you *also* bring up something about diversity… whether it's disability, or about a pupil with two mothers. [10]**

2.2.1 Powerful reflection

According to Kari Søndenå's research and comment to this "critical" development, referred to in *Powerful reflection in teacher education[22]* (2004)*,* the grasp and use of the term reflection in Norway is not only excessively vague, it is almost exclusively on pedagogical practice, regardless of being called critical; it is rather *uncritical* reflection, she writes, that saturates local teacher education. As an alternative, she proposes a "powerful reflection" on previously thought

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[19] For example: "Life in school 1" (Manger et al., 2009) and "Life in school 2" (Lillejord et al., 2010)

[20] "Core curriculum for primary, secondary and adult education in Norway" (Education, 2006). (New version comes in 2020)

[21] For example: (Klemp, 2013; Mordal-Moen & Green, 2014; Nerland, 2006; Ottesen, 2007; Søndenå, 2004; Æsøy, 2016).

[22] Norwegian title: *Kraftfull refleksjon i lærerutdanningen*

thoughts about the self and its values, attitudes and relations (p. 23), with aims to challenge oneself and contribute to social justice, to avoid "infantilized road seekers" (p. 87). She maintains that students, as "independent subjects" (p. 31), should in dialogue consider dependence on norms in their own knowledge about others, to improve this knowledge. Recall, that in Butler's argument regarding norms, that I am drawing from, we make ourselves recognizable to ourselves and others *in* normative terms, and *there is no* knowledge about the other that is not fully constituted *in relation to* norms.

Most importantly, Søndenå emphasizes, ethical reflection should not be about pedagogical practices, but one's previously thought thoughts about the self and its values, attitudes and relations (p. 23), with aims to challenge oneself and contribute to increased social justice. The necessary premises of Søndenå's argument, and many others similar to it, positioning as more ethical than conventionally procedural, and often vague, practices of reflection, are profoundly incommensurable with Butler's argument, which is built on undermining these premises. While Søndenå's argument relies on a foundational reality outside of discourse, Butler instead offers us a way to see that norms are what "prepare a place within the ontological field for a subject" (2005, p. 9). No knowledge can be "improved" away from this. Access to oneself and good knowledge of others, is for Søndenå inextricable from ethics; for Butler as well, but rather because of its *impossibility*.

2.2.2 A diluted medicine

Another Norwegian text about and against current discourses of reflection, by Knut Ove Æsøy (2016), offers what I have found to be a rare connection between all three curricular demands my project engages with. He argues that they function based in shared epistemological premises and political-educational incitements and cause difficult or impossible thinking and being as an ethical teacher. Æsøy has as his quite different premise and starting point Habermasian critical theory, yet I find that as he critiques the discourse of reflection in Norwegian teacher education

textbooks, he offers us several important and creative connections to take with us in the context of this project, ones that are valid across these theoretical fault lines.

Æsøy employs a very appropriate metaphor of a *diluted* medicine, to depict how the term reflection is used, and how the practice of it is assumed to heal. He insists it is in its current use without proper content and direction – in terms of the "actual" meaning, historically and theoretically. Here, he says, reflection is "a search for knowledge, not based on experience and facts, but closely tied to philosophical thinking, critical theory and the ability to develop an overview" (p. 63). The way to see the substance, the potential of reflection, he writes, is to be more aware of what sort of knowledge one may achieve. In a call for ongoing focus on ontology and understanding of humanity, he says its potential also concerns the seeking of meaning, purpose and direction in life; this increases the "active ingredient" and therefore possibilities in thinking and being as a teacher. The aim of reflection, for Æsøy, is to really "orient oneself", it is to question meanings, and to speculate, not assert. It is to be critical to current truths in ways that guide practice in better, more ethical, ways and acquire "knowledge on how to keep orienting myself regarding what a human is, what justice may be, or what a good person is" (p. 72).

He connects current practices of reflection with the belief in science, as a *regime*, as an extended epistemological culture of teacher education. This scientism, Æsøy holds, diluted the once more orienting, "hesitant" and humble directions of thought, changing the desirable practice of thought into "productive", reflective knowledge aimed at mastery and control – a "production-oriented knowledge". A central curricular context this is demanded in, he writes, is the "knowledge of pupils". When one is to reflect based on this lumping together of psychological knowledge, he argues, to achieve mastery in producing efficient learning, these two demands reinforce each other. This dilutes reflection's potential for improvement of pedagogical relations, as it makes doubt, speculation and openness next to impossible to fit into the teacher education system of meanings.

Another aspect of dilution Æsøy points to, is non-distinctness in use from words like *discuss*, *think*, *interpret, believe* or even *sum up,* yet calling it reflection gives what you say depth and

validity, even though it is void of anything but that "productive" function. An important goal of reflection now, he complains, is to make certain terms and knowledge one's own, integrated in communicative behavior; the teacher is to "be able to express the practice knowledge [it] develops in practice. In this way, the teacher can verbalize and document the knowledge that is visible in practice" (p. 71) and, through the legitimization such reflective practice yields, have this be what is valid, deep and always relevant in professional practice and development.

Æsøy further critiques how, when self-reflection is "presented as the question of understanding our own action" (p. 71), it claims to include our assumptions and prejudices, and is thought to be a means for tolerance; self-reflection is as such problematically "…presented as demands or standards for the correct thoughts and behavior. This leads to imperatives about what is the right kind of behavior by a teacher in the meetings with different pupils" (p. 72). And finally, summing up on what he refers to as a "momentum of dilution", Æsøy reminds us to be aware of the problematic belief that current "use and understanding of reflection leads to a close connection between reflection and being conscious" (p. 72). The demand to be "conscious" *and* the belief in valid, confident and ethical practice, manifests – in this fully diluted and diluting way he has argued – as a *consciousness-regime*. This is a "security blanket" of meanings connecting the possibility, depth and value of "conscious reflection", of knowledge about children and youth, of efficiency, and even of (social) justice orientation.

> **I think it makes you conscious of your actions, plain and simple. I think that is basically what it does. It makes you conscious in your actions as you go through a day, for bad and for good!**
>
> **C: *Does* it do that, or *should* it do that?**
>
> **It does, in my case it does… maybe not everything! But yes! [11]**

2.2.3 **Ahistorical, imprecise and even vacant – yet so powerful**

Another sweeping argument on the shallowness of a discursive function in teacher education has to do with the discourse's *ahistorical* circulation. Fendler (2003) says the reason discourses of reflection have maintained such currency, is precisely because the concept holds so many different assumptions that *appear* not to be in conflict, although its "criteria for reasonableness ... are otherwise incommensurable" (p. 17). This array of assumptions, she argues, across a field holding vastly different understandings and practices – explicit or not – functions as seductive and has therefore for many years deflected critical appraisal (p. 22). The seductiveness comes from the fact that the concept is so fully established as indicating shared professionality. The discursive "shell" of necessity is about sameness and legitimacy, as opposed to any clear grasp as to of what "it" is.

Fendler is ultimately concerned with "the effects of power that reverberate through current reflective practices" (p. 16), and convincingly calls attention to how ongoing constitution of teacher subjects is central to what discourses of reflection *do*. Research shows, she says, these practices rationalize, reinforce and justify beliefs instead of challenging assumptions, and "authenticate some particular ways of being a teacher while it obliterates others" (p. 23). This is because the demands to reflect are necessarily "molded and disciplined by the very social practices and relations that the reflective process is supposed to critique" (p. 21), and fundamentally undermines any realness in, or access to, so-called transformative knowledge. All this despite the fact that current discourses on reflection assume "self-awareness" can generate this. Further, Fendler reminds us, in a parallel argument to her writing on psychology (2012), the false optimism about human rationality this enacts, most problematically extends to responsible choices and forecloses different kinds of questioning of ethics and contemporary notions of responsibility; epistemological assumptions and foreclosures in the ongoing becoming of recognizable, rational teacher subjects radically limit possible ways of being ethical in these practices.

Fendler's arguments on psychology and reflection are about many of the conditions and effects of how I too see these chains of citation as working, including their connection to demands to

counter social injustice. I would specify briefly that from my perspective the seduction of coherence happens as a pull that makes the *site* of subject constitution, rather than "for" a subject, but believe we could agree that as long as these discourses are necessary to be recognized as professional, and depend on strong assumptions of rationality, consciousness and morality, some pull toward subject coherence, and toward equivalence*,* as I come back to in Chapter 6, can function just as powerfully while the meaning is imprecise, contradictory or even vacant.

2.2.4 A doubled reflection on reflection

In "Reflecting Reflective Practice" (2012), Simone Galea, like Fendler and Æsøy, emphasizes the power of the demand to be reflective in order to attain teacher subject status in the eyes of oneself and others. She asks how "the very difference in teaching that reflective practice is purported to bring about is being levelled out by attempts at systematizing the practice, of routinizing it, of removing the very possibilities for teachers in reflecting their practice in alternative ways…" (p. 246). Engaging primarily with Luce Irigaray's reading of Plato on reflection and strategic mimesis, and Irigaray's take on phallogocentric metaphysics, she considers the im/possibility of reflecting in "truly" critical ways in teacher education and education. Galea's argument is that a person should in and after teacher education incite a *doubled*, ongoing reflection *on* reflective practice, to be able through mimesis – repetition – to subvert the reproductive function of conventional, "routinized" reflection. Portraying the spirit of such practice, she writes that

> (…) the methods of reflection and reflection on reflective teaching are used against themselves, not to suggest moving beyond reflective teaching but to use the idea of the teacher as a reflective practitioner itself and present it as the possible way through which teachers can become otherwise. In reflecting reflective practice teachers move between the possibilities and impossibilities of reflective practices of teaching. (p.247)

While, commendably, aiming to figure a way to affirmatively uphold the spirit of reflection and becoming otherwise, it is important to be aware, she reminds us, that a challenge in working

with and through this paradox, is that "[i]nstitutionalizing reflection on reflective practice might continue to adopt the phallogocentric tendencies of standardized reflection unproblematically and simply act to justify the very act of standardizing reflection" (p. 257). There is no escape; she cannot offer a suggested solution that *ensures* countering this inherent risk of a relative establishment of meaning and practice, in how – after all – discursive practices function through their reiterative effect.

From the latter three contributions, I take that a form of "dilution", in content and aim, by routines, scientism or other ahistorical citations of reflection or "reflective practices", can in many ways be seen as what constitutes the power itself, in the current role of reflection in teacher education, even with theorists as different as Foucault, Habermas and Irigaray. From Galea I am well reminded of how deconstructive approaches to and in practice may, through the same function of iterability that offers potential for change, easily be "coopted" through the very functioning of institutionalization and mass-reiteration that both streamlines and delimits meaning. Æsøy's text is a rare example of literature which supports my emphasis on this three-way reinforcement and shared function of all three fields of discourse.

2.3 Discourses of social justice in education

As I referred to initially regarding my interest in these particular three demands, they are connected within my perspective in overlapping concerns with the intelligibility of the "self" and its (differentiated) other. They are also connected to some extent in explicit, visible ways *within* curriculum and mandates, actually being articulated in the same sentences, as you can see in this chapter. We have now reached the part on the third demand, concerning social justice values and efforts in and through teacher education, before we move to the very last section, the critique of these three as *one* inseparable function.

2.3.1 One local political and discursive context

Within the Norwegian context, work toward viewing diversity positively, and increasing efforts at inclusion, has since the 1980's [23] been an increasingly visible and general aim in Norwegian education, as what kind of teachers to expect and citizens to foster. When publishing in English, several local writers and practitioners use the term social justice but in politics and education otherwise, terms translatable to *diversity* and *inclusion* are in focus, along with words like *minorities* and *prejudice*. The course "Pedagogy and knowledge of pupils" has dedicated units on "diversity in the classroom"[24]. We can see in main textbooks[25] and additional literature[26] in this course and elective ones, a demand for knowledge and reflective awareness about situations and challenges for bodies and lives marked as different (for example "disabled people", "gay people", Sápmi peoples[27], or other "ethnic minorities"). It is repeatedly called necessary with such a knowledge-base to attain competence to "build relations" and engage in democratic and empowering dialogue, and to encourage tolerance and empathy; the student is to prepare to work to improve issues of diversity and inclusion in the classroom.

> **But, well, diversity… we have also had about disability, and learning difficulties…**
>
> **This topic is mostly about, I feel, that you are supposed to see the diversity, and use it as a resource! And think about the challenges you can also encounter!**
>
> **But also the positive, yes!**

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[23] See "Core Curriculum for elementary and secondary education in Norway" (Mønsterplanen 87) (Education, 1987), where human rights, solidarity, tolerance, knowledge, awareness and equality are seen as core, given and demanded values to give children/youth.

[24] At Oslo Metropolitan University, 15 out of 60 credits are dedicated units, both for those who will teach grades 5-10, those who will teach grades 1-7(OsloMet, 2019a, 2019b).

[25] For example: *Life in school 1* (Manger et al., 2009) and *Life in school 2* (Lillejord et al., 2010)

[26] For example (Lied, 2009; Lund, 2017; Nilsen, 2017) and ("Immigrant children in school. Information material.," 2016)

[27] Indigenous peoples originally living in regions across the north of what is now Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia; now these are also part of populations according to national borders. They have been harshly discriminated, and to some extent are still not treated in ways they are satisfied with, by the nation-states, and by the non-Sápmi populations. https://www.unric.org/en/indigenous-people/27307-the-sami-of-northern-europe--one-people-four-countries

> **Yes, but is often that way that it is referred to as an extra challenge, as a teacher. But I understand that when it comes to kids with many backgrounds, language-wise, and stuff. So. There is often a negative focus.**
>
> **But it is really fun, if you are lucky, when it comes to this! It has been really fun, with diversity! [12]**

Here at a level of teacher students' official contexts, the following excerpt illustrate how expected values, aims and competence when working in schools are described; it gives a sense of how diversity, as a professional concern, is presented as culturally and morally *given*, and how knowledge about it is seen as powerful and necessary for preparing for and practicing this. I do not comment directly, but simply insert this as one local, present-day discursive context to set a tone. The current "Core curriculum for primary, secondary and adult education"[28] (Education, 2006), a national policy document teacher students must become familiar with, describes the moral, social and political mandate teachers have in the opening section:

> Our Christian and humanistic tradition places equality, human rights and rationality at the fore. (…) …new models for social relations and human interaction can be created through reflection, criticism and dialogue. (…) Education should foster equality between the sexes and solidarity among groups and across borders. It should portray and prove knowledge as a creative and versatile force, vigorous both for personal development and for humane social relations (pp. 7 – 8).
>
> The school system embraces many pupils from groups which in our country constitute minority cultures and languages. Education must therefore convey knowledge about other cultures and take advantage of the potential for enrichment that minority groups and Norwegians with another cultural heritage represent. Knowledge of other peoples gives us the chance to test our own values and the values of others. Education should counteract prejudice and discrimination, and foster mutual respect and tolerance between groups with differing modes of life. (p. 10)

I now move to offer a reading of key scholarship which outlines some of the last few decades' critical contributions on approaches to social justice in education.

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[28] This particular quote is not translated by me; the source offers an English version online.

2.3.2 Critical pedagogy

Critical pedagogy has played a central role in defining and/or influencing how to do social justice in education since the 1980s. Patti Lather, in "Critical pedagogy and its complicities" (1998), reminds us how "[o]riginally grounded in a combination of Frankfurt School, Gramsci, and Paolo Freire, critical pedagogy emerged in the 1980s as a sort of 'big tent' for those in education who were invested in doing academic work toward social justice" (p. 487); this development includes the emphases on critical reflection from the 1990's, and it took hold with an increasing surge of scholarly interest, educational engagement and political will.

It is useful to remember the joint history, development and practice of social justice and social science. Elizabeth St. Pierre (2013) tells us how, historically, social justice work in academia and politics shaped the development of methodology and still plays a central role. With the entry of social movements into the academy (1960-80), concerns with epistemology got a strong hold on the humanities and social sciences. According to her it

> (…) seemed urgent to disrupt disciplinary, exclusionary canons ... [and so] ... qualitative inquiry – informed by interpretive cultural anthropology but unable to escape the hold of positivist social science – was conceived … to resist so-called value-free scientific knowledge and make public the knowledge and everyday lived experiences of the oppressed… [As such] the new methodology was a powerful tool for researchers in the social movements. (p. 648)

In Erica McWilliam's (1997) words, critical pedagogy's main foci were the power relations of knowledge production, drawing from "the new sociology" of the 1970s and using a concept of *critical* aligned with Jürgen Habermas's critical theory, among others. This initial field of writers in critical pedagogy, drawing primarily on "neo-Marxist discourse of liberation as radical political action" (p. 219), at the time confronted mythologies, troubled claims to value-free knowledge, interrogated andro- and ethnocentrism, and offered increasing focus on language and meaning making, with catch phrases like *subjugated and situated knowledges, researcher reflexivity, dialogue,* as well as *acknowledging voices and multiple realities* (Lather, 2013), and a rhetoric of *empowerment* and *emancipation*. Paulo Freire became central among those doing this work in the 1980s, as did Peter McLaren and Henry Giroux (McWilliam, 1997, p. 220).

The main problem was, St. Pierre (2014) holds, that "even as [social sciences] introduced phenomenological concepts like *voice, lived experience, narrative* and/or critical concepts like *authenticity, agency, emancipation, transformation, social justice,* and *oppression"* (p. 6, *italics in original*), these related to positivist structuring concepts. All those social science-based approaches remained – and remains – confused and mired in humanism's representational logic and the metaphysics of presence and the extended discursive structure supporting it and being supported by it; even as writers introduced critical approaches to epistemology toward their areas of interest, "the nature of being [was and is] completely imbricated in that knowledge work" (p. 648). Available perspectives that also fully troubled ontology, were bypassed almost completely, because, with political and social issues *for someone* as s starting point, social justice-oriented writing and practice has to a large extent logically *required* a stable, knowable subject – as the very ground of its own field.

2.3.3 …and some of serious issues with it

Through the 1990's though, Sharon Todd (2012 (2003)) writes, *otherness* became a preoccupation and controversy in the field of ethics, and the question concerned whether "how we engage with otherness leave[s] intact or challenge[s] the very differences that categorize the Other as other" (p. 2). She was not alone in bringing this question into education, in arguing that it was crucial to rethink the age-old coupling of ethics and knowledge to engage the *impossibility* of knowing the Other as a necessary basis for troubling current views on ethics in education. The increasingly argued focus was that the "blind spot" of that stable subject did not hold.

It was not that all the directions of confrontation in critical pedagogy came to be seen as problematic – a focus on epistemology *is* clearly important; what "imploded the canons", Lather tells us (1998, p. 496), was Elizabeth Ellsworth's analysis of subject positions available and the

ideological force in empowerment ideology in "Why doesn't this feel empowering? Working through the repressive myths of critical pedagogy» (1989). This classical text was followed by decades of critiques of connected ontological and epistemological premises and consequences in practice – and of how that general direction of critical pedagogy has developed in scholarship and functioned in practice.

Todd (2012 (2003)) refers to that first, most agreed on aspect of critique, when she tells us how this range of social justice pedagogies, the range developing from the initial critical pedagogy, has at its most fundamental level

> (…) been and continues to be marked by a moral concern with those who have been "Othered" and marginalized through discriminatory relations that are seen as violent, both in symbolic and material terms. Often defined through social categories of identity, difference and community, this figure of the "Other" occupies a special, and central, place in both theoretical and practical approaches to such pedagogical initiatives. (p. 1)

Learning *about* the Other functions as the basis of most social justice (in) education, firmly established as the commonsensical, necessary way to "be ethical" – as a teacher educator, teacher, student or pupil. This is apparent whether practices or writings employ concepts like "voice" or "empowerment*"* or not; as we for example see in Norwegian policy above, *knowledge about them* is established as a commonsensical ground for how everyone in education must approach diversity and injustices ethically.

I think diversity is a difficult term.

I think that's because the institution has given us very difficult, but very clear guidelines about what it is! And they speak about something very specific, but also very vague!

I think the fact that the institution has had so much focus on diversity being about culture and ethnicity, has done so that I really feel like I hardly dare to talk about it, because I am afraid to use the wrong words and hurt someone, or offend someone!

Yes, it's really difficult!

It is *really* not acceptable! [13]

In the context of such efforts, Todd tells us, in scholarship or practice, the "Other" means someone marked as undesirable, due to its formation, its position, in oppressive circumstances: "[i]t is an attribute obtained through material, ideological and discursive practices, and it is therefore viewed as a construction of time and place" (p. 2). Conversely though, as a philosophical concept, the Other is "of a different order … [as it] signals a radical alterity that is independent of social forces" (p. 2). This too has various philosophical formulations. For Levinas for example, she argues, the very real other – *any* other – is Other *because* of its alterity, and as such "infinitely unknowable" (p. 3), as all radical otherness necessarily is.

Todd in other words tells us that the impossibility of knowing the Other was, and is, a necessary basis for challenges that have been pursued in many directions and fields of practice, based in various conceptualizations. For example, in the text I am referring to here, she writes about the becoming of everyone in pedagogical encounters through engaging the different premises of *temporality* and *affect* in the divergent philosophical concepts of the Other and otherness in the writings of Levinas and in "the project of psychoanalysis" (p. 13). Another brief example of approaching a "production" of the illusion of coherent, knowable subjects to emancipate or liberate, from 1997, is McWilliam's way of troubling critical pedagogy and its framework. She also focuses on affect in learning, and learning affect, and insists on the usefulness of "viewing all pedagogical work, including radical pedagogy, as a desiring production" (p. 217). She argues the discourse of critical pedagogy functions as a social production, here theorized as an erotic desire for knowledge and coherence, that again produces its own role and function.

Finally, before I make final comments on the intimately shared function of the three demands, I should mention that in my reading of this field, *social justice education* has long functioned in English as an umbrella term for what is really a quite contested field of practice and thought, across international scholarship and practices that encompass a "wide range of pedagogies that seek to ameliorate social harm wrought through inequitable practices and structures" (Todd, 2012 (2003), p. 1); based in this common denominator the term holds whether the scholarship or practices involve concerns with epistemology and/or ontology – or not explicitly considering any such concerns at all.

2.4 One shared constitutive function

I place this project's approach in a long line of contributions trying to point to the centrality, the impossibility, and the troubling consequences, of the known other in education, like some of those offered above. On the more critical side, the issue has not been whether someone has used for example Habermas, Foucault or Levinas to take apart the contemporary situation of educational practices and premises, but the fact that some kind of ethical issue with the epistemological and perhaps ontological premise of the knowable other has been a shared concern across very different readings and arguments for quite some years. Beyond this general direction, I have not specifically positioned relative to historical, contemporary or critical writings. I involve this whole section as a backdrop, to try and establish in your reading how this premise of the knowable other is so powerful across a great width of contemporary educational discourses – and controversial across critical approaches to them.

In other words, the problem I have painted has not been specific directions within psychological or sociological parts of pedagogy, but rather the status and constitutive function these narratives hold when leaning on, and reproducing, that ontoepistemological premise. For example, the developmental psychology in early childhood teacher education that Cannella and Lenz-Taguchi have both critiqued, is a mere corner of the field of educational psychology. However, I argue that neither the branch critiqued, nor the level of child-care or schooling a program is directed at, is relevant in the context of this inquiry, one that will increasingly also extend to a general argument on constitutive relationality and framing in and through education. What *is* generalizable, regarding Cannella's and Lenz-Taguchi's work, is how they insist scientific and theoretical knowledge is wrapped up and demanded as valid and professional, and tied to acting socially just, and becomes part of what students and teachers recognizably *are,* as competent and responsible subjects.

We can say this equally about many of the social justice approaches in education with some group focus, or perhaps that are concerned with more inclusion, tolerance or solidarity on a very "individual" basis; the *nuances* are not relevant in the use I have here for the painting of what this field of demands entail. *Any* articulation with demanded knowledge base about pupils, or people outside school – is just that, also regardless of how much it is declared as tightly connected with and as reflection.

Now, with regard to reflection, I can similarly say that as opposed to the separation, for example, Søndenå maintains between reflecting on practice, and on the self and its thoughts and values, I hold, with my reading of Butler (2005), that if the "I" attempts to give an accurate account behind its actions or its practices, to offer and consider the reasons why the "I" has acted in whichever ways, or even try to justify or defend a specific deed, this practice-reflection *is* necessarily reflection centered around the "self". It is just as much a self-constituting "account" and event. Butler refers to *all* reflexive offerings of accounts and narratives of one's "self", values or practices *as one issue*, constituting the "self" and its other(s) in each moment of that overall type of effect. For the purpose of these particular theoretical considerations, we can say that reflection in education, either articulated in diluted, vague or internally incommensurable ways among different foundations, foci and modes of address in official and institutional demands, or in attempts at clearly defined practices, are caught up in the *functioning* of demands to know and be(come) *as* a professional "self".

It becomes very like positive and negative assessment concretely then and there. But the weekly log has been more … about topics, and personal experiences with it. The internship schools structure it in quite different ways though!

Yes, some get questions to answer, and… some are just told "write a log!". **(Laughs.)**

Yes, there are big differences. But you are, all the time, well… reflection is a *thing* here, to put it like that! (Laughs.)

I have certainly… thought that… the first year, one has you know… enough of the reflection, you know! Because it was so forced! You were supposed to do this and that, and we almost hadn't done it even! We didn't quite know what it was about! We were supposed to just figure it out, mainly!

But yeah, as the years went, we have sort of learned, figured out something that works.

There are concrete things about the teaching. But it's also with regard to how the relation with the pupils is working… But it's really dependent on the

> shape one is in that day, because some time it feels like I am sitting there all empty and I can't think of anything, can't retrieve anything! But sometimes I feel confident as a result of it also, yeah.
>
> For me, we… we were just supposed to have reflected. I don't even know where it came from… or where I have it from. I don't remember having had anything about it in class here. It is just something one has done. Especially during internships. And especially during first year. But there were times it was useful too. That one is supposed to observe and then reflect… and especially see a tendency in that. [14]

As I argue we tightly connect these three demands in and as *one* framing function, I must reiterate here at the end the importance of not losing sight of the implications of the psychologizing knowledge of pupils in both their formalized and commonsensical roles in educational discourse. We have seen mainstreamed an established relation between reflective practices and social justice education, as well as critique of this, but it is important in this thesis to *not* place the "knowledge of pupils" to the side of these two, instead of in a just as fully intimate connection with them.

Many of those theorists I have brought in above focus on *one* of these demands, and in those cases, it is my argument that brings their troubling roles alongside each other for you as a reader. We can on the other hand see for example how Fendler's argument on psychology in teacher education, similar to Æsøy's insistence on teacher education's "epistemological regime" functioning through both social and human sciences in the knowledge of pupils *and* reflection. Both are talking about this as connected, and as excluding *alternative* ways of being and thinking as justice-oriented professionals. Even more than this, what I can also relate to in their work, is their different but crucial ways of attaching these discourses to an extended narrative of rationality, consciousness, etc., and that the power of these other foundational beliefs assists in how each established demand and the responses to them bolster each other's legitimacy.

My way of arguing this connection is much more explicitly focused on the "self" as a problem for ethics. I hold that even though the demands for citing discourses of reflection may seem more focused on the teacher "self", and the other two demands may seem more about the known other(s), this is only a question of relative emphases in the articulations. My point with this picture of an historical and contemporary situation is to bring forth how they all rest together in a humanist intelligibility and have a shared function in education. The "self" and its

(differentiated) other are made in the same movement and moment; in other words, all three aspects of pedagogy necessarily *imply* foreclosure of the Responsibility to the becoming other in pedagogical relations. All three, through demanding address, involve violent constitution of others – including their differentiated situations of precarity.

In this fully connected way, I still consider – or I should say *imagine* – that the history and field of practices of reflection plays a particular role in terms of how it has a type of integrating function. For one this is due to precisely the span of vague but mainstream citation of this terminology at basically all levels of education. But more than that, I would say it is a form of strengthening agent in the overall affective "self"-affirmation, most explicitly upholding the belief in not only the knowing but also the knowable "self", in the simultaneously moral demand to be an ethical, accountable professional. I come back to this in Chapter 5, with a view to how a processual demand for reflection, like dialogue, is a discourse more about the demand for continuity as a way of constitutively addressing oneself, than any sort of "content" as such.

Additionally, on the relation and role of these demands, a much larger function of education and schooling as demanding address is *as* reiteration of a humanist intelligibility within the much larger context of contemporary society. I thoroughly come back to this in Chapters 5 - 7. In the process of developing my inquiry further, the three demands do not structure the text, but play the part of *exemplifying* citationality and framing in and as responses to educational demands.

Conversations with students about these parts of teacher education allows me to get closer to showing what constitutive citation *does* in and through address. Visible insertions of speech are certainly much messier than the theoretical discussions; they remind us of the ways demands and responses to those demands are articulated. In that mix of the in/formal and the incoherent, I find it also carries immense density of moral and other normative meaning. I hope this visibility and engagement may perhaps provoke some more useful perspectives on what goes on behind the curtain. Coming up, Chapter 3 offers theoretical readings on performativity, writing and ethics, first of all as a foundation for the subsequent chapter's argument on how

and why to insert what I refer to as *performative utterances*, but also for how I challenge and extend my own perspective in the remaining chapters.

3. Performativity and utterances: Reading, writing and conversations with Derrida and Butler

I have held how constituting as student and teacher subjects involves, in part, performative responses to the three central curricular and professional demands considered above. I have argued how this response, in a structure of address, involves constitution *as* subjects with relevant values, knowledge and practices, through *citing* these discourses, putting this to work

to be recognizable and coherent. My particular interest is in how such a "self" *implicitly* has violent impact in the lives and relations of others.

I encountered a challenge though, as to how I could theorize this argument in the most interesting way "close to" the constitutive processes. How could I do this innovatively, creatively, and make something seemingly abstract as "real", important and effective as possible, critically speaking, in your reading? What style of argumentation could also assist further in pointing to the dynamic of *address*, beyond the focus on these particular demands, as I move into the final chapters? How could I both show you how I see this happening, as presumably varied and vague but simultaneously powerful, and in that also contribute in an argument on the complexity in the happening of constitutive address?

While this thesis is a theoretical inquiry, I chose the unusual route of arranging group conversations with students in a teacher education program here in Oslo, about these three parts of pedagogy. Considerations behind this, and how and why to involve and *insert* transcribed words in terms of what it may offer, and challenges with regard to research ethics, are developed via this chapter and through Chapter 4.

The first section of this chapter briefly provides further justification for having the conversations, but mostly focuses on the basics of recruitment, participation, rapport and open-ended structure. The second section offers a reading of Derrida's key arguments on general citationality and on engaging with deconstructive dynamics through performative writing, while the following one is my extended reading of Butler's perspective, but here on embodied politics of performativity and utterances. A final section brings these two related articulations closer together. There are three reasons for how I craft these latter three sections as a sort of preparatory readings.

The first reason concerns my interest in pointing to the *function* of the (demanding and responding to/in) educational address that I want to consider in this inquiry. The lack of foundational subjects for me implies the transcribed words could not in any way be seen as "empirical" the way I view that term, and while I believed these conversations would allow

something of additional interest and relevance in my writing and your reading, I found Butler's otherwise inspiring work insufficient alone to develop this idea and involvement theoretically. Derrida's arguments, co-engaged with Butler's, were key in considering what kind of function and role transcribed sentences could have in this overall *performative* inquiry; I lay some ground-work here to argue that in Chapter 4.

The second reason was to be able consider how having conversations and engaging with transcribed text may conflict with rules and norms of research ethics in the field of educational sciences. My approach was from the start guided by the perspective that the citations of pedagogical discourses I was interested in have ethically violent implications, while what students discussed may feel "given", important, and morally obvious, in an identification with demanded knowledge, values and behavior. At the end of Chapter 4, based in this chapter's writings on reading, writing and performativity, I turn to the difficulty of consent, and premises of disrespect, and consider what it means that I planned to write a thesis that *upon reading* might make participants feel personally attacked – in a sort of "stand-off" of ethics. I also outline ways I tried to counter this.

Finally, the readings in this chapter "zoom out" from the neater focus on the demands in the previous chapter and *expand on* – and with Derrida allow a context for – earlier readings of Butler's work on normativity, self-constitution, address, framing and ethics. The broadening of the conceptual landscape in these preliminary readings is also a necessary background for moving into the further developments flowing through all subsequent chapters.

3.1 Conversations: Justification, context and execution

When I ask students about these parts of their curricular demands, they clearly do not answer the same ways as if they spoke such words in a setting of their studies, or during work in schools.

But it was a way I could get close to self-constitution where responding to these demands was involved; I wanted us to see them in moments of address *while and through* employing these discourses. That is all. The interest was never in "mapping" or "analyzing" values, knowledge, or competence, but crucially to have "them", constituted in each citation, visible on the pages of this thesis.

As you may have noticed, I have in Chapter 2 inserted sentences somewhat according to each curricular demand considered or referred to in the surrounding text. From now on you will see that insertions often, but not always, seem more or less random, as the thesis moves to another part of the argument where that correspondence is more or less impossible, but also not relevant. These are just two ways of placement, toward the same end, which you may perhaps catch yourself reading into in usefully different ways. In this project, discourse and reality are related to each other in ways where theory does not "refer to", "explain", or "comment on" the speech in the conversations, and excerpts of speech are hardly "examples of" what I am theorizing.

As I come back to more closely in the next chapter, the insertions primarily serve the purpose of one aspect of an overall argument on the complexity, vagueness, density and constitutive power in moments of demands and responses in educational address, where certain discourses are in kept in play. I believe in juxtaposing the meta level of theorizing complex dynamics, with an interrupting particularity of embodied responding to address from/in a demanding context. Whatever each may be read as in your overall encounter with it, the combination possibly triggers a more unsettling read, with much potential for ethics, whether spoken words seemingly fit their surroundings or not.

Through the next chapter I argue much further on writing, reading, reality and ethics in inserting pieces of conversations, but first now, some more information about my choices and procedures.

In early 2014 I approached the administration at a local teacher education program, and asked if I could have fifteen minutes of class time with students a few months from graduation, to invite them to participate in research concerning their own education. I wanted to maximize

their familiarity with the three demanded knowledges and practices, through the years of reading, writing, classes and internships. I was granted times to visit, with two separate classes, and was promised the use of a room at their institution to make participation more likely.

I invited them to sign on to participate as 3-5 person groups, that it was a maximum two-hour[29] conversation – not interview – and that the topic was their own education. They should not feel concerned they would stand to remember "correctly" in any way; I said it was about experiences and opinions. By arranging in groups, I hoped to allow more positioning, variety and chatter; the range 3-5 was so to not have too few for that same reason, or too many so that there was enough room for each to speak up. Three people in the first class volunteered for a conversation, five in the second. I did not select or reject anyone, just thanked them all and got their contact information. The fact that they could participate with people they already knew in their own class, seemed like a positive factor. I told them I would supply fruit and cookies and whatever kinds of soda or water they told me in advance, but otherwise did not offer any incentive other than the feeling of contributing to research on teacher education. Each group found a time that suited them, and I booked a room.

The institution they were in has the largest, most dominating and prestigious teacher education program in Norway, at what was until 2018 known as the University College of Oslo and Akershus, and is now OsloMet – the Metropolitan University of Oslo. I chose it for no other reason than proximity. My own institution, the University of Oslo, does not have a teacher education program. I have no affiliation with either the program or institution, and had never met any of these students previously. Finally, some of the participants let me know during the conversation we had, with some pride it seemed, that theirs is a "research institution", and that they are used to being approached to participate and contribute and consider it a good thing that higher education *is* researched, to keep improving on it. This environment may have been why it was not difficult to find willing participants.

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[29] This maximum was set just based in my assumption that this was long enough to establish a good tone and hope for many interesting and useful articulations, and as long as I could get them to focus and not get tired of talking.

It would not have mattered whether these conversations happened in another city and program, or with other participants, except maybe for this willingness. No "quality level" of competence or particular knowledge, was ever at issue in this inquiry, and these three demands are a part of teacher education nationally[30]. What I was after was citation of discourse; presumably varied citation that together performs this function of becoming coherent as recognizable subject.

The reason behind organizing *two* conversations, was that I was unsure to what extent it would work to just have them talk the way I was interested in – thinking the situation may be tense or maybe they would be insecure and quiet. I figured I might learn something in the first conversation I could do differently the second time. In other words, it was in order to ensure enough recorded speech. The first conversation went very well, but I still went through with the second, mostly because it was very rewarding and I thought that more of this talk could only be good to involve more varied and exciting bits of speech. Also, those signing up for the second round had been eager as well, and I did not want to cancel on them.

It was a very open-ended way of facilitating what was explicitly meant to be, and was done, as conversations, not as interviews. As I was not after information to "analyze", but fairly casual ways of speech, the only thing that mattered was making sure they were comfortable enough in the situation, with each other and with me as part of that, to refer to or consider these parts of their education and profession. My role was to ensure a rapport where any story, language-use, or opinion could feel "allowed", so they would be comfortable and keep talking. I explicitly encouraged them before we started to allow room for differences of opinion, with respect and understanding for how they would all want to emphasize different things, like anecdotes versus curricular references.

I posed the three main opening questions, the only ones planned, spaced out to circa divide the two hours in three, saying "What do you think about when I say '*reflection*'?", "What do you think about when I say '*knowledge of pupils*'?", and "What do you think about when I say '*diversity and inclusion*'?" But I also posed many follow-up questions in between, like "What do you mean?", "What about you?", "Do the rest of you agree with her?", "Was that useful?",

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[30] "National guidelines for teacher education" (UiR, 2018)

"Does anyone else have similar experiences?", "How do you expect you will have use for this?", "What about in your internship work?", and "How would you connect that to what you were talking about earlier?".

The students seemed comfortable answering, discussing and telling stories. They agreed and disagreed among them, in both groups, but there was a good tone and even quite a bit of laughing among us. They seemed eager to be good and engaged students, and acknowledged a legitimacy and necessity of competence in all these three parts of their education. Many told stories from their internships to connect the demands of their curriculum to its use in practice. Several said they learned much more from internships than from the rest of the time in the program. Some were critical or positive to for example particular lecturers, to particular textbooks, to some leadership styles, or to what they expected to have to deal with in schools. They talked about what would be exciting, interesting or challenging, but even more interestingly they were also more or less explicitly connecting the demands in question to each other, and to institutional and political contexts. Several were unsatisfied with a lack of input and assistance on the what and how of practicing reflection, and the lack of both quality and amount of knowledge about other, or many enough, groups, to prepare them to be as good as they wanted, in engagement with diversity and inclusion. In other words, I would say they brought up many aspects of studying and teaching as they conveyed commitments, concerns and opinions, through interestingly varied ways and directions of employing these discourses.

I have kept each exchange you see inserted as it was spoken, as this was relevant to make it visible how the conversation flowed. There is no referring "coherently" to particular people within each exchange, or from one to another, or keeping track of what was said in which of the two conversation; you can see that no numbers or pseudonyms are used. One exception is where it made sense to insert an exchange where I was among those who said something; this is indicated with a "C:", my first initial. As I referred to in a footnote below the first insertions, in Chapter 1, the original Norwegian formulations are in Appendix 2, matched through endnote numbers[31]. No names were ever entered, even in my full transcription. This is not primarily for anonymity or confidentiality even, but because, as I will thoroughly argue, it was never relevant

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[31] The numbers in parentheses next to them *in* the appendix (not the endnote function) are for my tracing purposes to the recording.

who said what. I did still have a consent process with each group, where these issues were promised, and they *are* ensured, but I will come back to the consent process at the end of Chapter 4, because it becomes interesting there in a new way.

I found it kind of fascinating – there was this "diversity week". And I think the organizer assumed that we thought of diversity as ethnic diversity… but I think many of us saw a broader diversity! Because the woman visiting said "oh, there is not much diversity here!" when we entered her lecture. And she was giving a lecture on diversity! Hehe. (Not impressed)

Well, we are many ethnically Norwegian girls. Presumably.

But there were also old and young. Thick and thin. Etc., etc.

Even among us three there is diversity as well, surely. We are similar, but different also, right!?

Yes, and your identity… The way you see yourself. How you are in your family. How you are in class… How you are alone. With all your interests. Experiences… culture… or what norms you have lived into or maybe distances yourself from. And if you feel included or not – in all kinds of contexts… yes, there is so much!

Yes. But the biggest fault you can make is to limit diversity to nationality, or ethnicity…

But it is so easy to make that mistake! [15]

3.2 Deconstruction and performativity: Jacques Derrida

In a seminal lecture first delivered at a Johns Hopkins University conference in 1966, and later published as "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in *Writing and Difference* (1978), Derrida tells us that the structurality of the structure of meaning, "has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin" (p. 278). He recounts how it had become necessary

(…) to think both about that which somehow governed the desire for a center in the constitution of structure, and the process of signification which orders the displacements and substitutions for this law of central presence… (…) [I]t became necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-

substitutions came into play. This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of origin, everything became discourse… (p. 280).

3.2.1 Iterability – and the illusions of presence and representation

Key to Derrida's argument is the perspective on *iterability* as a central condition of the originary structure – of meaning having to be repeated(ly cited) to be (seemingly) maintained. This temporal dimension makes meanings always already *different,* and because there is a "movement of supplementarity", he holds, of constant delay and deferral, that also constitutes meaning in always indeterminable ways. This movement, this "play" in discourse (p. 289), often also called the "dynamic of différance"[32], is never preceded by anything in what we can call its disruption of "presence" or "being", only by an "originary complexity"*;* I find that all of his work may be said to be derived from this thought.

The function of the illusory center of meaning, he argues, in its nostalgic desire for coherence*,* is to limit the play in discourse; in current humanist discourse(s), *presence* and *representation,* or being and knowing*,* appear as the problematic core that fulfils this function of limiting play and maintaining the illusory coherence. In St. Pierre's words (2013), Derrida's arguments on différance are tools to keep "pointing to" this dynamic, "to the exhaustion of phenomenology's belief not only in transcendental presence in being but also of language's ability to capture and close off meaning, to represent being (lived experience)" (p. 651). In Derrida's work, the representational schemas' hierarchy of language and reality is flattened and exist as one surface, as textuality – with always indeterminable meaning. No foundation is accepted and nothing *secures* being; this goes for a "self", "consciousness", "man", "God", or any transcendental signified (1978, p. 280). At the very core of the problems, he sees the notion of a *human being* as centered and "present" to itself, because, again in St. Pierre's words, that notion of the human, "that description, that assumption, that belief, enables descriptions of other concepts,

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[32] In French, *différance* is *différence* misspelled on purpose; they are pronounced identically. It is meant to upset the traditional privileging of speech over writing, but also, the word *différer* means both "to defer" *and* "to differ".

e.g. truth, reality, experience, freedom (…) that organizes and structures a certain way of understanding the world" (2011, p. 45).

> **I also think the pedagogy, the theoretical part, can be a sort of safety net… in the beginning. But the more experience you gain, the freer you become! In relation to you own pupils! [16]**

3.2.2 Performative utterances – making reality

In another articulation and focus of this early argument, in "Signature Event Context" (1982 (1972)), Derrida approaches the idea of "communication*"* in the field of speech act theory, and argues that the believed distinction between speech and writing is premised on a presupposed *presence.* He tells us that *both* speech and writing are rather bound to the irreducible structure of ongoing deferral of meaning, a continual rupture in presence. This implies meaning's radical breaking off from who-/whatever sends/communicates it and who-/whatever receives it, as well as from any necessary context, which also makes communication impossible – and temporarily possible – at the same time.

Later in this text, Derrida challenges J. L. Austin's 1962 argument in *How To Do Things With Words,* that a class of speech acts he called "performative utterances" actually *do* something. They work performatively, Austin claimed, through a force, in illocutionary acts, exemplified with how the "I do" at a wedding functions to change reality. This class was for Austin separate from "parasitic" utterances on a stage which only *cite* "true" performatives but lack force. Dismissing this distinction is part of Derrida's reappropriation of the concepts of performativity and utterance. As Sara Salih (2002) puts it,

> Derrida asserts that what Austin regards as a pitfall or a weakness is in fact a feature of *all* linguistic signs that are vulnerable to appropriation, reiteration and (…) *re-citation*. This is what Derrida calls "the essential iterability of [a] sign" which cannot be contained or enclosed by any context, convention or authorial intention (1972: 93). (…) this means that, as Derrida puts it, the possibility of failure is intrinsic and necessary to the sign, indeed it is *constitutive* of the sign. (1972: 97, 101–3) (p. 91, *italics in original*).

In other words, Derrida insists iterability is the prediscursive condition and premise of *all* meaning, and that *all* utterances must necessarily cite linguistic and cultural convention. According to James Loxley's reading in *Performativity* (2006) Derrida meant that "citationality (…) is itself a more local name for the *general* iterability that characterizes all language…" (p. 79), and if a performative productivity of utterances is determined by the structure of iterability, this makes *all* utterances – *oral or written* – performative, including those Austin called "parasitic". What Derrida does, in effect, is to deconstruct the distinction between iterability and citation within its established dichotomies of true / false, and effective / non-effective, twisting both terms to apply to the condition of meaning in general; iterability and general citationality is the condition of the making of all so-called truth and reality.

The process of this sweeping claim also implies, as Hillis Miller points out, the dismissal of another premise of Austin's argument, that performativity "presupposes [a] preexisting, stable, and perdurable selfhood" (Miller, 2007, p. 227). Derrida's perspective on utterances includes the performativity *of* the "self" where, in the temporal logic of iterability, in Loxley's words, "the speaker is retroactively constituted by the utterance it appears to authorize" (2006, p. 102).

3.2.3 Engaging with deconstruction

Derrida's sentiments on the dynamic of discourse and performative utterances means one can engage deconstructively with any kind of *text*. Clarifying his use of the word *text*, Derrida tells us, in *Limited Inc* (1988 (1977)), how for him it

implies all the structures called "real", "economic", "historical", socioinstitutional, in short: all possible referents. (…) This does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied (...) [it means that] every referent, all reality, has the structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this "real" except in an interpretive experience. The latter neither yields meaning nor assumes it except in a movement of differential referring. That's all (p. 148).

It is in a way certainly paradoxical, but unavoidable, here, that I even imply the question "what *is* deconstruction?", when multiple, extensive arguments referring to "it" in Derrida's work seem written with a desire to open us up to the indeterminability of meanings and possibilities of "it". Yet, I will offer my reading here that deconstruction is first of all yet another term for the *going on* of infinite movement, of supplementarity, a destabilizing logic already in motion. In that sense, deconstruction is "always already" (1976, 1978) underway. Without an agent "doing it", without an originary "source" (1976, 1978), it paradoxically constitutes *and* destabilizes meaning; meaning deconstructs itself as it is inherently unstable.

Deconstruction is also variously considered to describe approaches that *point to* "it", to the paradoxical dynamic, by exposing multiplicity and contingency and demonstrating surplus of meaning in any *text,* and any *reality*, there is critical interest in. The premise for wanting to affect such exposure, is that 'difference in itself', pure difference, is always constitutive movement because temporality makes a repetition return with a difference: it never repeats "the same" (1978). Encouraging this, Derrida wrote, "[t]o risk meaning nothing is to start to play … to be entangled in … writing simultaneously insistent and elliptical … carrying off each concept into an interminable chain of differences" (1972, p. 8)

He emphatically reiterates, though, that for him deconstruction does *not* imply a "method" or "methodology" (2007, p. 23), concepts tainted by assumptions of presence and representation. He writes that deconstruction

> (…) loses nothing from admitting that it is impossible. (…) *possibility* is rather the danger, the danger of becoming an available set of rule-governed procedures, methods, accessible approaches. (…) The interest is … a certain experience of the impossible … of the other (p. 15).

I read Derrida's *other* as the constitutive *outside* incorporated in the im/possibility of meaning in *all text,* including subjects; it is the otherness that always constitutes, or "invents", (temporary) meaning, and it is this we should hope to *point at* to destabilize truth and being and open up for something else. The central difficulty in this is how there is, in Derrida's words, no way of escaping "complicity", since we have to "use" – we have to cite – meaning that leans on the metaphysical premises of the *text* in question, for

> (…) to demonstrate that there is no transcendental …signified (…) one must reject the concept of "sign" itself – which is precisely what cannot be done. (…) [so] we cannot give up this … complicity without also giving up the critique we are directing against this complicity (1978, p. 281).

Even though one cannot escape, Derrida argues, there are different ways of dealing with the metaphysical complicity of the sign the critique of it is dependent on. This question, he writes, is "perhaps measured by the critical rigor with which this relation to the history of metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought" (p. 282). He shows us how the incommensurability between the vast field of discourses leaning on *presence/representation* (being/knowing*),* and acknowledging the play of différance, does not deny an affirmative*,* critical approach: the possibility of displacing meaning through what he calls interrupting in double gestures (1982). Writing affirmatively, allowing truths in their contingency, is both necessitated and encouraged, because "[i]t is only on this condition that deconstruction will provide itself with the means with which to intervene in the field of oppositions it criticizes, which is also a field of nondiscursive forces" (p. 329).

In *Margins of Philosophy* (1982), Derrida argues that in both "senses" of deconstruction, it "overturns and displaces a conceptual order*,* as well as the nonconceptual order with which the conceptual order is articulated" (p. 329). For me this means the constitutive dynamic is ongoing, and can be overturned, on what are conventionally seen as "both" material and discursive levels; this includes any concept, notion or subject and how these function as constituted realities on the textual surface (1978).

3.2.4 Performativity in/as writing

To further gather what I engage with from Derrida's work, I turn to how his convictions are played out in his strategy or style of writing. In "Derrida's Performance"[33] (2015), Yonathan Listik argues that "[t]he purpose of [Derrida's] performance in writing is to call our attention to the spectacle. [For him] the barricade placed around seriousness in writing is nothing more than an attempt to preserve the fetishism of 'true' and 'false'" (p. 15-16). It is not that language for Derrida has no relation to truth or reality; it is not so that no concept of truth can remain, when arguing a concept, an object, a structure or a subject as fully performative. Thinking this, Listik holds, "misses [Derrida's] point completely" (p. 15-16); he does argue truth value to utterances, but he "(…) uses the notion of 'as if' to illustrate what he means. An utterance performs *as if* it were true. It pretends to be truth. It is the performance of truth" (p. 15-16). Reading Derrida's consideration of the word "professing"*,* Listik insists that Derrida means to perform the *as if* even in the meaning of his own argument, as he writes that

> (…) [t]o profess consists always in a performative speech act, even if the knowledge, the object, the content of what one professes, of what one teaches or practices, remains in the order of the theoretical or constative. Because the act of professing is a performative speech act, and because the event that it is or produces depends only on the linguistic promise, well, its proximity to the fable, to fabulation, and to fiction, to the 'as if', will always be formidable (Derrida, 1988, p. 215, quoted in Listik, pp. 15 - 16).

As he professes on performativity, Derrida not only argues *about* the *as if,* but also performs the impossibility of an argument being anything but performative*;* Listik comments that Derrida argues "as if it were possible, as if it were real. (…) he's also 'acting' in the sense of attempting to *produce* a truth about the world" (2015, pp. 15 – 16, *italics in original*). I agree with Listik that Derrida's work always maintains a kind of theatrical relation to, or tension in, the conviction he illustrates. We could say it seems he writes *to* leave open, to show indeterminability and "pronounce nonclosure" (1978, p. 298), and to show how "proper and improper uses of language are not separate" (Listik, 2015, pp. 15 - 16). What does this reading suggest we can take from his work? Derrida aimed to trouble the

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[33] Nonpaginated online article, listed as "pp. 15 - 16".

hegemonic fire of Enlightenment and show us another way to relate to our contexts, relations, norms, structures *and writing*; in Listik's words, he

> (…) leaves us with the fire of performative language. Performative language that is not completely under our control, but with which we can do things in the world, like create truths. Performative language that escapes its context but does not cease to be language. Derrida thus replaces one light with the other (pp. 15 - 16).

The argument *and* style of Derrida's work, in its refusal to succumb to the desire for coherence and foundation, together performs his explorations, including the primacy of ethics*,* and along with my Butlerian perspective on embodied subjects, materiality and politics, this inspires the argument on my writing's purpose and style in the next chapter.

3.3 Butler's performative bodies and other utterances

Long before she was writing explicitly on the ethics of the constitution of the "self", in for example *Giving an Account* and *Frames of War*, Butler developed her concept of subject formation as *performativity;* this was offered first in *Gender Trouble (1999 (1990)).* Here, as Salih comments, Derrida is influential, but we can say he "is an implicit rather than a stated presence (…) [even though] failure, citation and re-citation are crucial to Butler's discussions of subversive gender performatives" (Salih, 2002, p. 91).

3.3.1 Ontological norms as performatives

At the core of, and most controversial here, was how Butler holds that the naturalized materiality of "sex", that so-called socialized gender is mapped on top of, rather functions performatively *through and as discourse*, that is, through ongoing citation of ontological and epistemological meanings in cultural and linguistic norms. Like Derrida held, iterability is the prediscursive condition and premise of *all* meaning; "sex" too is a meaning being "maintained" in citation. In effect, Butler deconstructively collapses the sex / gender distinction, arguing that "gender emerge[s], not as a term in a continued relationship of opposition to sex, but as the term which absorbs and displaces "sex"" (1993, p. 5); "sex" was always already gender, she wrote – fully *performative.* We may of course recognize the Derridean "as if" when Butler argues that when she says "[g]ender reality is performativity", she means "it is real only to the extent that it is performed" (1990, p. 278, quoted in Loxley 2007, p. 118).

Central to Butler's perspective is that a performative, like "sex", works "to the extent that it *draws on and covers over* the constitutive conventions" (1993, p. 227, *italics in original*). As long as "gender roles" are referred to, "sex" is "retroactively installed at a prelinguistic site to which there is no direct access" (p. 5). The concept of sex, she argues, is left above scrutiny as prior to what is seen as culture, much as, I would say, for example a material reality of "white" or "colored", or as the lasting, foundational "self" is in *Giving an Account*. This is a dissimulatory process – neither singular nor deliberate – "by which the subject who 'cites' the performative is temporarily produced as the belated and fictive origin of the performative itself" (1997a, p. 49). This way the subject as "meaningful" to itself and others comes into being every time it cites by doing what it supposedly is.

3.3.2 A sharpened focus on performativity's subversive potential

In *Gender Trouble* (1999 (1990)) Butler focuses her development of the concept of performativity more on a "forced" aspect of citation of ontological norms of "sex", to rid us of sex/gender as a distinction, while three years later she reformulates. In *Bodies That Matter* (Butler, 1993)*,* citationality describes, as Salih tells us, how these "ontological norms are deployed in discourse, sometimes forcibly and sometimes not" (2002, p. 90). Butler tells us more explicitly here how performativity relies on premises of iterability and general citationality from her own and Derrida's reading of Austin, where this applies to the general condition of meaning, to the making of *all* truth and reality. With this she moves to emphasize more how each citation is necessarily different, which in her argument implies an *agency* that is situated in the dynamic of discourse.

In Salih's words, Butler now "sees potential for subversion in Derrida's characterizations of the citational sign, and charts a move in her own theory from performativity to citationality, since rethinking performativity through citationality is deemed useful for radical democratic theory" (2002, p. 91). Still using that example, what Butler is saying here is that when performatives such as "sex" are cited, that is, necessarily re-cited*,* in always new contexts, this *may reveal citationality as such,* which *points to* how performatives fail to be lasting and foundational. Citation(ality) becomes, I agree with Salih, a term that is both different than, and aligned with, performativity, as Butler's writing is more focused on "the political enactment of performativity as citationality" (p. 92).

I do not read this move in her conceptual focus as a *shift*, but more as a further development of the same argument. Performativity was for her always citational, always agentic, but after the much critical response from readers to her radical arguments in *Gender Trouble,* she wrote not only *Bodies that Matter* (1993), but also for example *Excitable Speech* (1997a), in ways responding to those claiming her perspective on performativity both denied the body as such, making it fully only discourse, and removed all possibility for agency and change. Both aspects were especially contentious vis a vis political and academic feminism (1993). These works, I find, are both unapologetic and patient in how they answer thoroughly to these concerns, with

the same major premise*,* but formulated differently, with different emphases, on different contexts/topics.

How is this conceptual refocusing relevant in this thesis? I find that we might consider these reformulations to enlarge the area of applicability of her perspective on becoming subjects and materiality – including how re-citation, both in speech, writing and in other embodied ways, has unsettling potential; I come back especially to this latter issue in the next chapter.

> **It is a very visible part of diversity though. Or… maybe more like "concrete". Yes, she is from there and she is from there, and they speak this or that language.**
>
> **Yes! And I do understand a little bit that we have it in our teacher education too, because we…**
>
> **We *are* from a country which… used to have anti-Semitism in our laws. And it has influenced our history! And it is natural that we have that part of diversity in school…**
>
> **And then there is rights. To have tutoring in one's native language during school hours… It is probably a little bit because of that too. [17]**

3.3.3 The performativity of the embodied "self"

When it comes to the question of the body, Butler still maintains as a central tenet in *Senses of the Subject (2015b)*, 27 years after *Gender Trouble*, that we must not try to separate embodied signification from verbal or linguistic ones; "we cannot really differentiate between different 'levels' as if they had an ontological status that exceed their heuristic utility" (2015b, p. 14). The bodily dimension is always involved, she insists, but it does not "haunt" speech or other performances as an ontological given. Our identification *as* (a recognizable subject, like) "woman", "black", or "teacher", is the practice *and* the effect of embodied, performative citations of norms. New directions and contexts of displacements in her work manage to hold the issue of materiality as she brings forth a multitude of social, political and ethical issues.

In other words, the basic argument first developed as performativity always plays a role in her conceptual terrain, but sometimes reconsidered with alternative but overlapping words, like the constitutive "self" in *Giving an Account,* where we can say the "self" is *performed* as a citation of the performative that is the notion of a "self" – performed *as if* is real and true*,* but with no pre-discursive foundation. In *Frames of War* this is less explicit, but in both texts the "self" only comes to be *as and in* a (citational, performative) response to demands to become – in a structure of address. Other times she rather maintains focus on performativity though, like when she writes on performative agency (2010), performative utterances (1997c), performativity of assembly (2015a), or on performativity in dispossession (Butler & Athanasiou, 2013).

3.3.4 **A politics of performativity**

Butler encourages a politics of performativity, meaning an ongoing exposure of what seems real and true *as* performativity, revealing the pervasiveness of its reach, and that our usual accounts of identity, the representable *being* of anything, do not hold. This subversive potential she urges us to pursue goes for any other realness and truth, as much as for the meaning of bodies, their subject status. It is a matter of a potential for social change through a type of agency that does not belong to a person but resides in a social iterability, where the body's occasioning of meaning, in both reading, writing, speech and other actions, plays a central role.

The function of discourse that we recognize from Derrida is reappropriated and extends in her work to be emphasized as a wholly paradoxical situation of the im/possibilities of embodied subjects, which may, seemingly "on purpose", or not, perform meaning in ways that may undermine assumed, foundational firmness, destabilizing the subject itself. Similarly, and connected to this, the indeterminable potential in the performative logic *may* – that is all – allow changes in normative, material and structural conditions. Butler clarifies though, how, necessarily, even with this agentic potential for subversion and destabilization, "a performative

works to the extent that it *draws on* and *covers over* the constitutive conventions" (1993, p. 227). It is part of performativity's function, that it makes reality's givenness possible precisely due to the *invisibility* of the constitutive dynamic.

3.3.5 The indeterminable meaning of performative utterances

Butler also, more explicitly, theorizes the power in reading and responding to performative utterances (For example in 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). She leans on Derrida's argument that there is an equivocality of the utterance itself, a disjuncture between utterance and meaning, because meaning only "exists" temporarily in the utterance, and can never be unequivocal across readings of it (1997c, p. 365). She, too, implicates the utterance's radical distance from the utterer, one constituted *as* utterer in each occasion of utterance; the constitutive power is *in* the performative function of citationality itself, certainly never based in *intention*. In other words, there is nothing before, or outside, of this embodied utterance (whether in speech, writing or whatever a body occasions), but there is also no deciding how meaning *becomes* in each response/reading.

As an example of the indeterminability of utterances, ones that yet "make" some sort of reality, Butler troubles the idea that what may count as hate-speech and anti-hate-speech necessarily achieve opposite or even different things. Anti-hate-speech does not, in any way, guarantee non-complicity in social ills. It cites the same system of differences and to some degree reproduce the same meanings of bodies, the same structures, and in that the same social problems. This latter issue, of complicity, is of course paralleled in the many critical approaches to social justice, that in different ways trouble the demands for knowledge of the other/Other as implying foreclosures in the lives and relations of others.

> **On the surface you can be very different, but then you are very similar in many ways! And that diversity is a bit of spice, but what you are similar about ties us more together!**

> **And all the children have the same need for care and safety… regardless of background those are essences that will be reflected in children. [18]**

3.4 Derrida and Butler in closer proximity

Let me say again that for both writers there is an iterable logic that conditions the possibility of temporary reality and truth, or *being* and *knowing*. There is in this also an impossibility in terms of *lasting*; utterances, in writing, speech or otherwise embodied citations, constitute truths and realities temporarily, whether declaring a marriage, offering an argument, speaking "as" a teacher, "being a man", or whatever other, mostly mundane, effects.

At a fundamental level, utterances retroactively ensure, in ways these theorists call citational, performative and/or constitutive, an implicit "self", "I", speaker or utterer. Further, as what I choose to mostly write as the "self" because of its centrality to ethics I engage with, there is also citation of more or less explicit areas of meaning, like "gender roles", or "reflective practitioner"; in teacher education and teaching the normative demand for, and recognizable response "as", knowledgeable, competent and moral, depends fundamentally upon that premising "self". It is in that sense, in what is really a mutual dependence, for example sex/gender, or "self"/teacher work performatively *as* pairs, where one side has a function of given foundation, but both sides are reiteratively constituted *as that pair*, together. This dependent relation is an aspect of the affect and effect of constitutive address, where this "dual" becoming is possible *and* necessitated. In Chapter 5, I start to redevelop this becoming as in terms of "curricular performativity", in the context of extending the centrality of address in this project.

3.4.1 Writing to let the other in

For both Derrida and Butler, the non-foundational subject may not "be" ethical and may not own or "intend" moral speech and action; ethics is located in the relation to the indeterminable outside/other. The central relevance of the other is quite differently developed in their arguments. However, I would say that there is, for both, an other that at its most basic is the other as a discursive function, the outside that as inherent paradox of im/possible meaning temporarily constitutes meaning. Therefore, within their arguments, discursive practices open to the other are open to the always indeterminable becoming of meaning. Within both of their approaches, the ethically troubling function of the powerful, illusory center of meaning (like "self" or "God") is precisely to rather guard *against* the indeterminable and (seemingly) maintain coherence.

This overlap, but in Derrida's perspective developed as a primary logic of iterable meaning, performativity and ethics, is why I from here on in move with both of their works together, but in some ways working under the larger umbrella of becoming in and as *meaning*. Certainly, you will see that as I include more visibly in my working perspective the Derridean other, as the outside of all *text*, in a thesis otherwise mostly inspired by reading Butler, I do this also to emphasize that I reappropriate her subject-oriented concepts of demand, address, and framing for my purposes, for developing an innovative argument on the many demanding aspects of truths and realities in education.

Responsibility in the relation to the becoming of a *subject* other is for me another articulation; just like the constitutive outside of meaning in general, a human other in a scene of address is an outside that demands constitution of you as a "self". In other words, the similar ethics (as I read it in this particular context), where Butler's articulation most distinctly also employs the concept of *address*, still resides in the productive and exclusionary dynamic of discourse because it concerns the relation between discourse and materiality, together on or as a non-hierarchical surface. This makes subjects un/viable and lives im/possible, because coherence of the other(s) ensures "self"-maintenance. This dynamic characterizes an ethical relation because it regulates how people can relate, act and narrate (Butler, 2005, 2006, 2009; Butler &

Chakravorty, 2007; Derrida, 1978, 2007; Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000).

> **...you are a person too! And even though the first priority is taking care of the pupils, you also have to be taken care of, if you are to be able to teach, and take care of the class, it is important that you are respected both by the pupils and by your colleagues.**
>
> **Yes, because if your personality is overlooked, or not acknowledged, that is a violation!**
>
> **Yes, because then you feel that you as a person isn't good enough! [19]**

Derrida's ethics of deconstruction resonates strongly with Butler's work, where performative politics of writing *and* other embodied utterances are encouraged; Butler creatively engages with her interest, according to Fiona Jenkins, "in the effects of what can be made to 'seem real' or 'compelling' as part of an order of appearance that *conjures* underlying realities in ways that make it seem as if it is necessary to *presuppose* them" (2008, p. 145, *italics in original*). It is also in line with her arguments for a permanent indeterminacy of the terms of recognition of the "self" and the other in social and political relations (Butler, 2005, 2009, 2015a, 2015b). These insistences cannot be made insignificant or taken out in either of their work – or in mine – and this is central to my attempts to facilitate, or rather hope for, ethical avenues of writing. I argue this further in the coming chapter, where content and style come together to *point to* presupposed but conjured realities. Efforts even hinting at the constitutive dynamic, however this is executed, and in whichever context, is, as I understand it, itself about Responsibility to the other.

I must acknowledge that Derrida's work of course holds an explicitly developed perspective on strategies and ethics of reading and writing, while Butler's does not. Yet, I read her as sharing his affinity for both strategic and given paradoxality, as layers of argumentation, as she engages in work on conceptual, social, political and ethical questions. As Jenkins comments, Butler's way of writing "foreground[s] the interest and importance of rhetorical strategy and posit paradox as a productive space" (2008, p. 143). Her arguments, like Derrida's, are both topically or conceptually specific and immensely broad in terms of implications. I would say that they both have a certain obliqueness in their styles of engagement, in ways that unsettle common rules of argumentation. Playfully and purposefully, I think, each implicates us as readers in the ethically destabilizing effect.

Again, Butler holds that *affect* plays a central role in the maintenance of the coherent "self", that necessarily differentiates among others; as part of the function of framing, there is what I see as an affective "pull". This is familiar from Derrida's focus on a center of meaning as a function in discourse, to limit *play* and remain in/as its foundational role in the system of meanings leaning on it. Affective "force*"* is certainly, I find, intimately relatable to his argument on a center of meaning's "nostalgic longing" (Derrida, 1978) for stability, a longing *in* the iterable logic that ensures (relative) maintenance of meaning.

> **I feel I've developed through the course of this study. It's my own experiences and reflections that have had the most impact!**
>
> **Yes, I notice that very much with regard to the institution and the internships too! Yes, they are completely different things! I feel that there isn't even a connection between them! It feels more useful with the internships! [20]**

For this thesis, perhaps the most relevant part of Butler's perspective is her focus on the structure of address that this force of affect, and normative demands, are at play in, and the embodiment that both supports and is affected by this. What I take from Derrida, on the other hand, is that we should see that the "self" is just *one* center of meaning, and that the "longing" functions, as it must, in the overall non-hierarchical *textuality* that is our material-discursive situation. Even though lives are always *relevant* in his work, his core arguments as developed with a primary view on the function of the other in reading/writing.

Discussing the contrasts between Derrida's and Butler's enormous scholarship are clearly not within the scope in this thesis. I have read some central elements of their arguments together, quite selectively, and my hope is that their intimately related but different approaches to social and discursive functions may compliment and extend each other's usefulness and reach in the context of my particular interests. In the next chapter, I carve out a road of my own based on moving with these theorists together. I find there is great potential in engaging you with the im/possibilities of *writing* the constitutive dynamic in question.

4. Performative writing and paradoxality as productive space

There are a few things I would like you to think back on now and keep considering as you read further. First, what were your thoughts, when reading in the opening pages those pieces referred to as "Uttered in conversation among teacher students", and then encountering my readings of main theorists, of this anti-foundationalist, fully theoretical project? What has it made you expect? What kind of relevance have you assigned to the words I have inserted like this, in the context of my overall writing so far? What do you think the transcribed sentences you have seen sprinkled in the thesis have *done*, in your reading? Have you considered how the participants may read this thesis? Finally, I would like you to be open to (re-)consider what the

words in the conversations could imply, when spoken *and* written, about those people they seem to refer back to, their *reality*, and now what they might affect, in your reading, from here on in.

4.1 To perform a destabilizing argument

It follows from my project's dismissal of a foundational subject that the conversations were not organized to provide "material" in any social scientific sense, premised on presence and representation. Again, underneath Derrida's initial work on performativity of speech and writing, which Butler also bases much of her work in, is how iterability is the precondition of *all* meaning. There is in this dynamic an ongoing deferral of meaning, what also implies a rupture in any presence or stability, that makes meaning disconnected from who-/whatever "sends" or "receives" it, or any context; communication is paradoxically im/possible, that is, only possible in radically temporary ways. To reiterate, I hold that *all* utterances cite linguistic and cultural convention and there is nothing ahead of or outside what becomes in these moments of citation; *performed* meaning/truth/reality *is all the meaning/truth/reality there is*, whether in oral, written or whatever other mode of "communication".

Central to my reading and engagement is how the students are non-/present in your reading. They are only constituted, for you, as utterers, *in* the event of reading, where embodied reality, here visible as sentences, functions as performative; it is as real as they can get. There is in my argument no one "behind" the transcribed speech, no "holding" of *experiences, opinions, competence, values* or *insight* by a "self" outside citation. Yet, I argue, this does not preclude transcribed words from contributing to pursue the conditions and functions of education I am interested in.

In the spirit of what I read as Derrida's and Butler's open-ended perspectives on how it is

possible and ethical to perform a destabilizing argument, or whatever other performative politics, I find their work offers exciting ways to merge an interest in the framing constitution of "self" and its many others through education, with an approach to writing ethically. Although the select arguments I bring together from these two theorists are closely related, they do contribute and inspire differently. My basic inspiration concerns the concepts of normativity, address, framing, affect, Responsibility, and ethical violence, and is heavily Butlerian. This still guides me in how I see what both allows and drives of citation for recognizable professionality, as well as my larger aims and interests regarding ethics and society, in and through education. Subjects, such as those in the conversations, are from this perspective im/possibly constituted as meaningful at and as temporary sites of response, in scenes of a demanding structure of address. Yet, it is Derrida's way of arguing the iterable functions of discourse, and approaches to what writing and reading *does*, that sparked the interest in having conversations as part of this project – what I, for reasons outlined below, believe can, and should, be done with the transcribed sentences.

In all, this is about being better able, in this thesis' address to you, to engage with writing and reading of subjects *and* discourse, *and neither*, precisely because they are also, in non-hierarchical perspectives on discourse and reality, one and the same.

> **One teacher here has been very good at using cases. Then you share your thoughts first, and then the reflections can also come!**
>
> **C: With your attitudes, you go in and look at other people's actions?**
>
> **Yes. And during internships. And throughout my days, more in general. [21]**

In writing forth connections of bodies, speech, writing and reading, I *point to* the function of utterances in becoming as subjects. Again, Derrida reminds us of how there is a paradoxical *always already*, a "temporal displacement", in the utterance as it "refers back to the people that authorizes it, but it also looks forward to that people as the entity it will constitute through its utterance" (Loxley, 2006, p. 103). It is here I think of the participants' function, how I hope to make use of the words spoken, creatively and ethically.

The differences and the diversity is part of making you a unique individual! Humanized!

It doesn't have to be sensational that you are different!

Yeah but it depends a lot on how you see it. There's a lot playing into how *you* interpret it. No one else… thinks for you! I decide how I want to interpret you! But at the same time… the environment, and the attitudes I've grown up among, influences how I think about others. and what I've learned in school. And negative and positive experiences have influenced how I judge, or *see* others! [22]

4.1.1 Performing the performativity of speech and writing

It is relevant here to refer back to Derrida's theatrical performance of performativity, and Listik's (2015) comment that *saying* how utterances are performative of reality is one thing, but using theatricality to *point to it* is something else, or another articulation of the argument. Derrida might have said it is a necessity. I agree with Listik's comment that it is crucially relevant to remember that if while engaging with Derrida's work we disregard the full meaning of his performances we refuse to even consider his "as if". If my thesis argument considers responses to demands in educational address as performative, and I within the writing maintain, in any way, a presence and representation of participants, or to somehow allow the illusion that "I" or "my*"* writing is *not* performative, it would arguably cancel out my own argument. The seemingly methodological aspect of the participants cannot stand as some sort of foundational presence apart from the overall theoretical inquiry. I cannot argue I write "about them" or refer to words as "theirs", or in any way claiming to "present" articulations as meaning what someone "intends" them to mean; this would (Butler, 1997a; Derrida, 1972) imply a notion of ownership as pre-discursive subject.

4.1.2 To affirm the bodies' occasioning of subjects and other meanings

For me all this implies an incitement to use creative means and perform an inquiry that engages what many may refer to as "quotes" as doing something radically different, something that rather only suggests what the spoken utterances *do* in the moment of citation, what they may do in written form in a relation to a reader, and what they may do at the site of the constitution of the you as an "I". It urges me to not only invite trouble on the topic of becoming as professional subjects, and the infinite others made in the complexities of demanding address I will argue the field of education involves. It also urges me to engage with a closely related dynamic, in how this writing could perform an openness in its function and relation with you as reader; this is writing, in my address to you, *as if* my argumentation can be true.

Further, both Derrida and Butler hold that the otherness of the outside/other constitutes subjects as much as it does concepts/words and my argument is that a deconstructive possibility, and necessity, in affirmatively allowing inherited metaphysical assumptions, is equally pertinent in relating directly to the "actual-ness" of singular, speaking people, as to meanings in "pure" conceptual critique. What I am saying in this argument is that in the performativity of embodied students, normative content, and the aspect of materiality, can all be *pointed to*, and so can, as I engage with the next chapter, the dynamic of address overall.

I argue the theoretical and ethical usefulness, and even appropriateness, of including pieces of transcribed text, to offer a possible additional opening, or challenge, in your reading overall. In different ways, Derrida and Butler write of subjects, utterers, addressors and addressees, and others – whether distant or not. All constitution is somehow occasioned by bodies, yet the more directly imaginable "actual person" as fully constituted, on singular, affirmative terms is, in my reading, not approached in their writing. I see it as merely a difference of interests and foci that neither theorist engage closer to, and with, sentences articulated by somewhat proximate bodies this way, but rather only with published or public text. My writing may be to the side of theirs, but I do not see this aspect as conflicting with their perspectives; it is, after all, from looking to their arguments on ethics, performative subjects, and paradox as strategy, that I make sure to do this.

In other words, I believe we can and should *point to* the constitution of the subject and its other, as this is occasioned by bodies in teacher education. Why not *write* the instability with a sense of "actual" people? To this end, I have inserted transcribed text throughout this thesis, unmarked and unsorted, to perhaps have somewhat of a provoking function. Insertions of speech, where speakers are seemingly present and referring to themselves, it seems to me, affirm "them", as *owning intentions, self-insight, practices, values* and *knowledge.* You have encountered these articulations many times already. Some may be placed within sections where central words in these utterances are somehow a focus or issue of what I am arguing, but they are, as you may have noticed, often fully without any such placement or comment.

These sentences may, in this general context of theorization, function as written utterances standing in for spoken ones*,* in a type of interrupting double move that relates closely to, but also requires a leap from, both Derrida and Butler's styles and concerns. I want to make visible the play and power of meaning by blurring the lines through/in writing, tying together the dimensions of signification and reality. I constantly give space to both dimensions here, to show the incommensurability between argued performativity of *all* utterances, and a caring, knowledgeable "I" of a speaking student.

This makes possible seeing/thinking/imagining a constitutive dynamic, with not only concepts (such as "reflection"), but bodies and recorded words, "in play". To engage deconstructively one cannot, as Derrida argues (1978), escape the signification one critiques in the first place, and in this project that means the very words said, by "real" students, that may also ensure the recognizability of teacher subjects – words "they" are taken to express about "their*"* knowledge, values, opinions and intentions.

4.1.3 Our layered engagements with citationality

When I insert what I argue as embodied utterances, as performative events of becoming, I hold that both the students and I are partaking in (becoming through and as) citing the system of meaning those curricular demands entail. In your reading you also partake in reiterating these pedagogical discourses to somehow relate to the argument, becoming in relation to the argument as demanding, an argument ironically even explicitly insisting on the violence of such a dynamic. You, they and I are responding, *at and as* performative sites of reading, speaking or writing "selves".

I return at a later stage to an argument that *any and all* reiteration of these paradigmatic discourses, not just in address among human bodies, on one level necessarily entail that their premising intelligibility is maintained, which can ensure continued ethical violence. What I am hoping for though, is deploying what both Butler (For example Butler, 1993, 1997a; Salih, 2002) and Derrida (for example 2007) might differently call citation's iterable potential for destabilization, its agency even, through re-citation in other contexts and other incoherent ways, and in that *pointing to* citationality. And so, this project involves layers of normative citation in speech/writing/reading: formal and informal use/re-citation, *and* within the consideration of this performativity itself. Further, with the citation of educational discourses being written, spoken, asked and answered, I *point to* not only their role in framing what is recognizable, and their ontological and epistemological premises, but also their utterly unstable ways of traversing, vaguely and chaotically, yet powerfully, multidirectional address across fields of education. This style of performative writing's is precisely ethically committing to show the *as if* of what is real and true in education and society – to trouble the constitutive functions I see education as heavily invested in.

4.1.4 Intimate readings and moving with paradoxality

I keep the relation to the occasioning body, as it responds as a "self", close to us in this thesis for two semi-separate reasons. One, to the extent it can be seen as a separate issue, I do believe it is a theoretically sound argument and engagement in itself. Two, as a matter of opening up the reading, which of course relates to the first point, it is important, I find, in a thesis like this, with heavy emphasis on troubling premises and consequences of discourses of education, to keep the bodies always within sight, and the project not too theoretical for you to entertain as having relevance in society. It is all too possible within all of our academic contexts as pedagogues or perhaps philosophers of education, to read the argument on constituted-ness as interesting but abstract, as not interrupting the reality of our being and everyday encounters.

For me, the theoretical argument in this thesis holds without the participants' utterances, but I find that this juxtaposition of utterance with theoretical argumentation helps me to argue better *both with and against* the reality of students and re-view their role in the constitutive workings and implications of education. I aim to undermine firewalls and make openings in the powerfully maintained binaries of language and reality, theory and the material. That is why this critical inquiry into education is made specific and grounded with bodies of "actual people*"*.

> **I may not add much… I mean in terms of diversity my classroom. Even if I am possibly not the majority in that room, I am majority in the greater society, in Norway. [23]**

I think of it as a retroactive constitution of the realness of the embodied subject, and suggest that the words should be read with openness to maintain in a paradoxical space – that they are real students "referred to", but ones also *becoming* real, in each moment of citation, *as you read them.* Further, with a radical distance between both utterance and utterer, and utterance and context, we can even say that it is for example possible to read, in many of these sentences, "palpable", reflective, knowledgeable, social justice-oriented *students*, but confusingly, also, performative *teacher* subjects, far outside the conversation-setting. In other words, these

insertions provide, for me, a type of paradox I believe is very valuable, theoretically and ethically, to maintain, even as it implies daring to disallow one's reading "self".

This move, of course, this performance of the *as if* the words *belong* and *represent,* relates closely to the overall theorization in this thesis, where I draw from theorists' work and engage with concerns with curricular demands, and with framing and normativity as functions of complex events of address. These aspects of the thesis *are* merged, at a distance from any foundational ontology and epistemology; the written utterances are included to hopefully "work" both *in and as* the theoretical *pointing to* the constitutive dynamic, to make visible the whole ontoepistemological structure as always already destabilized – *as* materialdiscursive movements and moments.

In other words, I let "them" *be*, hoping to get closer to perform, in my relation to you, a theorizing text that "moves close to" the singularity of becoming subjects, if only due to "perceivable" bodies and "selves" in this transcribed format, and may constitute a troubling read as it lets you stumble in the paradoxical reality of a discursive dynamic. I invite you to imagine, perhaps vividly, the performativity of students in what I in the next chapters will develop further as complex *address*, with many others, demanding *and* differentiated, where I also relate this to societal implications. Theorization of the function of educational framing, and normativity*,* is given weight and coloring, and in that, I hope, made thought-provoking and engaging.

Overall, again, this engagement is for me not so much a matter of disagreement, but merely a different type of unsettling move than what I read as performed by Derrida and Butler. Involving words articulated by bodies in my local context in ways I find neither come close to, is only one part of a project that joins the efforts by these two, and other writers, to somehow *point to* the constitutive dynamic as it works, and has normative and ethical implications and structural and material consequences, in general and/or particular contexts.

Clearly, behind the involvement of conversations was, for me, the doubly inspired perspective that this inquiry may theoretically function *better* as *pointing to* framing, including the address

framing is a function of, from this double move with *real* people, and that it may otherwise have more easily remained a purely conceptual question for you. As such, I stand by choosing to involve recorded speech in a theoretical venture that could stand on its own, although differently, without it. It is not only permissible from my perspective on the contexts and processes of both education and writing; there is rather a close relation between the overall theoretical project and this choice.

4.1.5 A necessarily failed recipe

The lines of argumentation I offer in this past section on the purpose/hope and ethics of inserting utterances, came to be more "explicit" than I initially assumed. I aim to "argue by doing", to perform an intimate relation between argument and form – message and means. I am offering something that may enable something else to be thought and to happen that may constitute a promise of openness to the otherness of meaning, in epistemology, ontology and semantics. At the same time, I am aware that reading is indeterminable, as *otherness* eludes representation. I am very aware there is nothing to ensure an experience of otherness in your reading as there is really no way of knowing the extent that it "opens us to it". Any declared *pointing to*, in any way "telling you", what I in this moment believe is suggestive of "it", is risky business.

I felt resistance to this almost methodological argument I have offered, because of its own possible effects of foreclosure, through functioning like a (necessarily failing) recipe for reading. I have been apprehensive about a trap of seemingly appropriating spoken/transcribed iterations for a defined meaning to a defined end. In a stated hope toward openness through an unsettling read, I have also been concerned with this leading argument, or claim, on the function of written utterances. So, why *say* anything here about performative utterances in/as writing? If I am mainly interested in affecting your overall reading, why not let transcribed sentences stand and *possibly* function this way, without further comment, on their own?

My thoughts on usefulness of such leading suggestions have imposed on my desire to strive for implicitness and paradoxality, but part of what has developed as a purposeful way of writing this section, also has to do with *daring* to lean creatively on scholars' work in whatever ways they inspire in this thesis context. I dare to stand in the proximity of these two famous, and infamous, theorists and read quite selectively into a context of truths, realities and implications so crowded and so central to our societies. I dare to use language, to suggest, to use *real* bodies and *real* speech as my choice of standing somewhere, all the while dismantling any firm foundation for this choice.

The thing is, I have come to believe that this sort of "writing of" students is so tightly connected to the argument on the performativity of subjects and other *text* in a constitutive process that I decided this was not the time for subtleties, but rather for almost exaggerated reiteration of this relation between writing, reading and other becoming of meaning *as* interesting and appropriate to develop and address you with. It is my hope that it, in some readings, might be.

I want to restate, first of all, that inserting these utterances in this thesis context, and now explicitly arguing their possible function in this section, rests, for me, on the same deconstructive logic. I seek to undermine methodological aspirations, to refuse any scientific notion of validity in the "use" of people involved. This is related to my ethical concern with both ongoing play of meaning, and *pointing to* the play. There is an ethical commitment in affirming presence and representation; a commitment in the sense of having to necessarily stand somewhere, to be able to speak/write at all, but the effect of standing there is also admittedly indeterminable and uncontrollable. This is neither a weakness nor a problem, but merely an implicit aspect of the overall argument. The inserted sentences do not, and cannot, belong to the students, but the meanings of the words, whether semantically, conceptually, or as function or ethics, certainly do not belong to me either. I take them out of the context they were spoken, a context I argue the meanings are necessarily radically disconnected from to begin with, and see them as utterances which *I* suggest *do something in the world*, even in another context, even in writing. Can I ensure that you see it the way I see it? Clearly not.

When I suggest the appropriateness here of *writing* the students, I also follow what I see as a lead from Derrida and Butler's styles, as they, I find, always playfully implicate their readers'

indeterminable readings. Listik (2015) comments that crucial in Derrida's writing is to always be open to the outside of meaning *in* ones writing, that his theatrical "use of the performative aspects of language attempts precisely to take the road not taken" (2015, pp. 15 – 16), to demonstrate such openness. As I try to do things in the world, to represent the real students *as if* it is possible, I am always aware of the impossibility of securing meaning in your reading.

> **C: The subtopic of "competence about relations" within 'the knowledge of pupils'. Has it been useful?**
>
> **Yes! It has!**
>
> **Well, we've had *one* assignment, on how to build relations. Not much in the curriculum, but it has been lectured about somewhat, and among some of our internship teachers there is focus on it. Not just… on a deeper level, but on a simple level, like… learn the pupils' names! Because that is an attachment that gives relation, and makes them feel appreciated.**
>
> **And we are several students placed together, and we discuss a lot, so we attain quite a high level of knowledge about the pupils! So, I feel that it is there, during our internships, that I have learned the most about relations. And been able to try it out! What works with that pupil and not another! [24]**

I hold that an articulated attempt at deconstruction here, when in, and as, a simultaneous undermining of the "intending" "self", and of any possibility of being "right", may itself function as a double move. My arguing "I", which cannot be escaped in a thesis project, is as im/possible as the argument itself. I still try to overturn, through standing, and affirming something present and real, the material and discursive levels of educational subjects *in your reading*, which *I* believe is the only place "they" can "be". I do this by rigorously connecting, and *pointing to*, affirmatively, the utterances in educational address and the demands within this historical context of inherited, metaphysical concepts. For these reasons I stand by wanting to explicitly emphasize in this section the matter of the intimate similarities and connections between a reading and responding body and all kinds of *text* it encounters. I want to bring together thoughts on citations and the constitutive effect at the site of embodied subjects, and on what otherwise goes on in the relation between truth and reading written text, as you (and I!) sit down with this one.

This potential for disturbance and opening is only there in your moment of reading. I believe that in order to see (read) subjects as constituted, to be able to consider *address,* and a "curricular performativity" within connectivities of becoming meanings, as I do in upcoming

chapters, one must destabilize the barrier that is a belief in even ones' own reading "self" – in engagements with *written* text *as much as* in relations with the subject other.

This thesis writes discourse and people, including you and I, as equally (con)*text*ual, equally implicated *in and as* Responsibility to the other through the function of address. I have dared to suggest what this inclusion of transcribed utterances *may* function as un/doing, and a usefulness in that. When coming across such inserted sentences in this thesis, it is *possible* for you to see them as responding to address *as* student subjects, with normatively attached meanings, and to think these necessarily embodied subjects do not exist prior or outside the constitutive event of such a response. Utterances refer back to utterer *as if* foundational, lasting subjects, whether directly from a mouth, in a recording, or on a page.

It is also possible in your reading to see each of these subjects as events of *affective* reiteration of an other-differentiating "self" to compensate for precariousness – with consequences to situations of precarity. Crucially, it is also possible to imagine these events as *connected* to the becoming of many more people and aspects in and through education. I hope to maintain these possibilities in my address to you, in the upcoming chapters.

I would, finally, say that in the context of theorizing a fullness of a Derridean argument on and through performativity in writing, suggesting this as making students (*as if* they are) real, temporarily, I am only with my exaggerated defense of doing just that, extending the commitment of standing somewhere this writing necessarily is. I believe that in terms of a commitment in this thesis' address to you, and the affective response at the site of *you as a reading "I"*, it may hold a promise that hopefully does not diminish by involving a chapter like this one.

4.2 Research ethics and ethical violence: A predicament of colliding premises

As I mentioned earlier, this brief section returns to a concern with research ethics and participants' possible reading of this thesis. I went through a process of consideration before I organized the group conversations, a process I could not narrate until now as it relates intimately to the line of argument above.

Do I disrespect anyone? What would that mean? My theoretical framework, and the guiding principles of *research ethics* that someone may expect as they agree to participation, are in a sense incommensurable, because the concepts of subject, discourse, presence, representation and interpretation are radically divergent. In my writing, the participation, and the words, are awarded different significance. They and the words I choose to involve here, are through the performative moves I make in this thesis, assigned certainly an unusual non-ontological and - epistemological "status", which undermines the premises underneath an applicability of research ethics as such.

Ethics are everywhere in the theoretical landscapes of this inquiry. In this section, it occupies the scene in yet another way. Here I tell of considerations in the dissonance between the sort of perspective on ethics I engage with, and the educational research field's expectations, as well as the expectations from participants, regarding considerations of respect, integrity and truthfulness, in research ethics, based in the less explicit but fully implicit assumptions of the role of participants and the use of sentences as "material" coming from them.

When a subject claims personal ownership of intentions, word-choices and actions, this is part of the narrative of liberal humanist agency which has sedimented in the iterable realness of a "self". What the participants may take to be *their* words, are here not engaged with as such at all, and cannot even be, and the issues of constitutive violence in this project's argument are not about "them" as "being" ethical or not. These insertions perform snap shot images from a discursive dynamic within an argument *about* this, in a doubled way that is quite particular to

this thesis' overall theoretical development. As a continuation of the previous arguments, the following considerations are about efforts made to avoid participants' possible reading of this thesis in a way that for them may constitute an insulting, hurtful read, undermining their perhaps affectionately held (performed) notions of integrity and identity.

I approached the conversations, and later this writing, with careful consideration to attempt to prevent feelings of hurt or unnecessary discomfort if they are to read this dissertation. I want to add, to start with, that I believe that a meeting with text *may* destabilize assumptions in a reader in ways that are read as positive, leaving more aspects of being, thinking and feeling possible. Yet, I did not believe a reading encounter with this type of serious and extensive text, for each participant, years after the conversation, in private, would *likely* be the context for this to happen. So, what could I do?

I found it useful to take as my point of departure a few established principles in the Norwegian "Guidelines for research ethics in the social sciences, law and the humanities" (NESH, 2016), which some may see as relevant to consider with regard to this project. These principles are quite conventional, recognizable to both fellow theorists or researchers, and readable by or likable to those who participated. To illustrate, I have included some key words and issues:

> [C]aution is required, especially when … self-respect or other important values are at stake. (p. 12)

> Researchers should not ascribe irrational or unworthy motives to participants (…) [and] must show respect for the values and views of research subjects. (p. 22)

Strictly within my perspective on subjects' relations to statements and discourses, these cautionary rules in social science ethics guidelines are made irrelevant. Yet, I was acutely aware early on, that whichever way I found of incorporating transcribed speech in a surrounding argument, it could be *read* as being judgmental toward values and views and severely undermining what they – in line with the guidelines – may see as *integrity* and *identity*. Because of the centrally considered ethical concerns in this thesis, participants – being invested in belonging, knowledgeable competence, professional values, and societal role – may jump to the conclusion that they were personally and explicitly being criticized as "unethical".

From where I am writing, the citation of meanings premising knowable "selves" and others in pedagogical relations, like reflection, knowledge of pupils and social justice, works in ethically violent ways, but this *does not and cannot* imply that there is a person that uttered the words that "is" unethical or immoral in this regard. I engage (with) *the function of* these citations, but what I argue as problematic does not belong to or "reflect" on the participants (Butler, 1997a, 1997b); they are not interpreted. I make that distinction fully. I firmly hold that no intention, motivation, values or consequences is, or can be, *found*, *ascribed* or *attributed* to them. I do not, and cannot, blame or shame a person for citing currently normative professional and political discourses and practices that do not belong to them, that are always prior to the performative moments of constitution.

> **But how many resources are one supposed to put into a classroom…? Because it also gets… it can counter the whole principle of inclusion too. Making clear categories among the pupils can be counterproductive!**
>
> **There could be an advantage to just think or say "yes, that's just how it is"!**
>
> **Yes, you have to do it as naturally as possible. With inclusion and everything. That you shouldn't point to everything and say "you are like that, but that's okay" with everything, because you can create problems instead! [25]**

A specific issue I had to consider was *informed consent*; should or could I somehow inform of possible future experience of discomfort or other challenges to what we may see as "self-respect or other important values". Further, how feasible was it to inform them sufficiently for consent, about the purpose of my project, like the guidelines say? I did not believe I could explain it to them, and, importantly, an attempt would undermine that whole part of this project.

I found that I could best approach informed consent through separate forms, before and after the conversation, and that it was sufficient with two sentences about generalized contribution to a field and aspect of society, on the initial *Information and consent form*[34]:

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[34] The full form is in Appendix 1, in English and Norwegian

Research topic and aim

This project looks at what teacher students think about the areas of knowledge and values called "knowledge of pupils" and "diversity and inclusion", and generally about the focus on reflection in their education. It aims to contribute to the development of related practices in the education and profession in innovative ways.

Informed consent with regard to *participant role* was another issue, and is connected also to notions of harm and integrity. The initial form said:

Your role involves discussing the research topic with this group, partially facilitated by the researcher. The reason I am conducting a group conversation is that your role is to help bring out different ways to describe, understand emphasize and connect concepts, approaches and experiences. I assume you will trigger, challenge and support each other's input. Do not be afraid to agree, disagree or generally position yourself in relation to what the others are saying!

The conversation (...) will be videotaped to ensure possible transcription, (...) Only written material will be used, and your contribution will be fully anonymous. (...) Participation is voluntary, and you can pull out at any time without giving a reason. Personal information (...) will be treated confidentially. The material is stored at a hard drive at the University of Oslo, and only the researcher has access. (...) I hereby consent to participate in a group interview, and that the material is used in the dissertation of Caro Seland Kirsebom

After the talk, I handed out another form[35] for them to read, while I also read it out loud to them, and gave the explicit opportunity to withdraw consent. Notice how role/aim/relevance are redescribed together, but still with as common, every-day words as I could manage toward this context and purpose, words hopefully sufficiently available to non-theorist readers, and functioning preemptively toward a much later date, possibly reading this thesis:

Thank you very much for your participation!

I offer some additional information now that I could not give before because it would change the conversation, and jeopardize the type of material I am interested in. After having heard this you will have a new opportunity to consent, or not, to me using the material.

Your assumptions about your own role may not coincide with the methodological perspectives that inform the project. Those assumptions, if not explicitly commented on, may lead to you feeling misrepresented or misinterpreted. I hope you can keep this in mind if or when you read my dissertation in three or four years.

This is a philosophical project about language and ethics; it is not social science.

I am interested in use of language, or discourses, about the three areas we have talked about, in and around your education, which are present and endorsed both culturally, politically and in the teacher education curriculum. I want to consider what the professional discourses we have talked about may be seen to imply, seen from certain theoretical perspectives.

---

[35] The full form is in Appendix 1, in English and Norwegian

I plan to engage with two philosophers and develop a thorough theoretical argument about premises and implications of current formal educational concepts, and your more informal relation to this language.

I emphasize: I will not analyze you as a participant. I will not even give you a made-up name or number next to quotes, because they will be used in detached ways.

Whatever I may write about the implications of language, I am not writing about you. It is about completely common and mandated parts of the teaching profession, in political and curricular terms. I will not attribute motivation, describe you, or compare you. (...)

Your participation is a very important contribution: it makes possible an exciting new approach to ethics and pedagogy! Thank you very much!

I hereby consent ...

However each of them read this at the time, I can only say that I perceived them to be focused and capable of acknowledging the terms when they read them, and no one withdrew their consent in this second round.

In addition to this, another effort has been made now to minimize perceived harm; in the context of thanking the participants in the acknowledgement section to this thesis, I reiterate in even plainer language that my focus is on normative discourses, not on *them* per se. In other words, rather than counting on participants to follow the line of argument in this and the last chapter in a way that "shields" from feeling insulted or disrespected, I have attempted to safeguard from perceived harm both in the two-part consent process, and while thanking them for participation.

I hope my efforts were as harm-minimizing, as possible. What does it mean to relate to radically different views on ethics simultaneously? I have tried to consider the process thoroughly, to stand by my conviction in doing this project at all, and I have not held back on argumentation while writing. I have also not been thoughtless about experiences of insult and misrepresentation, regardless of how I see them in relation to a normatively constituted and affectively invested reliance on a notion of "self". At its most basic, from my perspective, it cannot ever be unethical to problematize what sustains a system of meanings and let it open us up to new questions; to expose the constitutive dynamic, is for me the very meaning of ethics. I can surely acknowledge ways that reading this, and feeling disrespected and encountering to some degree an uncomfortable loss of "self", may be painful, but I also thoroughly hold that constitutive relations and discourses need to be made visible *as* always already unstable, and as, in principle, open to otherness. This is key in the coming chapters as well. It is where agency

is, and I even believe I may also offer these participants discursively agentic openings in their ongoing becoming if they read this work. These two uncomfortable *and* opening aspects of reading may clearly also, I believe, function simultaneously in a likely unfamiliar meeting with this kind of theoretical text. In closing, all I can do is insist I was *as* thoughtful and considerate in this conflict of ethics as I could.

4.3 Leaving part one

Wrapped up in readings of Butler's perspectives on subjects and ethics, I started the first half of this thesis by offering a partial selection of historical and contemporary perspectives on, and articulations of, central demands in teacher education, and arguing their joint function in framing and normativity. Having conversations about these parts of pedagogy as part of the project, and as showing this within the text, as I have considered closely, was about two things.

First, I hoped to make the function of citationality come to life throughout the thesis. How informally and vaguely articulated these utterances are is only a benefit here, because as casual, normal uses that leave their own premises in peace, they may work as good reminders about how it is the framing function of address that is at issue here. Normative citations, as I come back to, are not primarily problematic in this project for succeeding at making *sameness*, but for their way of hiding another level of force. Anything furthering such an invisible power should be taken seriously, especially in a field with such extensive reach as education. Second, I wrote to connect this to your reading to assist in the unsettling function of this thesis argument as you read it overall. What I see performative utterances as doing, in an *as if* of *all/any* reality and truth, whether spoken, written or otherwise acted, has allowed bringing *your* reading, and self-constitution as reader, intimately close to embodied meanings in and through education.

The remaining chapters rethinks the interacting dynamics of constitutive educational address through added readings of other scholars' work. More utterances will appear, to do their

possible work in your reading, but we are now leaving the emphasis on these three demands and the argument on performative writing, to rather reconsider educational address in terms of it interacting with and contributing to the reiteration of a paradigm.

5. Framing the framing function of address: Temporality, *text* and curricular performativity

The first part of the thesis was written to develop a usefully provoking reading context for your encounter with the remaining chapters. I was interested in how education plays a central role in normative reiteration that ensures framing effects in society, locally and globally. I was also thinking that all demanding aspects, and formats, of an immense field of discourses can be said to function in ways where many directions of constitutive demands and responses influence

each other; this dynamic is what I will approach now, as we must *point to* instability to hope for openness.

You will notice a moving away from the three discourses, and from the argument on utterances. The latter was not only an argument to accompany the inserting of spoken words, but a hope that you place this whole written text, your embodied becoming as reader, the plethora of demanding circumstances, and the becoming reality of everyone and everything in/around education together as connected in performative ways. You and I are not separate from this, and opening up to "one's own" complex becoming at and as unique sites of responses to address seems to me very important toward opening up to the rest of this thesis' theoretical developments.

5.1 Redirection: An approach to the dynamic of address

I have argued how citations of meaning in each response to the three curricular demands take part in a constitution of a "self" and its other(s). However, as I increasingly emphasize, the normative discourses are not what most fundamentally ensures the violence. I now turn to focus on how framing, as Butler tells us, happens *as a function* of *address*. To take my cue from her and *frame* the violent function of framing, I find it useful to redirect and *point to* the conditions, the complexity and the in/stability of the dynamic of address.

We can recall how in *Giving an Account* (2005), the structure of address is described as a *reciprocal* relation. A response to a demanding address is a constitution of the "self" *as* a knowing and knowable "self" that is being addressed, while it simultaneously necessarily constitutes that addressing other *as* (an) other; the "self"-relation cannot be detached from the relation to the other in the structure of address (p. 12). In *Frames of War* (2009), address is argued in another way, with media address demanding a "self" that differentiates among distant others. In both formulations, the "self" is an effect of address, but also a premise of humanism;

the central premises ("self"/other) are created and upheld by the structure of address. As part of reimagining address in this chapter and the next, both reciprocity, simultaneity, plurality, types of other(s), proximity and indirectness are aspects that will be engaged with and extended.

Further, Butler says in *Giving an Account*, the demand to be a "self" is also specifically a *moral* demand. Morality is described as a *relation* that in the structure of address is *prior to constitution*; there are no available ways of being recognized outside that demand to respond. Not just as a narrativizable "I", she tells us, but as an "I" that in our current paradigm is *accountable* in a moral sense "for itself" *as* a lasting, coherent "self". In addition to this prior relation though, morality also entails *normatively* moral demands or principles, as to what to know and how to act, as for example a teacher. This too plays an important role in encounters dis/allowing what I like to call "teacher proper". The doubly problematic role of morality, does, I hold with Butler, function in any address demanding our becoming as subjects and we should be attentive to it. What I am saying is that this relation and role, as it is a crucial relation within the function of address, is necessarily also unstable, even *as* it is "a prior relation"; I engage with this in the very last chapter.

Foreclosures of lives and relations surely happen *across* fields and situations of contemporary society to the extent they all have in common an underlying humanist intelligibility, and norms both leaning on and supporting it. I have been concerned with *education,* defined already in the very first footnote as including teacher education, schools and early childhood, the practice of teaching, as well as the educational research and theory that contribute to the discursive and demanding field; the concern is a normative and framing function of address at a sort of meta-level in society, and I want to approach that over-arching play of meaning and constitution of lives somehow.

You have read many references to *pupils,* and children and youth play the lead role in my concerns and hopes in thinking/writing, but I have so far focused mostly on curricular demands, and performative responses, in teacher education. This has been a way in, for the purpose of coming to rethink address that *includes* children and youth, and more. The purpose is not to move *away* from students, but an *expanded* perspective on movements and connectivity of

becoming in education, where, for one, pupils and teachers mutually demand and imply each other as meanings. The framing that happens in and through education is a function of address more complex than what has been visible through the focus of in the initial chapters, and this chapter's redirection is about what this extended perspective may entail.

5.1.1 Scenes of a structure

Butler (2005) seemingly slips between writing *structure* of address and *scene* of address. Nothing is offered explicitly to differentiate these, but I read it as a move that silently indicates an exceedingly intimate and conceptually overlapping relation. The *structure* is the interlocutory condition, both in terms of prompting and a necessary reciprocity of it, as relational constitution of meaning of "self" and its outside/other, and the *scene* is the *occasion* or *site* of this happening. The scenes are the temporal dimension of the structure. Each site of the relational, discursive constitution of meaning is its own always already different scene.

In other words, in Butler's work a *scene* of address is not a "place" or "context" in any regular sense; she does not consider such notions in this part of her work at all. On the other hand, I will argue in this chapter that demanding and meaningful places and contexts emerge *in and as* the address itself, becoming meaningful *with* the subjects – in the becoming of someone who *gives* its surroundings meaning.

I find the way Butler's engages with the structure and scene of address to be a useful (semi-) "distinction" in theorizing, but the terms can, and should, also be seen as fully inseparable in the relation of the subject to its demanding other. The subject is occasioned by this structure of address, and only "exists" in each scene. Likewise, the structure only "is" in its many occasions. I find such a silent intermingling of terms very agreeable in Butler's argument, and for the purpose of theorizing education I involve, but develop, this in ways to signal that key relation.

> **...I am almost afraid to ask "are you a Muslim?" I feel like I am doing something... yeah!?**
>
> **Yes, but then I think that you know that you're a good person! And would never mean anything bad by it! And that is a door opener in itself... having curiosity, is good thing! That is how you learn to know others, whether it is ethnic or religious, or... sexual orientation! And that curiosity is part of creating tolerance! And knowledge! ...and that's why I think it is so stupid that thing about having to be so politically correct, and... among my favorite things to do is travel and meet new cultures, and people. I am really curious! But I hold back because I feel it's wrong, because there is so much focus on treading wrong, about how wrong it can get!**
>
> **Well, your intention, it isn't negative. And the way you ask questions matter.**
>
> **Yes, but I may have said the wrong things. I have experienced that many times. [26]**

5.1.2 The threat of precariousness – in educational address

In *Frames of War* Butler compellingly braids a consideration of precariousness and precarity with local and global ramifications of media/public discourse, and how the framing function of media address "regulat[es] affective and ethical dispositions" (2009, p. 1). She holds up the problem that precariousness is currently responded to as a *threat,* and warns us who want to counter that pattern of response, that within any "ontology of individualism" (p. 19), in which one does not see this primary relationality, it is impossible *not* to respond to the threat from others to viability as coherent subject, with the exceeding, affective defensiveness that othering and precarization involves. Only within a social ontology that takes interdependencies into consideration can one be capable of discerning the paradoxical precariousness of life without defense reflexes (p. 28). This point coincides with the argument in *Giving an Account* for an ethics based in *shared* blindness about ourselves, an ethics without an undivided "self".

Butler does not, of course, see general precariousness as a threat, but argues instead that those of us who work toward creating more just societies, should not reproduce the fear of precariousness, which supports traditional modern logics of domination, but rather posit the current lack of recognition of fundamental precariousness as the best place to start for analyzing

relations of power, suffering and injustice. *Ideally*, she tells us, politics – in writing or other efforts – should aim for people to realize our shared precariousness (p. 28), and ineluctable sociality could become the very foundation for the political. But shared precariousness is not recognized in ontological individualism and therefore hardly exists anywhere as a possible affirmative starting point. Also, although precarious viability as subject is the primary dimension, the question of viability would not be so without the structural and material circumstances bodies are embedded in. This means that as for "directionality" of approach in politics, Butler redirects and argues that in these times not only must these circumstances *also* be critically focused on, it is rather "the differential allocation of precarity that … forms the point of departure for … a rethinking of bodily ontology" (p. 3). She illustrates this through a discussion on selectiveness and skewed media portrayals of precarity due to war and conflict, as a way to also invite readers, as a route, to consider our fundamental precariousness.

I agree with Butler we must always keep in mind *why* these undeniable, and unfathomable, situations of global precarity can become at all; differential treatment and politics are, necessarily, *based* in precariousness and affective, self-constitutive differentiation of others. But I also suggest that education, alongside media (in many societies), is one of the largest and most consequential arenas of address, and that self-constitutive differentiation is involved in everything from homophobic "slurs" in a school in Norway, to reading of skin-color, using pronouns to address people, casually explaining a child through diagnosis, lack of support for people seeking asylum that are seen as "less deserving", or some distant population not getting international support to end occupation. But also, certainly, differentiation is involved behind care or concern. Actions, big and small, singular or repeated, face to face or through online bullying, voting or donation to assist foreign crisis situations, are, I argue, compensating for threats against viability as coherently recognizable subjects.

Butler's insistence on including a perspective on compensations for precariousness in political and academic engagements, can also be seen in my approach. The societal precarization through education for example involves, but is certainly not limited to, the allocation of roles, importance, options and visibility for pupils. This makes up part of the teachers' impacted contexts, but also in different ways depends on what else is being interacted with in each moment, as I will consider further below. Moreover, pupils are not only "receivers" of impact

but sites of constitution in a system where they are defensive to precariousness in their becoming as well, and differentiate *their* others. I take with me the *span* of precarious vulnerability I have hinted to here, to consider, beyond Butler's work, a framing function of a rather multidirectional dynamic of address.

This violent framing is all, in part, legitimized, normalized and reiterated through the three discourses cited orally and in writing. Framing effects of such demands in teacher education involve reiterative constitution *as*, and implicitly "teaching" pupils, "unconscious" defensiveness against precariousness – to *be* coherently, to *differentiate* coherently, and to *value* others/situations accordingly. All this is possible and necessary within the individualist ontology that is part of the contemporary framing function of the dynamic of address, functioning to affectively sustain itself as well as respond to the overall threat.

Summing up this subsection, I reiterate that just as media addresses a viewer/reader/listener with references to, and concerns about, more or less distant people, and in that demands forth a differentiating subject that politically, structurally and economically affects bodies near and far, so does education, and I argue we should be attentive and critical in considering education as a politically and culturally mandated *societal* dynamic of multidirectional address, that "regulates dispositions" and forecloses new thought and openness. From the perspective on ethical violence at the self-constitutive site of the becoming of the other, openness is foreclosed at each site, each scene, and is not limited to those who are directly, as bodies, involved in one moment of address. This thesis suggests ways to grasp the troubling dynamic beyond the bodies in educational institutions, and even those they differentiate as distant third-party sites of meaning and living; as I consider in the next chapter especially, there is an almost all-encompassing impact in reiterating current normative discourses in that this ensures a violent humanism. Contemporary education, with so many explicit or implicit others, is arguably devastating in its varied framing of society.

Issues of precarity, inside and outside education, are part of what unsettling efforts in education may have potential to counter. The route I see from here is to further develop a

conceptualization of address to assist us in this, as it may allow us to rethink what ethics and justice can even be, on different terms.

5.1.3 Framing the framing function of address

It does not follow from the power of normative and framing functions of address that we are deterministically condemned to respond coherently. Let us consider this radical openness, which is, after all, implicitly the potential here, both for pursuing embodied but non-humanist doing and relationality, but also activism, politics and writing. Again, of course, the central emphasis on iterability and resignification in Butler's work implies that knowledge, subjects and other meaningful reality are necessarily always in a moment of being constituted. A humanist "self" is dependent on normative citation that props up its invisible power, and framing depends on such conditions for its effect, but its efficacy is at the same time challenged by this temporal dimension of iterability. There are challenges that infinitely different citations can yield, as the "very reproducibility entails a constant breaking from context, a constant delimitation of new context. (…) [and it] becomes a kind of perpetual breakage, subject to a temporal logic by which it moves from place to place" (2009, pp. 10 - 11).

Further, even though frames – norms of recognizability – constitute the parameters of our reading, *not* seeing many things is also a condition of seeing something; it is a "… 'not seeing' in the midst of seeing" (p. 100). Therefore lives, in their shared precariousness and striated precarity, necessarily take place "between, outside, or across the frames by which they are for the most part organized" (pp. 7 - 8). This constitutive *outside* is in itself, as much as it is with norms, a crucial part of the frame's power, and its re/production. This involves that both norms *and* frames are as a package dependent on the function of, as I have held before, a fully social type of affect. That sort of pull ensures the "maintenance", the reiteration, of the "self" (with its outside/other), *and* the normative meanings tied to this, in the relational discursive dynamic that plays out *in and as* a structure of address, however complex we imagine this. The powerful reproduction works even though, *and* because of, framing in each instance necessarily fails to

have totalizing force. Butler tells us there is a "suspended and spectral" dimension to life and how it is constituted, and that production of life is "perpetually haunted by its ontologically uncertain double" (p. 7). It is important to always keep in mind, she writes, with respect for and curiosity about this power, that a frame never "quite determine[s] precisely what it is we see, think, recognize, and apprehend. Something exceeds the frame that troubles our sense of reality. (…) A certain leakage or contamination makes this process more fallible than it may first appear" (pp. 8 - 9).

We are reminded that not only do frames keep re-/generating specific ontologies of the subject and constitute and differentiate lives, but the capacity to discern and name a subject's "being" is also always historically contingent because normative citations may also be a challenge to the givenness of the frames, and even the terms of intelligibility. Changing normative conditions actually in some way – at least in principle – ensure such shifts. This interdependent relationship of both maintenance and change allows what may be called a political and agentic aspect of Butler's philosophy. There is ongoing potential, and also, I argue, hopeful challenges possible in education, if we *point to* how our affective self-constitution functions in the dynamic and role of this normative field in particular.

> **Yes. Teacher and care person. Because, well, everyone's different! And it's important that a teacher sees pupils' qualities! And respect them! And based in the pupils' qualities, build safe learning environments! It has so much impact on the development too, what the teacher shows regarding their opinion of the child! I think it is so important for self-image and confidence, which again is very important for learning! [27]**

Norms are more susceptible to change than frames, and the intelligibility that conditions and reproduces them. With its constituted-ness more fully covered over, the "self" generally survives even while ruptures and resistances in the iterable dynamic changes what, normatively, we are recognized as or call ourselves and, more specifically, as part of that, what we may know and do (Butler, 2009). Yet, the leakage, the contamination and outside of framed meaning, as a co-product and co-producer of recognizability, makes the frame vulnerable to subversion as well, as it offers a way to question just how ontological fields are constituted. As Butler says,

> (…) it is possible to frame the frame … which involves exposing the ruse that produces the effect (…) [T]o call the frame into question is to show that the frame never quite contained the scene it was meant to limn, that something was already outside, which made the very sense of the inside possible, recognizable" (pp. 8 - 9).

Not only is it *possible* to frame the frame, Butler insists, but dealing with "[t]he precarity of life imposes an obligation upon us. We have to *ask about the conditions under which it becomes possible* to apprehend a life or set of lives as precarious, and those that make it less possible, or indeed impossible" (p. 2, *my italics*).

Butler's argument happens to be written forth on the topic of the function of media in affecting precarity on a global scale, via its addressees, but I find the urgency supports specifically employing these conceptualizations toward education. The wide applicability of her argument on the potential for subversion, in however thematic foci or writing styles available to us, inspired me to engage with education as a sort of societal framing mechanism. I hope to frame *the way* the framing functions in a powerful yet vulnerable way, in and through an infinite field of complex scenes of address. In other words, there is an outside to this inconspicuous dynamic of address as well, as a part of its power, and we must ask what kind of outside must be involved to ensure the inside can hardly be questioned within the current paradigm of discourse and relations. Working in awareness of a deconstructive mode of discourse, these are the difficult questions we must pursue, and in order to undertake such critique we must accept and even cherish the answers as only ever inspired suggestions.

What, in principle, are imaginably different ways of address to hope for in and through education, with less violent framing impact, are foreclosed in current, affective habits of reiteration only *to the extent* the current dynamic is as good as invisible to all who are becoming through/in it. Therefore, we must strive to make *visible* how address currently holds such invisible traction. I believe that through *pointing* to further premises and movements of this complex discursive-relational dynamic, and its framing functions in and through education, something currently *other* than this may possibly be allowed. This is arguably, again, part of the larger theoretical argument on ethics it performs, an attempt *to be where ethics is*.

The insertion of utterances is of course related to this attempt; they are both quite vague, *and* have a sort of dense and visceral effect. What comes next is a few further aspects to consider, meant to expand on Butler's two formulations on her concept of address, as offered above. I will move with its strengths as well as expose its limitations, to pose suggestions I hope has even larger potential to make educational address visible as always already unstable. I do see, with Butler, violent, differential allocation of subjecthood and precarity happening at the site of self-constitution, but I also argue that what happens in demanding encounters or scenes of address is more usefully imagined, argued, and exposed, as something more "messy" than what Butler's terminology manages to capture.

The argument I go on to develop somewhat exceeds, or at least redirects, the mainly Butlerian and Derridean readings examined so far. Their vast work does not thematically or conceptually quite suit all of where I take this particular project, as I engage with additional scholarship written within the philosophy of education. Again, I keep visible the utterances performing the *as if* of the student, which also maintains one aspect of the thesis specific to teacher education, *while* I consider societal framing and address in and through education, and how this makes lives and relations of the meanings of people and/in society im/possible in messy but powerful ways.

5.2 Temporal assumptions and constitutive address

To pursue this direction of interest, I choose to start by considering *temporal* premises as conditioning the dynamic and effects of educational address. The most basic issue, in terms of temporality, has to do with dependence on, and support to, a givenness of *linear time*. The notions of *past/present/future* and *progress* as willed, positive change, are heavily involved in the current, normative meanings of teaching, its education and its practices, and as such part of what education demands. As I contrast this condition with a logic of iterability, I can tell you that the next section's angle of interest to add into this has to do with the many, many encounters between not only subjects, but also between subjects and whatever other meaning has the

function of "outside", that the becoming subjects are in a constitutive – and temporary – relation with.

Progress is only a possible notion in an intelligibility where something is lasting through it. This is a narrative that leans on the pairing of a foundation of *knowledge* and *being* and some positively loaded and willed change. Certainly, all three curricular discourses I have considered and made so visible, are dependent on this pairing of the lasting, knowable "I", and whatever progress this "I" makes or is part of *as* teacher.

From my perspective, such progress is an impossible notion; there is no lasting subject that may experience progress *from* or *with* anything. Framing and normative functions of address "opening up", are the closest to what I can see now as *positive change*, but this is a matter of changes to demands and citational chains away from almost fully foreclosing ones, but in indeterminable ways – the sort of argument I consider toward the end of the thesis. And I would not call it progress, a term encumbered with ontoepistemological meaning that ensure the opposite of openness to the otherness of the other.

Considering temporal conditions of a humanist paradigm against what we could rather see as infinite scenes of address, can make messy and brake down such dependence on a linear temporality in how we think education[36]. Unsettling this backdrop of linear time, and what is

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[36] An example of a related approach is how Deborah Britzman and Jen Gilbert (2008) consider a destabilizing potential in focus on "temporal narratives*"* with consequences in pedagogical relations. They are concerned with a *faith in narratives of experience* as originary representations behind thoughts of knowable, narratable social difference, believed to be instructive and *cause* social change – an assumption of consciousness-raising. They refer to the paradox that "the more narratives become privileged in education, the less we know about how this meta-narrative … as a feature of modernity, forecloses the work of thinking about our thinking" (p. 202). There is rather a necessary *belatedness* in the temporality of narrative, they tell us, and experience is necessarily bounded by this when constitution of meaning happens; meaning of experience happens as *secondary* to narrative.

 Crucially, Britzman and Gilbert say, "[i]n trailing behind, narrative must then repress the mechanisms through which it represents experience" (p. 202), so the issue of temporality remains foreclosed in the current discursive connection between narratives and consciousness-raising, an argument similar to Butler's on the disavowal of a constituted "self". From this the two writers focus on how we should see the *unsaid* in how narratives function as a general feature of education (p. 202). In their case, difficulties co-thinking concepts of "*gayness*", teachers, and education led them to conceptualize what they found, as three temporal narratives, each with ways of thinking "difference"; they differently emphasize past/presence/future and in that also pedagogical relations between "self" and other. Interestingly, the premise of one does not exclude another; they sometimes co-exist in use, with mixed resources and aims, and still as a whole maintain the master narrative of experience.

 They suggest that thinking of the master narrative's belatedness*,* and assumptions of narratives in terms of the temporal logic they are premised on, may allow us to rethink what education "is" and could be, what knowledge and learning is, what radical difference is, and what the relation is between education and society. In

foundational and lasting "within" it, is necessarily a crucial part of any possible refusal of the (lasting) "self" with its violent consequences, and from this we may also imagine how pedagogical relations, and, overall, education in society, may possibly hold very differently meanings in terms of relationality, normativity, materiality and politics.

Everything in sight can almost surely be said to function with discursive reliance on the logic of linear time. And you can for example also adjust this argument to different professional fields, such as social work or health care, but temporal premises are involved in the framing and normative functions of address in ways very specific to education. In this way too, I have found *discourses of responsibility* to stand out in an interesting way for this inquiry, which I will return to. It seems to me that teacher education and teaching, perhaps more so than any other social institution or practice, involve, in each constitutive event, a "future-producing" *mandate* to its very meaning and purpose. Which implies subjects affectively reiterated through precisely citing normative truths about the role of education in social planning, hopes and politics, and what is pedagogically necessary for it.

This involves performing professional responsibility for "making" future society both at the level of "personal" knowledge and competence and in the more public sense of democratic participation and preferred social and economic developments. Through teacher education and teaching this involves, for example, an embrace of the "self" through citing psychological discourses of *future-oriented learning and development*, reflection as necessary in and after practice in order *to be better later*, and *increased* social justice through the *lasting* subject having values and practices that are *increasingly good.*

Responding to these curricular demands within pedagogy, but also much more generally, citing individuality, consciousness, rationality, tradition, liberalism, pairings of essentialism and social constructivism, types of causal narratives, etc., can be seen, I find, as bringing

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their argument "real" difference is made in multiple ways, and they speculate what kinds of social justice we can imagine and affirm – or undermine. An approach like this, they say, crucially "illustrat[es] and perform[s] key tensions that enliven and create new relations between self and other" (p. 203). Thinking about time and narrativity can open up social justice education to function through other stories of difference, relevance, responsibility and social mandates (p. 213).

overlapping parts of given meaning leaning on linear time, *into* and *as* premises of the moment's "reality". This is happening *at and as* a site of subject constitution, and is therefore partly what ensures the disavowal of this iterable dynamic. Despite this, and the dependence we owe to it in order to safely "be" with illusory autonomy, we are vulnerable in each moment of citation to a possibility of not being able to perform ourselves recognizably, as the site of reiteration always repeats differently.

These teacher education demands, function-wise, is not only, or perhaps even primarily, to "be now", but to "be later", to respond in a different time, at and as different sites of becoming. I believe the possibility of performing coherently and recognizably in response to such demands is currently determined by, and "projected" into, a *notion* of "future", a demand to "still become" in "the future". A professional education, *as* projected demands, has demands in infinite other scenes of address incorporated or *implied* in *one* moment's responding, in *one* moment's "identification", in *one* moment's embodied utterances. It is partly in line with this I found it a good and relevant point to engage in and include *student* conversations; those same three discourses are presumably cited when in a teaching job, and partially through that ensures recognizability *as teacher*.

It is helpful, I find, to see that the nearly ubiquitous moral and normative educational demands basically surround each body, but only arrive in singular moments. With the temporal premises in the intelligibility holding up these discourses, and through a social ontological affectivity, this still implies a *near-impossibility* of both a refusal to respond in the moment and to *keep* responding in recognizable ways. This can happen equally in proximity to other bodies or even just silently, alone.

5.2.1 Continuity of address as normative demand

I want to bring in parts of Ellsworth's argument in *Teaching positions: Difference, pedagogy, and the power of address* (1997). This offers an interesting, closer look at one affective function of a normative demand, to always ensure *continuity* in an area where there is a projected demand for responsible, competent subjects to respond. Here she thoroughly troubles the normative, curricular demand for an ongoing process of "dialogic communication" in and for professional development and practice, focusing on how that, as a centrally demanded structure of address *itself,* has immense hegemonic power in and through teacher education and education in general, in some format or another.

Ellsworth offers a critical reading on moderate hermeneutics and its assumptions of disclosure of meaning, and of "understanding" as based in notions of experience and self-understanding. She resists how "the ideology of the communicative" is built into rules, "offered to me within social relations by educational theorists who have folded (…) [it] into their prescriptions for how teachers should teach" (p. 92), and engages with communicative dialogue and its hegemonic function. Dialogic communication is premised on both a moderate hermeneutical epistemology and an undivided "self", while for Ellsworth there is no "self", and an "understanding" is really always a "persuasion". Dialogic communication was, and I would say *is*, central in discursive practices in teacher education and education in general, perhaps most notably proclaimed to facilitate democratic learning, and teaching with inclusivity, respect, and toward progress and social justice, across known differences, something we can recognize from the meanings attributed to critical reflection.

What is rather a *production* of others in the assumption of knowledge, is among Ellsworth's issues with the hegemonic effects, but she chooses to focus explicitly on the implied "self" in this process, and the normative, moral force of the demand to participate in dialogic communication. In a "supposedly innocent, disinterested reading of the other's message" (p. 93), Ellsworth writes, one is supposed to acquire knowledge about the other person(s) and their values and opinions, to *understand* them, and only then is disagreement allowed. She finds it disconcerting how according to an established narrative in education, dialogic communication

"across differences of opinion, background, culture, knowledge, or experience" (p. 94) functions as self-reflection toward transformation. She refers to Nicholas Burbules' insistence, feeding into this narrative, that when done right, it moves us "toward discovery, insight and enrichment" (p. 100), and is fully necessary to achieve respectful, inclusive, democratic and just societies through education. It is deeply troubling for Ellsworth how "appropriate" morality and virtues are seen as necessary, in a tight connection between communicative dialogue, ethics, democracy, inclusion, tolerance, continuity and rationalism. There is a close relation between even the common use of "dialogue", and "democratic" processes. Because of this relation, "[c]alling dialogue into question, questioning its will to power and its mechanisms of control, has the potential to cast more doubt on the one raising the questions than it does on dialogue itself" (p. 103).

She takes issue with both the necessarily positive connotations, and whether it works "as advertised" at all, holding that dialogue, within the logic of the supporting perspectives like democracy and rationalism, rather only works "when an answer to the question 'Do you understand?' is a reflexive and expected answer. … [Indicating that] I have taken your perspective upon myself, I can reflect it to you now in a way that you will recognize and expect" (p. 92). Through mirroring positions, she tells us, there is rather nothing new to be gained. Participants cannot have truly new thought because the demanded dialogic structure of address, based on premises of rationality and consciousness, with no theorization of difference, problematically "allows me to subsume whatever difference there is between us into conscious, self-reflective understanding" (p. 95). The same "self", and knowledge, is reflected back and forth, as "[t]he field of view has not been restructured – it's only being repeated, and can be repeated infinitely" (p. 95). In other words, beneath a benevolent surface of dialogic processes and aims described as respectful, democratic and change-oriented, the dialogic structure of address – where a compliant, coherent, knowledgeable "self" is demanded – it is ensured that "our differences or desires will never threaten the continuity of our conscious discourse, because we have already established our common ground of dispassionate understanding. (…) We are already mirrors of each other's knowledge and positions in that all-important sense" (p. 93).

And here is Ellsworth's key issue; when we, as we are mirroring each other's dialogical position, are held "in a place of sameness" (p. 93), the only things really "understood", are the terms of engagement, where *continuity* is key. It is crucial that we recognize communicative dialogue as a *processual* demand, where, as it leans on *and* reproduces meanings of "self" and other, experience, knowledge, consciousness, rationality, progress, transformation, etc., the seemingly important content is really not important, as opposed to continuous participation reiterating the very *role* of dialogue in the field of education as fully necessary and given. Such address functions, she writes, as "a desire for a response – because a response means the dialogue is continued" (p. 105). There is no new "insight", no "transcending" openings to ensure social improvements. On the contrary, and I agree, this powerful discourse of dialogic address has as its *only* function the continuation of its notion of a conscious, rational, knowing and knowable "self" and its other, *and* the temporality that is involved in this foundationalist "existence". The all-important continuity of development and progress, and the seemingly *willed* guiding or inciting of "personal" and social change, is fully premised on a continuity of a lasting "self".

I would say that in many ways there are striking parallels to the demand for teachers to be reflective practitioners, and the two are also explicitly connected, quite intimately, in the contemporary system of meanings in/around education. Like Ellsworth says, "self-reflection" is part of the discourse of what the "self" *does* in dialogic communication, and one possible format of reflective practice is *in dialogue*. Also, the necessity of continuing both practices in a school setting, when at least some of the dialogic and reflective co-players change, also runs parallel; both are part of what is supposed to go on *with* pupils, and to be facilitated *among* pupils.

Following Foucault, Butler maintains that "reflexivity is stylized … as a social and ethical practice." (2005, p. 114); when one is addressed, by an actual or factual other, and demanded to reflect on ones "self", *or* one's knowledge/values/actions, one is not, she writes, accessing anything that was there, with a possibility to improve "it", but rather each attempt merely constitutes the "self" as viable subject, and "repetitions enact again and again the site of radical unself-knowingness" (p. 79). It is a very explicit normative *and* moral demand *to address oneself*, and in that to account for, and performatively constitute, a reflective "self", including the logic that is its knowable other. As with dialogic communication, it follows that answering

the injunction of reflective practices, *in itself*, constitutes a "self" as a version of coherently, and recognizably, ethical, and within the same problematic logic, and similar to what Ellsworth says about participation in dialogue, it is threatening – certainly for students and teachers – to consider any failure to reflect, because it would imply having to "live with an inability to render oneself ethical" (p. 79).

> **For the exam you have to show you can name the different theories of learning and development, and pull out the main ideas… and then we are supposed to reflect, talk, around it. But there are no correct answers, from their side, it is up to us!**
>
> **You are allowed to think a bit freely, because the constructive reflection, is supposed to *be in you!* Then they help you move further with that.[28]**

It seems to me that these two may be considered, in similar ways, as *both* demands to be morally accountable and normatively recognizable, including at the site of "private" reflection, *and* as reiteratively forced *ways* of address *in themselves*, within which other moral and normative discourses are cited to ensure recognition as well. It is a crucial aspect in the overall destabilization of education as a framing function, how each occasion of participation in these ways of address are precisely in this double way playing powerful roles in the ongoing constitution of "selves", seemingly, as coherent, lasting reality.

Both dialogic and reflective practices perform and reproduce the temporal premises and assumptions of the conscious and rational, lasting subject/"self", and knowledge of the other, reiterated throughout most of the overall discursive context in so many societies. Such reproduction, attributable to the temporal premise of both processual demands that are more or less void of content, is, I would say, like a central, facilitating function in educational framing. Therefore, this can and should be approached somewhat differently in our critique, as opposed to demands in education primarily implying knowledge – but always in relation to these.

> **Reflection is thinking about what you have seen or done or heard! That you are open to change your opinion. or that you are sort of willing to process your impressions.**
>
> **It is that you can think about what you do, your opinions… that what you do has a reason, and you can actually defend or argue for why you do what you do, or mean what you mean! [29]**

Ellsworth's text encourages me to keep in mind that reflective practices and dialogic communication necessarily function like "self"-affirming fields of othering, in terms of available demanded reiteration that in effect projects this logic, reproducing the premises and assumptions ingrained from our discursive contexts instead of challenging them. They force, I would say, a projected sort of necessity, or (relevance in) the "future", in each moment of performatively participating in these ways of address. I argue it involves, within the dynamic of address more generally, affectively ensuring continuation of the temporal logic beneath normative changes to knowledges and styles of practice, by ensuring exclusion of any threatening *outside* to this aspect of linearity.

A performance within these ways of address, constituting a reflective and/or dialogic student, teacher or pupil "self" is, I argue, in a way *structured by its own anticipation of repetition*. It demands its own continuation and works in each moment as in anticipation of the next. From the perspective I am working within, *all* citations of norms/discourses imply a sort of anticipated repetition because each as necessarily singular event *implies* some sort of relative repeatability. I still argue that the continuity of these ways of address themselves, are demanded as necessary in particularly powerful and troubling ways, in terms of the role of education as a central moral and normative mandate in the stability, development and progress in society at large.

These always vague, or empty, yet *enticing* discourses are good examples of very problematic stumbling blocks in terms of an alternative ethics in education that does not rely on coherent, knowable "selves" and others. They contribute, like affective "glue", with this function in and across many aspects of teacher education and teaching. As situations and citational practices where other demands are responded to as well, these two, I hold, have integrating functions; the givenness of ways of address, notions of truth, and lasting reality, are *together* disavowed in their constituted-ness.

Finally, I would also say that reflection and dialogue as naturalized, processual roles in education, purportedly toward insight and transformation, that forces the continuity of the

other-differentiating "self", cannot possibly avoid upholding the social and political status quo. Rather than ever challenging or ethically opening it up as we have seen many of its proponents hold, they are symptomatic of education in society as what I will come back to in Chapter 6 as powerfully reiterative functions of ensuring a tightly knit normativity and carrying ethical violence, across *webs of address*. Before we get to that, I move on to consider how not only subjects are constituted as meaningful in the demanding scenes of address as it works in and through education, as well as an interesting concept of curricular performativity.

5.3 Beyond subjects: Further rethinking address

A promising next step in *pointing to* the instability of the dynamic of address, has involved considering possible limitations to how Butler employs the term *demand*, and what that implies regarding her concept of *reciprocity*, as well as ethical *relationality:* Responsibility to the becoming of the other. In reappropriating this conceptual system, I suggest how for me constitutive address in and through education has to be grasped as involving a great span in terms of "types" and "times" of meanings, functions and consequences.

First of all, again, as I read it in *Giving an Account* (2005), reciprocity is, without a subject prior to citation, certainly not a *willed* relation, but a discursive-relational dynamic that *happens* as a primary structure of address. It is about how meaning *as* subject is reciprocally demanded, and constituted, between human bodies. The constitutive relation in *Frames of War* (2009) on the other hand, refers to media as addressing, which demands its addressees give meaning to images portrayed of people, but the unwilled, constituted effect happens in a more indirect address between a site of a differentiating "self" and the "third party", distant, human others, with consequences to precarity, to compensate for one's precariousness. These distant bodies are not directly addressing in the first place; there is rather a constitutive *influence* between meanings becoming in the encounter, but it is neither imagined as "merely" primary (it involves a normative level) nor is it written as reciprocal. The latter publication in other words offers a

less orderly image of influences, in terms of indirectness, distance, plurality and dimensions of ethics and politics, yet it is certainly also a constitutive relationality among human subjects.

From this I want to move to better point to the myriad of demands for meaning in education as field and function(s) in society. In multidirectional, simultaneous encounters, a plethora of necessarily unstable but affectively reiterated *meanings* are always already changing/changed, in a giant landscape of everything from educational policy, historical/cultural narratives, social and political demands, mandatory and optional textbooks, institutional structures, teachers and teacher educators, internships and assignments, to children and youth and their families. Yet I can still hold that rather than there being knowledge, progress, continuity and development, demands arrive and are responded to at and as sites of subjects *in each moment*, in ways that relatively speaking "maintains" available discourse, but that also undermine those conventional, temporal premises of linearity, and as such its implications. In other words, I see the span of the demanding landscape and function of such address also as all kinds of *text*, in a Derridean sense, that, as referred to in Chapter 3,

> (…) implies all the structures called "real", "economic", "historical", socioinstitutional, in short: all possible referents. (…) [which have] the structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this "real" except in an interpretive experience. The latter neither yields meaning nor assumes it except in a movement of differential referring. That's all (1988, p. 148 (1977)).

I find this terminology useful in rereading Butler's arguments on address, because I see that *text* is any subject *or* other temporarily real referent constituted in an encounter where an embodied student, teacher or pupil subject is performed. I hold that all kinds of *text* work in interrelated, constitutive ways, where each demanding scene of address, involves what Derrida calls "movement[s] of differential referring" (1988, p. 148 (1977)).

Within ways I hope to destabilize the givenness and invisible traction of address in and through education, it is counterproductive to disregard, for example, a textbook, or a national framework for teaching, as only a *mode* of address from its human writers (even though we can say it is that too) when, as I have previously held, there is a radical distance between utterer and utterance and the relevant citation here in this case is in the relationship of reading/constituting

meaning. Such types of *text* are, in terms of their function in address, "demanding others" in their own right, as they address and demand response. Moreover, they do so at the most primary level, demanding the constitution of the *reader* "self", which, in teacher education for example, is imbued with other "fitting" normative meanings as well. I find that for the purpose of this thesis, it is beneficial toward rethinking the power address in and through education to focus on what it may open us up to if we see *everything* making up the constitutive outside of the subject as the meaning's – the subject's – other; whatever truth/reality/referent a body somehow reads and responds to, as a reading, listening, watching "self", is simultaneously constituted *as* its other.

We had a lot of those theories of learning the first year. And we had lot of discussions. And we always landed on the best thing being a mix of them! You can take a little of this and a little of that, and… but it not optimal to just take one and stick to that! [30]

Following this, conversely, I find it useful to articulate that a reader "demands" meaning of for example a textbook other. The book is responded to by a body, whether in physical proximity or in any other moment where reading this writing is perhaps far from immediate, but the constitutive reading is performed, reading its content as facts, perspectives and values, as *part* of what in each moment is the compound meaning of how to be professional. Meanings *of* specific psychological knowledge about youth, or of critical reflection, are constituted, *exist*, only *in* the performance, and I will get back to further temporal implications of arguing this regarding the arrival of, and responses to, demands.

The direction of thought I am opening for can usefully be pursued, I believe, if we can say there is at least one embodied subject which through citational practice designates meaning to its constitutive outside/other(s), and in that affectively constitutes as a coherent "self". Both "parties" to such an interlocution, a demanding address, "have" meaning in this scene, but is the term *reciprocity* still useful? I find that it is, between subject and *whatever* constitutive other; this allows us to think of reciprocity as how *becoming meanings* are fully dependent on each other; it is address – a demand for meaning – that functions simultaneously in a demanding *relation*. In other words, I extend Butler's conceptualization of address to include many subjects and other types of *text*.

Away from the subject-only limitation raised above, I find it is relevant to ask: should we still think about these imagined encounters as involving anything like a Butlerian *relationality?* Is such address usefully similar to what involves Responsibility to the *human* other in all constitution as a "self"? Where each scene of address, is "what we may call the rhetorical condition for responsibility (…) [and the] ethical valence of the situation (…) concern whether (…) parties to the interlocution are sustained and altered by the scene of address" (2005, p. 50)? I return to this question in the next chapter.

5.4 Curricular performativity

Along the way, I was encouraged by Marg Sellers' "Re(con)ceiving young children's curricular performativity" (2010), an engagement in an early childhood educational context inspired by readings of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Sellers tells us that observing/recording/reading children's play through this theoretical lens let her think "differently about curriculum, young children and how they perform their curricular understandings" (p. 557).

The reading of Sellers' text was fueled by how the work I had engaged with became insufficient to further rethink this extensive complexity of educational address the way(s) I imagined. As you have seen, Butler's arguments in *Giving an Account* and *Frames of War* have inspired me with the most central concepts of normativity, self-constitutive responses, address, framing, ethical violence and Responsibility. This, and the critical role of Derrida's work, has allowed a view to educational address that contrasts sharply with any illusory lasting subject through progress, and connects the becoming as subject to other *text* in education.

However, I believe that this still offers us too *neat* and *partial* patterns or directions to think with, so that it fails to embrace a more "chaotic" vision of constitutive function in and as education in society. The purpose of my considerations here is to bring the thoughts engaged

with thus far to be challenged and expanded by engaging with some aspects of Seller's work, where she troubles many of the same truths and realities as both Butler and Derrida do, but with a substantially different theoretical discourse. I find that a select, creative conversation between their terminologies adds something to my approach.

To start with, Sellers' argument also fully denies linear notions of time, and by extension meanings dependent on these. In her words, the perspective she draws from and pursues "opens a vista of an extensive milieu of space~time, in which both space and time are irreducible to a linear conception" (p. 567). Her writing, she tells us, is informed by aspects of an

> (…) approach to thinking~reading~writing [which] perturbs conventional order/ing, sequencing, categorising and linearity, including that represented in/by the (metaphorical) tree of knowledge, in which conventional understandings of curriculum are grounded. In contrast, [Sellers argues, there is] heterogeneous connectivity (…) [in] ceaseless interrelational movements... (p. 559)

Such an approach via *non-linearity* of not only writing, but of what is ever-ongoing "happenings", and of "being", here for her

> (…) opens possibilities for other linkages and intersections among concepts of children, their learning and curriculum. Understandings of becoming-child(ren) and becoming-curriculum are used for exploring the situated production of subjectivities of children alongside notions of curriculum... (2010, p. 563)

Through Sellers' readings and arguments, we can read how this

> (…) 'becoming is the very dynamism of change' (Stagoll 2005). Becomings are always a flow of becoming-something, such as becoming-child, becoming-curriculum, becoming-curricular performativity; the happening of becoming gives birth to an emerging subject or condition [but only] in moments and spaces of liminality (Sellers, 2010, p. 563).

Sellers' perspective in this text includes that *becoming* "produces nothing other than itself" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 238 in Sellers 2010, p. 563), that "it is the becoming itself that matters" (p. 563). This resonates with Derrida's basic argument on *play* and *différance*. It is a necessary, ever-ongoing change and difference in meaning. I have already discussed this

Derridean backdrop to Butler's embodied performativity, where I maintain that a constitutive relational dynamic of address is always functioning *through the same force and logic* as "pure" demands from the outside/other to meaning, the play of the outside/other necessary for meaning to be temporarily coherent and recognizable.

There is no use of the term *other* in Sellers' Deleuzo-Guattarian argument; performativity and becoming is written forth both without a conceptualization of relation/-ality or address, and without a consideration of an outside of meaning; she makes no argument as to "what" *drives* becoming, what I see as movement toward meaning, or "how" – whether regarding subjects or otherwise. Her argument seems*,* in these ways, narrower in its reach, with respect to my concerns. At the same time however, I find it to be bolder and more sweeping, making influencing connections messy, severely overlaid and intertwined*,* rather than having an argument on addressors and addressees appear structured and conceptually "partitioned". Sellers and Butler are both concerned with foreclosure within discursive contexts that are too narrowly normative – Sellers specifically children's – but they explore their concerns through different avenues. Both of which, I find, have something to offer this inquiry.

Sellers' concern with children's *becoming* in relation to curriculum is intimately familiar and her arguments on curricular performativity allows us an unsettling engagement with what I see as an all-encompassing normativity and framing in and through education. I have not connected the words curricular and performativity until now, but a reading on curricular demands in educational address, where the responding entails constitution/performativity of subjects, is clearly not new in this thesis.

Going beyond Butler, as I have in the previous section, shows how Sellers and I are both writing *performative* responding and becoming as meaningful, as concerning far more than formal curriculum only. I see performativity, in terms of curriculum, almost functioning synonymously with the constitutive demand of society's norms. Butler, using performativity in a politically articulated but Derrida-based way, lets us take this term to argue about an *as if* of truth and being, in all kinds of embodied utterances; however, aspects of Sellers' sweeping articulations strongly resonate with how I came to imagine this overall dynamic as I started to develop this thesis. These aspects allow an exciting way to argue what curricular discourse, normativity and

education more generally (can) mean and do, in ways of traversing bodies, and in society. I can relate when she writes how for her

> *(…) working with children's curricular performativity is to illuminate happenings (…) moving away from the given or representational towards doing, towards a doing that is generative of further(ing) possibilities. Such possibilities include those of becoming-children and their understandings of becoming-curriculum (e)merging as becoming-curricular performativity with/in/through milieus of becoming* (p. 564 *italics in original*)

Sellers tells us how she brings "the imaginaries" *becoming* and *milieu* to disturb conventional, developmental understandings of children (p. 557). She rather engages with "a conception of children as embodied be(com)ings. (…) [This] generates different epistemological understandings of who/what children/childhoods are, in processes of becoming" (pp. 562 - 563). Her writing conceives "bodies as constantly changing assemblages of forces. The notion of becoming – as in becoming-child performing curriculum, each engaged with the other, embodied within curricular performativity" (p. 563), is a way to act and be with/in the milieu – the surrounding of becomings in the "heterogeneous connectivity" of becomings (p. 559).

In her words, Sellers "…re(con)ceive[s] children and their relationships with curriculum as a performativity of the milieu(s) they inhabit (…). … [M]ilieu(s) that children generate for their learning … as they make visible the always already happenings of their curricular performativity" (p. 557). Such milieu(s), she holds, are continuously (re)constituted in ways that relate to curriculum, but even more centrally, I find, is that this dynamic is in a sense multi-directionally constitutive and function in an infinitely changing/new heterogeneity of becomings' relating to each other. This argument is clearly familiar with regard to complex, mutual influences being powered by the normative context(s) in discourse/narrative, but necessarily failing at arriving or relating in any succeeding or repeating sense. These milieu(s), like momentary landscapes *of* movements, "…are constituted by many singular moments … [without] beginnings or endings from which linear sequences derive" (p. 564). Crucially, on that note, Sellers adds that

> (…) expressions and mo(ve)ments of the milieu are *irreducible*; everything is always already chaotically becoming with/in/of/through… (…) [The dynamic of becoming] happen within milieus, are milieus and illuminate milieus at work, *all* becoming curricular performativity (p. 566, *my italics*).

In other words, she takes us outside the dualism of *child* and *curriculum* to focus only on what happens that is not "both", or "in between", but rather only becoming as a performative function, where the "what" is irrelevant as opposed to (an always already) openness. I follow her lead on this type of focus, but with an aim to engage with more subjects and other types of *text* as performative of meaning. I also find it conducive, as you see in the next chapter, to combine Sellers' terminology with Butler's, in ways to grasp what I imagine goes on. Part of this is how I am led with Sellers to make more visible a non-separateness in space~time, of for example student and curriculum.

A striking and relevant contrast is that the word "constituted" in Sellers' work is used about milieus, games and groups, but there is never a "self"; the humanist "self" has met a comparatively silent, implicit dismissal in Sellers' text, as opposed to Butler's work. There, as you have seen, it is basically put front and center, and not only fully "outed" and destabilized but also placed as the core of ethical violence in our societies. Yet, when Butler writes how performative constitution of the "self" with its outside/other(s) is necessarily different in each reiteration, as a never-arriving movement toward meaning, it is for the purposes of this thesis comparable to Sellers use of a concept of *uniqueness,* which means unique becoming – in a performative event. It is unique in terms of how becoming meanings do so in interconnected ways, radically non-lasting in its context of becoming, Sellers argues, and

> (…) for singular children in their uniqueness as subjects, 'the child [does] not become, it is *becoming* itself that is a child' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 277, emphasis in original). From/with/in this happening of intersecting forces, all kinds of inseparable becomings emerge in an endlessly becoming-multiplicity (Sellers 2010, p. 563).

It is as an intimate part of this never-lasting specificity of subject becomings, Sellers' work also argues the performativity of curriculum "itself", becoming *as*, or *through*, the flow of unique becomings of child(ren). I have already argued this in other terms, that this is ultimately where curriculum *is;* the meaning of a textbook only "exists" in the moment of reading it, *as* a body cites meaning in self-constitution as a (knowing/aware/competent) reader. For me it makes sense to see the powerful influence, the extent of normative "force", of curriculum as constitutively demanding but also never-lasting performance, as it is

(…) in flux, is always already becoming, is in an ongoing condition of becoming – amassing, overlaying, conjugating different dimensions… (…) 'It is in this sense that becoming-everybody/everything, making the world a becoming, is to world, to make a world or worlds' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 280) (Sellers 2010, pp. 563 - 564).

While I take with me how Sellers writes about all becoming as connected, in and as milieu(s) of becoming, where curriculum and child(ren) are engaged with as examples, there is also, in my perspective still largely based in Butler's work, no becoming (of subject or other *text*) that happens outside of an affective "force" of address that *is* the interacting demand for meaning. This involves at least one embodied subject even though it also "just happens", on a discursive level. This combined terminology is further developed in the upcoming chapter.

5.4.1 Performative understanding

Before I move on to that discussion, it is interesting to comment on what we in Sellers' conceptual landscape may appreciate in, and take with us from, her clever uses of the word "understanding". Why is this important? This one sentence illustrates this well, I think; Sellers tells us of an interest in understanding children's "understanding of" curricular performativity, aiming to critique

(…) in ways that decenter (…) hierarchical arrangements in which adult conceptions of curriculum assume precedence over young children's understandings of curricular performativity. (…) [She holds that this will generate] different epistemological understandings of who/what children/childhoods are, in processes of becoming (p. 563).

I do not think Sellers believes children in any common sense *understand* curricular performativity, a theoretical concept far from public discourse. More than that, I doubt she believes she, or anyone, can *have* "understandings of becoming-child(ren)…" (p. 563) in a way most may assume "having an understanding" entails, because, most importantly, *understanding*

is thoroughly in conflict with her arguments on *becoming* and *performativity*. Within my perspective, so relatable to hers, uncritically citing that premise of possible understanding is integral in its support by and to humanism, to maintain the system of meanings that ensure the "I"/"self" as center of meaning, and the other in that.

> **It's important to see the child! Maybe challenges, or personal qualities… or the nice things about the child! Just acknowledge as an individual!**
>
> **…just showing each one that "hey, I see you, I understand you!" It is not easy!** [31]

I read this word-choice within Sellers' perspective as a form of affirmative move, similar to so much other deconstructive writing, that in this way has potential to contribute precisely to the overall destabilization of the notions of curriculum and child(ren) she is hoping for. The presence and representation that the term understanding assumes and reproduces, is in a paradoxical way *shown* more than critically argued about: people's so-called understandings, are an aspect of the ongoing, overall performativity of the connected (becoming) meanings in our contemporary humanist paradigm. Children's grasp of what is expected from them in this early childhood institution is rather, it seems, in Sellers' argument proper, written as a process of ever-becoming meanings. This is visible, she argues, in their non-linear performativity of necessarily temporary and incoherent understanding (p. 574). As she writes forth the different *understandings* this generates for *her*, she tells us that

> [t]hese children working to express their understandings and our working to bring our understandings of their understandings of their becoming-children becoming curriculum becoming curricular performance are a rhizo (ad)venture within (a) never ending milieu(s) of becoming-, including ours/yours/mine as becoming-adult with/in more of (a) milieu(s) of curricular performativity, with/in which we might welcome young children's understandings into ours of becoming-curriculum. (pp. 574 - 575)

For Sellers, reading and writing with/as *rhizome* lets her connect her own work to the becoming child(ren) as curricular performativity, all in a heterogeneous connectivity of becoming more widely. This is familiar from my writing on the function of utterances late in Chapter 4, and lets me take with me as part of the further thesis development, how *understanding*, whether at the constitutive site of an academic writer or anyone in education, never holds an understanding *I* behind it, *or is ever possibly anything but performativity.*

Finally, I want to reiterate, I see it as being about performativity *doing something* – something happening – in the world, as Derrida argues, it is about *all* citationality as performative of truth and reality. And with Sellers, although much further emphasizing fluidity and connectivity, I agree *curriculum* has a quite particular "worlding" function (2010, p. 564), both for each unique becoming as subject, and as interconnected constitutive effects. I would say there is a worlding function in the encounter with a student's, or pupil's, reading of curriculum, however offered/available/facilitated, in self-constitutive responses that involve demands that what is encountered "has" meaning. We cannot separate our constitutedness from other becoming – and certainly not from curriculum, demanding and affecting realities of what can and should be, and be known, through that large, demanding field of education. This is what I move toward, this relation between educational and societal curriculum, and connectivity of becoming across complex dynamics of address.

6. Webs of address

I find that Sellers' concept of curricular performativity initiates a challenge to and deepening of my perspective on framing, address and education; it both connects performativity and ethics more intimately with education, and allows me to develop an alternative way of *pointing* even more widely to instability in the function(ing) of education, both discursively, relationally and ethically.

6.1 A combined view to instability: merged terminologies

This concept of curricular performativity is a way of employing the word curriculum as not only the concrete demands for knowledge and competence for teachers, students or pupils, but something that functions in and as milieu(s) of becoming of meaning, and as becoming society. As I reappropriate Sellers' interconnection of becoming-child, becoming-curriculum, becoming

curricular performativity, I also see becoming as implying what Butler calls an affective drive, a drive to *be* and *know*, in a structure of address. The drive functions in the reiterative dynamic to sustain illusions of lasting, and coherence, but necessarily always fails. It seems to me Sellers and I would agree, that we are both articulating this movement as a normative moment of *exclusion* (Sellers 2010, p. 564), as the outside/other, in each scene, trying to ensure delimited, coherent meaning – but how each moment and site of becoming also interacts with and overlaps many, many others; there is normative exclusion and affective drive in powerful ways, that still manage to always fail at what it attempts.

Through a joining of theoretical imageries, Sellers' writings contribute to both underline and further rethink the concept of constitutive reciprocity, as I already argued to extend beyond the subject-only exclusivity in Butler's emphases. Although Butler's argumentation is extensive in its applicability, I find it is also, for my purposes, limiting in several ways. Sellers' argument, on the other hand, easily opens toward an unconcerned and enjoyable "meshing" of infinite scenes making up what we may see as both complex ways of address far outside of immediate *time* and *space* happening in and through education. It is also quite simple to just see each becoming as one worlding that holds, implicitly, all worlding in the dynamic, the scene, that makes *that* moment.

This leads me to imagine something like *fluid geometries of address* in and through education, as messy (reading) encounters, with so much *text*, and always-new connectivities of becoming. I see what goes on as indeterminable and "chaotic". The use of the term chaos here is dependent on its opposition to linearity, foundation and order, and is in our context of political and scientific discourses a negatively loaded term; views to plurality, implicitness and simultaneity, and becoming in education *as* curricular performativity, assists us in critically emphasizing the affective reiteration in the longing *for* foundation and order. My hope is that in some ways, rather than dismissing the attempt at such imagining stressful and impossibly complex, we may perhaps even *enjoy* the openness the view to chaos may hold – this thought of truths and realities *as* fully constitutive, in such complex ways?

When I read Sellers' way of closely relating "thinking~reading~writing" (2010, p. 559), as I do with other destabilizing writing approaches to, and as, ethics, there is a part of the image of

"web-like interactions of rhizomatic thinking, of interconnecting and intersecting (…) [where] 'becoming is the very dynamism of change' (Stagoll 2005)" (Sellers 2010, p. 563), that I find very appropriate for my thesis. This never-stabile, flowing interaction, implicitly connects all becoming of thought and meaning as performative.

I came to combine this *web-like* interaction and interconnection from the movements of rhizome, with a Butlerian perspective on address and ethics, in a relational discursive constitution of meaning where there is no, for either theorist, hierarchy of discourse "and" reality. I maintain framing as a socio-ontological effect of self-constitution in such a *web of address*; it is just as much a two-dimensional, ethical and political issue. Consequences to precarity are mainly explored in the next subsection though, after I engage with other issues encountered in this co-reading of perspectives that are, admittedly, rarely seen together. How can this even be done?

> **C: When you are with a pupil, and you are considering knowledge to relate to that pupil…?**
>
> **It is a lot of psychology. Everything from how they move, to how they behave with others. Social games.**
>
> **You have to talk with them, and try to get to know them better, on a personal level too.**
>
> **That is the ideal. But I don't think there is any particular knowledge you retrieve then and there! It is just about experience you have gained, and then our personality… Well, what we have learned in pedagogy is really just to argue that we take the time to talk with the pupil.**
>
> **It is a bit commonsensical really. But we do have some references to attach thoughts to, some theorists to refer to, if anyone is to argue with us about anything!**
>
> **Yes. But not only that. For me it is also a very safe basis, that I can perhaps read up on things that I may not have any way of learning in school. [32]**

I invite you to imagine a plurality of subjects and other *text as* addressed and *in* addressing, the way I suggested in Chapter 5 that generally speaking we can say that a constitutive relational address means a simultaneous demand that meaning *comes to be,* in/as the relationality *of* becoming meaning – which is close to what Sellers calls *connectivity*. Either way, curricular and other *text* has meaning *only in* the moment of a performative "self" constituting/reading it. The becoming meanings are dependent on each other and become as meaningful in this

demanding scene, this unique web of address where necessarily many other others demand to be meaningful and are constituted simultaneously as well. With powerful, but necessarily incoherent, consequences, there are many sites of becoming *within* a temporary web of relationality, of irreducible but also unique encounters. What I mean is that the meanings are irreducible, but the temporal scene and the web of particular connectivities and demands are unique. I will return to how I see this as demands *traversing* webs of address, yielding the violence of framing and normativity, even though it implies an uncapturable specificity of any of the meanings as such.

As I said early in Chapter 5, I read Butler's structure of address (2005) as the constitutive reciprocity ensuring "self"/other, and the scenes as events of that happening. The *web* of address I am theorizing here on the other hand, is something I see as the temporal event *and* the geometry of this particular event, where subjects and their others are only some aspects of what becomes as meaning/-ful. Yet, envisioning this only as a pattern of ensuring this particular intelligibility, underneath varied but normative citation, is much too simple. There is too much else going on for that selective focus to be the most fruitful. We should rather see the only thing that remains as the principles of connectivity and force of movement toward newness in milieu(s) of becoming, in the face of affective reiteration toward illusory coherence. In this paradoxical situation of im/possible meaning becoming in webs of address, discourses reiteratively "travel" and circulate as they are cited again and again, but involve different becoming of meaning due to different connectivities, each moment.

This web for me is a "stretched", connectivity of becoming subjects and everything else, in that, again, "extensive milieu of space~time, in which both space and time are irreducible to a linear conception" (Sellers, 2010, p. 567). In other words, as I have built up to through the previous chapter, I envision what goes on in and through education *as* webs of address, as a fanned-out dynamic*, at and as* sites of all becoming meaning. I find Sellers' affirmative writing with a *tilde* (~) agreeable, thinking it is important that it is visible, theoretically here, or even pedagogically, that becoming is anything but linear "over time", and anything but conventional in terms of how *space* is believed to be straight-forwardly connected to *time*.

Interaction, overlap, simultaneity, and implicitness involves that the whole normative and framing function of education can be seen as reverberating truths and realities becoming, *as if* they were coherent and lasting, and in that extended reciprocal sense its multi-directionality is central. What I am arguing is that in and as each instance of becoming subject or other meaning, the outside/others to this event are a diverse abundance. In always new, and always different, connectivities*,* there is a complex demand for becoming in and as *each web* of address.

> **Well, the pupils do become more and more *individuals*, if you can say that. They *find* themselves more and more the older they get! So, they become more, what should I say, themselves! They create themselves and… you are there! You are part of that process! [33]**

The different perspectives I entertain in this chapter stand in tension in terms of how to go about arguing to make unstable, or provoke perhaps, our readings of what goes on. I offer a merged argument via several routes, and layers of theoretical discourse, to *point to* the underlying dynamic I suggest is going on in and through education, but always especially with regard to the illusory "self". I do this to destabilize from several directions, in ways that are relevant for ethics. Either way you look at it, I find, the normative discourses, like those of curriculum, are themselves at the surface of the dynamic, as curtains that are sometimes exchanged for new ones, or just fade. The normative reiteration ensures the invisibility of, or disregard for, what is underneath, holding it together, maintaining the illusion of continuity, maintaining *reality*.

Not only are the inserted utterances here quite informal and "personal", but in terms of citations they are also, just as I discussed in Chapter 2, quite vague, even empty, even as the focus or frequency of words is unquestionable. This, I find, only affirms that complex and unstable becoming, *as* curricular performativity, in webs of address. Such constitutive sites are anything but coherent, yet there is becoming that may be *read* as teacher student, or teacher, in each affective moment. It is not what is "meant by" the for example the word reflection that matters to my argument, or efforts to practice it; to me the concern is rather the vague and imprecise, and basically infinite, reiteration of normative discourse that entail a *span* of performativity across webs of address. *This* does the work of the normative maintenance of a humanism that is frighteningly effective in curtaining off its violent constitutive dynamic.

Sellers' work on multidirectional influences and interactions *complicates* the structure of address considered in *Giving an Account*, and the "three-way" structure between media, audience and distant others; it offers a more fluid and wide view to the *movements* of meanings in education than either of these arguments. The intimacy of time~space outside of its conventionally assumed relation allows me to engage with education, at its most "basic", *as* connectivities of becoming, radically new in a massive, web-like address. This co-reading interacts to give us something, a necessarily *new* read, a new combination of conceptualizations and foci. My hope, in extending and combining concepts via several routes, is to let us differently unsettle constitutive dynamic and thereby what education is and does in society today. It allows, perhaps, efforts toward interrupting the ways the most troubling discursive demands traverse these webs of address that education performs, becomes, within.

6.1.1 What about the "self"?

There is no approach to or mention of "self" or other Sellers' theoretical landscape; in contrast to Butler and Derrida, she performs a quite different destabilizing approach to humanist assumptions, about the child as a subject, and curriculum, and the relationship between those. It is not that she does not use words that refer to influential "sides" when she argues how the becoming of the child *is* the child; curriculum is certainly written forth as an influencing factor but also connected becoming. Her *focus* though, is on what happens with the meanings of curriculum for, or in relation to, child(ren), when we break down the commonly leaned upon premise that is the relation of time and space. In a way argued even more fully *as* simultaneous, and intimate, than Butler's reciprocity, Sellers' connectivity is, in my reading, the *principle* of how all kinds of becoming is intimately connected, always already in necessarily different ways in each event of becoming meaning. Performativity of curriculum *is* becoming meaning *of* (performativity of) child; the child becomes *as* curricular performativity. In terms of constitutive force, this *stretches further* in the direction of how I held, in Chapter 5, that a student addresses and demands meaning of a textbook in the moment(s) of reading, and is in this demanded forth as a reading student "self".

I hold, with Sellers, that teachers, students and pupils are becoming *as* curricular performativity. I *also* argue they are becoming as "selves", but rather in each *web* of address where normative demands entail responding "as" reading "selves". There are so many more aspects than curricular demands though, that make up each web, with always new connectivities of *all* meanings involved – without which there would be no demand, no affective *drive*, to "be" that reading "self", reading/making all its others. This can also be seen as embodied or otherwise "materialized" *text* becoming in multidirectional encounters, happening in and through reiterated, circulating, discourses. "A" becoming can be seen as both demand and response, and temporally they are, here of course affirming a necessarily limited terminology, as each becoming is extended in terms of such a simultaneity of implications.

Again, Sellers' emphasis in her argument on child(ren) and curriculum is simultaneity and connectivity, and how becoming *is all there is*. The subjects in Butler's argument have no meaning "to start with" either; there is only iterability and unwilled becoming there too – but as *effect* of address, and I have already held that becoming meaningful in a dynamic of demanding address extends to *all* kind of *text*. However it is wrapped up and articulated, I find that we may all do well to be reminded of the *primacy* of the movement toward meaning *as such*, whether we argue this as *becoming*, *play*, *constitution* or *performativity*. Certainly, we should bring it back as a recurring layer within the destabilizing approaches to the enormity of the framing function of address that is education.

In such an approach, both avoiding and affirming troubling terms, such as the "self", may be useful, and we cannot say when it is not; it seems to me this depends on the web of address reading this argument *is part of*. Still, *I* find it most useful in this moment of reading/writing, for the purpose of arguing immensely complex constitutive influences and effects in and through education, to maintain but challenge the more "orderly" deconstructive argument on address, demands and responses in Butler's work. I maintain it *within* the perspective on a web-like dynamic, in its unstable messiness in terms of space~time, and multiplicity of connected "parts"/"sides"/"players"; there is becoming, or constitution *as,* in relational webs of address.

6.1.2 Compensations for precariousness across webs of address

I move now to suggest how the dimension of affecting *precarity*, to compensate for precariousness, can be seen to happen in such a multiplicity of becoming together, of responding to such variety of demanding *text*/others. How *one* embodied but complex site of becoming affects precarity is a difficult question because not only are there many aspects of a moment that demands meaning, but each demanding address necessarily functions differently with regard to who/what/where of temporal premises, proximity, and explicitness and implicitness of discourses in the many intersecting encounters. I believe that at this "chaotic" site of embodied becoming, all possible meanings that could become in *other* encounters, are always already implicitly possible *in that one;* the reiterative function of a(ny) constitutive encounter implies infinite other encounters and possible citations/responses. Rather than those possibilities being in, or geared toward, "the future", it is about a radical difference of any event from another.

> **Well, you do things impulsively. I don't think we're going to think very consciously about pedagogy, or knowledge of pupils, in the classroom situation…**
>
> **That is why it is so great with the internships! Because there you get to slow things down and go step by step through how the class went. So that is very nice… and now we have had most of that reflection already, at least! So, we can hope that, eh… it stays with us, so we don't have to spend so much time on it! Because it is just, sort of, there! Maybe.[34]**

Teacher education seems on the surface of the discourse to be a preparation to "be" a teacher that has and does – that maintains – appropriate and responsible knowledge, practice and values. What may *preparation* and *maintenance* entail in the perspective of neverlasting meanings? What may possibly "last" in or across a deconstructed space~time, in webs of address? Many becomings in each web-like interconnection also involve a dimension of materiality, as part of the meaning given, but never as a *continuity* based in any foundation. But, I argue, precariousness as viable, coherent subject across such a fanned-out dynamic of address is segmented and striated *as*, or *into*, conditions of precarity for many human others involved. All

demanding encounters in education function *both* as a constituting fully indeterminable *meaning* in each web of address, *and* as leading to, possibly, "long-term" precarization *effect* of this constitutive work. This happens, as I have argued, through differential structural/material/curricular allocation of roles/focus/importance/options.

Differential precarity is just as naturalized. In my rethinking of Sellers' and Butler's concerns and perspectives together, there is no difference, in principle*,* of how the relation between precarity and precariousness works; the former is a compensating effect of the latter. There is just a possibility of grasping, and critically approaching, more of it happening, in a greater plurality of affect and effect, of meanings and materiality.

For me a part of considering temporal implications of education as web-like address, is that we may for example argue that curricular discourses of teacher education, and its social/political mandates, as these are cited, may contribute to constitute various and multiple subjects in the "now" and in the "future" all at once, in singular events. Further, teachers, pupils and other *text* are becoming as curricular performativity, and this again includes a sense of *other* moral and normative "curriculum" on what to be, know and do. All this, as I see it, is *societal*-curricular performativity, all premised by the social and political convention of (liberal) humanism. But it does not happen in a linear sense.

We should see that the premising intelligibility implicitly demands, or "expects", affective defensiveness against precariousness across what happens in such webs of address as well; as recognizable, other-differentiating subjects we are made safe from the overall threat. We can for example say that the function of humanist discourses of *responsibility,* of accountability*,* that are part of the very premise of teacher education, heavily involves such affect. Meeting society's and education's demands to perform in terms of being responsible, one is at the same time ensuring im/possible becoming and lives in the society one is to be responsible for.

It follows, I find, that in becoming as curricular performativity in teacher education, even at a moment of private study/thought, each web-like address *extends violently* its framing and normative function. What I mean by that is, for example, that the demanding address to teacher

students in a context of their education, is a simultaneous social and political address to pupils, as the students perform by citing professional discourses, in oral, written or otherwise embodied utterances. The pupils are implicit at each site of becoming in a program setting, in each instance, in a way I see as "stretched" but not in a linear sense. In the connectivity of becoming, this further holds for extended fields of pupils' others; in each moment there is becoming as teacher, these pupils also have implicit surroundings, near and far, which are vulnerable in *their* address/reading. In other words, the complication of address still involves that education implies normative foreclosure and framing, but also potential openness, in the becoming – and precarity – of many, many lives, locally and globally. But there are useful differences to note for those of us who want to grasp and interrupt this in new ways.

> **We have been told not to ask the pupils to draw Christmas Eve. And then we're back to having to be careful about everything. What can we really do, other than sit and read from the book, you know!?**
>
> **We can't do anything!**
>
> **Yes, so what is the point then – I mean, it is so discouraging! I think that what am I supposed to do, then?**
>
> **…yes, and at the same time we are to be so "creative", and very "motivating".**
>
> **So, then the question is what can I as a teacher really do? We are treading so carefully that things become invisible, really non-existent!**
>
> **Yes, and the pupils are mirroring that! It is a very sore topic… and we are influencing them, taking away their curiosity, and giving them inhibitions!**
>
> **We are supposed to create the educated human (Bildung!), but how will it turn out with all those seven qualities of the educated human if we are not allowed to do anything?**
>
> **We get the human that is afraid!**
>
> **It is very, very scary. If we're moving in that direction.**[35]

The webbed connections demanding becoming in and as curricular performativity, extends the implications I argued for in Chapter 4 concerning the *as if*, the performative reality, of a student. I add now that what I called my *writing of* real students, that is, the insertions of all the utterances, may be read as intimately connected to, *and* dependent on, the becomings "surrounding" it in *our* thinking~reading~writing. I want to also reiterate that the inserted utterances cannot and should not be seen separately from, and irrelevant for concern with, children/youth and their lives. With citations of what constitutes teacher subjects, these insertions perform *as if* reality, in its temporally paradoxical condition. They do so *in and as*

webs of address which in this consideration includes *your* becoming, which entail everything constituted as other at the site of the *you*; this is all the reality that is possible in that becoming.

6.2 Normative functions across webs of address

Has anything changed with regard to the function and implication of *normativity*, as argued from the very first pages, with this extended perspective on address as a web-like dynamic? What does this imply for me going forward? These are the questions I pursue in the remaining sections of this chapter, around the topic of a teacher community, and a generally violent function.

First, I want to say I still find it useful to see contemporary citations of normative meaning make up the more tangible aspect of the constitutive event that leans on, *and* ensures, the notion of a "self", where both are aspects of a dynamic of address. On the other hand I find that the fluidity of how for Sellers "…becoming-children blur with becoming-curriculum and both blur within becoming-milieu(s)" (2012, p. 566) allows us to imagine a dynamic where normative discourses *are* influential, but where connectivities, non-linearity, and becoming is still *really all there is*. She holds that this perspective is well illustrated in the free-play and exploration methodology in a Te Whãriki curricular approach[37] in New Zealand, and that it should inspire

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[37] "Conventional conceptions of curriculum all-too-frequently imply a *more* prescriptive adult and child-*less* interpretation of how learning should proceed, with adult decisions prevailing as to what content is deemed valuable. This way of understanding curriculum tends to prioritise historical matters of syllabus, that is subject matter and how it is taught. Te Whãriki, however, is not such a prescriptive and definitive document in that content and processes are not specified. Rather, it is more directional, following principles of tikanga Maori (culturally this means all things Maori) with proposed learning outcomes being indications of potentially achievable knowledge, skills and attitudes. Towards meeting these outcomes, reflective questions for teachers are provided as well as examples of experiences for infants, toddlers and young children.

Teachers thus work to provide opportunities to enable children's growth and learning by, most commonly, working with the strands. This involves: *wellbeing* as nurturing children's health and wellbeing; *belonging* as linking with children's families, with what they do and how they do it; *contribution* as valuing what individual children bring to learning; *communication* as using all kinds of language – spoken, written, drawn, signed; and *exploration* as playing, and working things out through new experiences. The potential for children's growth and learning that Te Whãriki generates flows from it being a curriculum without 'recipes', a 'dictionary' of possibilities

more parts of education overall. With and against Sellers, I see what goes on within this methodology as small bodies demanding meaning from each other, and from other *text*, in a web of address. They do so relatively "openly", as they all variously interact and "chaotically" perform continuously disrupted and changing narratives without explicit threats of exclusion in terms of belonging in the flow of the game.

Further, while I have emphasized seeking ways for education as a field and practice to allow openness *to the other*, the non-foreclosure considered by Sellers concerns becoming *as* movement, and the connectivity to be *among movements*. This way she writes *uniqueness* without contrasting it to sameness *of* things/subjects/etc. For her it is the movement and connectivity that *is* the uniqueness a singular child entails (p. 563). This is part of what I have taken with me to say both that each becoming (responding as, and being read as) is unique, *and* each web of these connected becomings is as well.

C: But what is the difference between thinking about something and reflecting on something?

…ehm… I don't know… Reflect, then you go more into yourself and the situation and analyze and possibly make changes, whereas thinking may be just sitting and pondering and everything, but not necessarily change from it!

You may figure that you acted right, but usually you can find ways you could have done things differently!

C: But how do you assess yourself?

Well that is the ability to be self-reflective! Ehm…

That is kind of trying to see it from someone else's point of view! And see how, yeah, if I had those attitudes instead, how would I then have thought and acted?!

Yes!

C: Are you able to?

In some situations, I think it is very easy to think that if I had been so and so I could have done this and that. But other times I think it is really hard. [36]

(May and Carr 2000). More complexly, Te Whãriki states that everything surrounding learners and their learning matters; the document statement simultaneously avoids any specifics of the *what* and *how* of curriculum.

Curriculum is thus described as: the sum total of the experiences, activities, and events, whether direct or indirect, which occur within an environment designed to foster children's learning and development … 'The curriculum is provided by the people, places, and things in the child's environment; the adults, the other children, the physical environment, and the resources. (Ministry of Education 1996, 10–11)' This includes both planned and spontaneous experiences and interactions amidst a diversity of programmes, philosophies, structures and environments" (Sellers, 2010, pp. 560 - 561, *italics in original*).

In other words, I maintain a critical focus on the notion of a "self", but acknowledge how Sellers' approach, conflating *all* becoming, is both a wider, and more enveloping grasp of constitutive relations across the singular and the infinite in the enormous field that is education. Still, it lacks the benefits I find, as I said above, in focusing on normative demands and responses in address, including the two-dimensional violence self-constitution implies. I think, for one, that is pedagogically useful. The now intelligible notion of a "self", and its knowable/known others, is fully unstable *and* inseparable from the supportive normative citations in each web of address, and these notions are for me tools in affirmative writing, but clever ones, ones needed in developing ways for us to address students or teachers with fingers *pointing to* constitutedness and its ethical implications in ways that may be easier to see, in partial ways, to begin with. Even more clever, I think, if we in this manage to move with, but always also *beyond* this, and make it less "tidy" in its articulation.

6.2.1 Between unique webs of address and negotiation of sameness

I want to return to the consideration of performative utterances, to ask you to now specifically to imagine *several* students/teachers at the time*,* and I also invite you to see these as becoming, as performativity, in unique webs of address. Each body is addressed by normative demands to cite curricular/professional discourses, and that aspect of each site of becoming is, if recognized as students/teachers, leaning on a logic of equivalence. These sites of becoming are to that extent "the same", as opposed to all non- students/teachers, as Fendler showed us in Chapter 2; the array of assumptions, across varied citations, does not matter, it is the citation of these necessitated discourses and practices that indicates legitimacy and *shared* professionality. Each respond as an other-differentiating "self" in vulnerability to precariousness, but also seemingly "share" what, through citational variations over normative discourse, looks like the same knowledge, competence and responsible values *as* a "community".

Where I am taking you with this familiar take of normative citation and framing, is toward what happens when it is considered in terms of webs of address, *and* with plural bodies (proximate or implicit) that are becoming meaningful as "the same". But what about normativity and pupils? Regarding the choice I defended in Chapter 5, to use teacher education as a *way in* to consider performativity and address where the students' becoming interacts and interconnects *with* becoming pupils, I emphasize that even though normative demands somewhat differ, the *dynamic* pushing and pulling forth other-differentiating "selves", recognized as one in a group, is in principle the same. It is the same web-like complexity and constitutive simultaneity, and the coming argument on *negotiation* applies as well. Still, the reason why, after extensive blurring of lines between pupil/student/teacher becomings in and as interconnected webs of address, I return to focus primarily on the students/teachers, is that from here on out I develop a way to think about *interrupting* the violent educational framing of society across webs of address. This surely forecloses lives of pupils and beyond, but I want to argue how it may be most usefully *approached* through the field of teacher education.

Returning to the issue of this section, what is really this "logic of equivalence", as opposed to difference, premising being and belonging as "the same", and what may that imply in terms of professional truths as normatively influential, yet imagined in each unique becoming? I agree, reading Butler's or Derrida's work, that equivalence of any meaning is only possible in that paradoxically *im*possible way, due to iterability. What I am getting at is how I believe, through co-reading with Sellers, that equivalence is impossible in another way, due to but also *beyond* the iterable logic. Further I also think that a sort of embodiment of power to produce and maintain the illusion of group-belonging goes beyond Butler's *affectivity* for coherence as subject, and Derridean *longing* for lasting meaning.

...we were supposed to write a group assignment during our internship, on diversity. And I remember that in our group, and with our teacher there, the first reaction was that "how are we supposed to do that assignment, there are no pupils in that class with another ethnic background! We can't do the assignment!" ...and later I thought this was because of the focus here at the institution.

And I think that we have had about it for a whole year, and what are we left with?

A fear of doing something wrong.

> **That's why I think it is even more important that we are able to tell our own pupils again, well *to talk about it* – what is diversity!? Because we as adults are sitting here and putting words to what it is!** [37]

I believe that a chaotic site of embodied becoming that somehow, uniquely, is a response to crowded circumstances, is fiercely resistant to "be" what it on the surface seems like citing the same normative discourses should ensure. Normativity, seen as *any* sort of streamlining, is certainly illusory; from the perspective I develop on curricular performativity, in webs of address, the curtain-like function of normative citation is rather only its role in maintaining the givenness of a "self". *Within* this function though, normativity also ensures the rest of what is out of sight in the reiteration of this intelligibility: the powerful premise of temporal linearity, of affectivity in defensiveness against precariousness, and the prior relation of accountability *as* a "self".

In political theorist Ernesto Laclau's *Emancipation(s)* (1996), inspired in part by Derrida, he holds that the (empty) "signifier of the pure cancellation of all difference" (p. 38) leads to "the paradoxical situation that what constitutes the condition of possibility of a signifying system – its limits – is also what constitutes its condition of impossibility" (p. 37) (a fundamental ambiguity in *every* im/possibility of meaning, as Derrida attributes to the play of différance). Laclau engages with this discursive logic and Rosa Luxemburg's work, to consider what goes on between political groups that share a common enemy, and argues that the unity of a class is determined "by the accumulated effects of the internal split of all partial mobilizations" (p. 40). By this he means to connect the "partial struggles" in each becoming subject, one's necessarily failing to "arrive", with the unity of a larger anti-oppression struggle (p. 41), calling both out as im/possible due to *one* dependent relation between the differential and equivalential logics. At the same time, the temporary unity of the group depends, he writes, on the constitutive *ambiguity* already penetrating its (differential) "parts". I return to this below.

At this point, I suggest we pursue what is possibly left of an assumed function of normativity, *beyond*, as I just said, the centrally violent "self" it attaches itself to and "props up". I want to consider the becoming teacher subject as what Laclau refers to as the partial struggle, and the teacher community as the impossible unity of the class. In his work, relatable to Butler's writing

on performativity and community[38], he explicitly theorizes the struggle of singular and plural coherence as a simultaneous dynamic and in a convincing way both writes the constitutive impossibility of any coherent group, *and* honors the role current identity formations' play. He does this through theorizing ongoing inter-group "negotiation" of equivalence, as a *function* of reiteration itself, across multiple bodies. Negotiation is a word I enjoy, like *understanding*, in how it affirms an illusory foundational subject in his writing and in mine, and an intentionality based in this.

His argument on im/possible group unity may be usefully transferred into my concerns with becoming teachers, and could apply to any profession(al education) as these sites of becoming are responding to demands so intimately fueled with meanings of cohesion among professional subjects – meanings which are demanded precisely *as* continuity, as for example reflective, inclusive, and knowledgeable pedagogues.

> **Reflection is important, but I feel it's best if it comes spontaneously. Not like when we had those reflection days during our internships, because it becomes very forced! …especially in the beginning when everything is so new! And it is hard to put into words! So… but it becomes more natural after a while!**
>
> **I find written reflections to be very difficult! …to sit and write those reflection logs! It is much better to just sit and talk! It is better when in just comes naturally![38]**

I see *all* bodies in education becoming, reiteratively, as curricular performativity, in and as what I write as the humanist curriculum of being and knowing. In necessarily unique events of responding to multiple others, the students, and the teachers, are normatively *the same* in a certainly illusory, but saturated way in terms of citations in response to demands. As I see it, the becoming of subjects in these overlapping "groups" is about performing an "individual" *and* a "belonging to" of what is a normative "gathering" of teacher meanings in society, and regardless of the fluidity and complexity of becoming it is also, in each moment, remaking the normative landscapes.

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[38] For example in *Dispossession: The performative in the political* (Butler & Athanasiou, 2013) and in *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly* (Butler, 2015a).

Again, in general, *address* is not "intentional". As I am using it, I am looking at this juncture at *a collective, reiterative negotiation* of normative sameness of being and knowing, but not, of course, in a "willed" sense, centered around students' and teachers' "conscious" dis/agreements. I maintain, emphatically, moving alongside Laclau, that *each* becoming subject, in unique webs of address, that responds to curricular and professional demands, *partakes* in a negotiation of sameness among other such sites of becoming, a sameness which is fully impossible but still "sought for" in/as the address itself. This, I hold, is one of the issues to maintain focus on, in destabilizing how education works as a violently framing field. I return to this further toward the end, but first we further consider the paradoxical function of this sort of negotiation of the normative meaning of teachers as community.

> **I don't really think there is any difference with regard to grade. Because you have to all the time build a relation. And let's say you get a new pupil in fifth or sixth grade. And it's your responsibility to make that pupil feel important, valued and included!**
>
> **…because, as we've mentioned, that thing about developing antipathies, it's very scary! And it can ruin so much, for the development of that pupil. Yes, so relations are important all the time.**
>
> **There may be more need for sort of care and stuff when they are little, but at the same time it is when they start to get close to junior high school – that something happens in the brains so that they get very conscious about themselves. And then it is really important to already have a relation.**
>
> **And that's the development I think you build the basis for, no matter what kind of teacher you are. And you are part of shaping basic things! Self-perception, and yeah what expectation a pupil can have to a teacher too! So, it's extremely important! That thing with *care*, and being *present*! [39]**

My point is that we should see that the *citations themselves,* ones that are necessarily varied, can usefully – and paradoxically – also be seen *as affective struggles* for a shared semblance of coherence, delimitation and continuity. That is, as whatever one and one's professional community is strictly or vaguely supposed to know, do or be. In this, it is the *variation* of embodied subjects that functions as affective community negotiations for what is same and different (inside/outside the *us*).

Any true equivalence is clearly impossible from any perspective on an iterable logic, but it is useful for us to consider the force of it as a contemporary assumption, in normativity and framing through the workings of address. In the situations and functions of teacher education

and teaching, there are such loads of normative demands in roughly the same terminology, from not only curriculum/institution/policy, but also the cultural narratives tying together the demands for becoming as teacher. Further, within the web demanding their becoming as singular *and* equivalent, a becoming student/teacher subject involves reading others as supposedly the same, in order for an *as if* of community at the surface to be possible. In other words, part of the problematic strength we should be aware of about this negotiating effect of reiteration, is that interacting sites of becoming *as* curricular performativity are all, whether in proximity or not, both demanding *and* readable, creating an effect of mutual reinforcement.

> **It could be worse when it comes to subject specific knowledge, but I think the pedagogy is something most can pick up. Much of it, at least. With just experience working in school.**
>
> **Yes, but *they* might not become really aware of *why* they do what they do!**
>
> **It becomes intuitive for us. [40]**

It is a negotiation that never ends or arrives, but it is, it seems to me, a *primary* dynamic, like différance is; it is what I want to call an optimistic, relational-discursive pull for continuous coherence *among* becoming subjects. That longing*,* as Derrida might say*,* functions multiply in the reiterative "project" that *is* the logic of equivalence, through whatever suitable terms cited. This, I argue, is *as* much an affective defense against the precariousness of a proper, delimited "we"*,* as in what Butler argues with regard to *one* precarious subject. These necessarily unique sites (of participation in negotiation) clearly also involve multidirectional influences in a web of address; their sameness is equally as impossible as a singular coherence, due to the same logic.

Again, in the relation between differential and equivalential logics, group equivalence depends on difference from its own outside, Laclau explains, like subject coherence depends on the subject's outside/other. To "achieve" temporary equivalence *as different from others* though, here as teacher community*,* depends, as he might say, on the members – which are each constitutively ambiguous. It is their embodied performativity of the normative meaning of teacher that may ensure the closest we can get to equivalence; on some sort of illusory surface, this is read(able) as similar *vis a vis* difference. It is an *as if* of equivalence, but as we can see

in politics, professions and other performed understandings and d/evaluations of social or natural difference, ingroup/outgroup negotiations certainly have powerful effects.

In other words, normativity's function *remains* as I argue address as a web-like dynamic, as only fictionally something other than fully paradoxical; it both "works" to make (illusions of "self"-based) collectivity and belonging, *and* obviously does not work at the same time. This is an aporetic concept of normativity, whether imagined in Butler's terms, or through considering *all* becoming in webs of demanding address. As the "self" and its other are violently made, and/or sameness is collectively negotiated, both the singular and plural are, in their dependent relation, at the same time intimate *aspects* of aporetic events.

6.2.2 Where in this paradox does ethics reside?

I held from early on that ethics resides in an openness to the otherness of the other, whether as the Derridean articulation of the pure function of the outside/other that makes meaning paradoxically im/possible, or as in Butler's, where Responsibility is located at the constitutive site of the "self" where, as a function of address, violent constitution of the other(s) happens. This principle also applies within the perspective I have developed on webs of address, and I round off this chapter with what I see as implications for ethics, which are particularly broad in and through education.

I imagine many radically temporary meanings are connected in webs of address in ways which, in addition to underlining the paradox of normativity for singular and group coherence, lets me argue implications of normative reiterations, that necessarily happen in a web of address, differently than any theorist I have used in this thesis. I believe each citation, however vague/incoherent, and/or in private, that leans on the current intelligibility and its constituent field of normative discourses, *carries a general function of ethical violence*. The event of citation plays a small part in a form of maintenance where this system of meaning echoes across

webs of address, across connectivities of becoming, and fulfils this function; violent constitution is dependent on the system, conversely making implications of citations reach outside the moment, but not in a linear sense.

An aspect of this argument is about differentially affecting situations of precarity as compensations for one's precariousness as subject; this may in that same sense be said to have impact near and far, however indeterminably, in moments and places fully detached from a moment of responding to demanding address. However, with "stretched" concepts of address and ethics, I must emphasize that even though my concept of address involves not only subjects but all kinds of *text* as demanding and constituted others, ultimately *ethics* is about the consequences for the lives and relations of *the human other*. Regardless of *who or what* the demanding and demanded others – sometimes for example a textbook – are in each web of address, the reiteration of humanism connects and contributes to *this* violent foreclosure.

C: What do you feel is the difference between thinking about something and reflecting on something?

Yeah, well, when you thing about something it doesn't necessarily make you more conscious! You can think without it having much impact on you then and there, it can just flow through you… but if you reflect there is a consciousness raising about an action or a thought or an idea, or something, that you might constructively change. [41]

The weight on us is that the numerousness of embodied becomings, its social mandate, and its dense normative landscape, makes education society's "powerhouse" of relative maintenance of the "self", and, more generally speaking, in the massive game of reiterating visible and invisible aspects of the humanist paradigm. Education is a function of great concern, precisely because of its size and role, and how formal curriculum is to some extent inseparable from what is the humanist curriculum of society.

On the part of students and teachers, this is for a large part centered, explicitly or not, around citing such discourses of knowledge, practice and values as I those I considered from the beginning, as generally *responsible* subjects – a notion providing one of the topics of the next and final chapter. Taking the complexity of address into account, and moral demands and

affectivity in particular, also has great potential; ethics is there as a *possibility*, in all the turning cogs of the complex, but also necessarily open-ended, reiterative machinery. This allows us to imagine ways for education to contribute to interrupt, not only maintain, a violent paradigm.

7. Irresponsible responsibility. Will you be upset with me?

> Is the relationality that conditions and blinds this "self" not, precisely, an indispensable resource for ethics? (Butler, 2005, p. 40)

We now move into the final pages of the argument this journey has to offer, or rather what I see as an inspired implication of the thesis, imagined as an approach through teacher education. But first, it is useful to retrace the trajectory of ideas that has brought us here. First of all, we can see how normative functions and iterable constitution have been a key assumption and interest from the start, with the humanist "self" as the center of a problem for ethics, because, in a structure of address, it is where constitution of the other happens. It is also what all kinds

of normative truths and realities now "lean into" – ways of reading, speaking, understanding, feeling, thinking, being and knowing that are premised on this type of subject.

Fueled by this perspective I considered three areas of pedagogy in teacher education because they exemplify so well how normative demands rely on assumptions of a "self" and its other. I argued these curricular demands ensure framing effects, as teacher "selves" are constituted *as* ones that differentiate others – ones that are implicated in the differentiated precarity of others, sometimes in very serious material and structural situations, but also many, many seemingly harmless ones. Involving Derrida as well, I argued how and why it is useful with visible utterances from student conversations about these areas of knowledge, practice and values, ones so connected in the meaning of teacher, as part of the theoretical endeavor.

With a primary interest in undermining the way education so powerfully contributes to ensure this violent subject, I moved to pursue a rethinking of the dynamic of *address*, and framing as a function of it. I believed that in a mutual dependence on normative citations this dynamic and function itself may be exposed as highly problematic but also unstable. I considered how this dependent system relies in a particularly heavy way on a temporal premise of progress, within the logic of what education is to be and do in society. I showed how practices of reflection are, like dialogue, demanded *as* reiterated ways of address, forcing a *lasting* "self", in a way that ties together this type of subject with the very possibility of an ethical, progressive society.

The next step was to reapproach the question of *what* a concept of address may or should hold, at a site of a becoming subject. My interest was to take into account more types of demanding factors *beyond* only the subjects of Butlers articulations of address, when we imagine education's constitutive relations and effects in society. I found it useful, in a quest to consider the complexity, power, yet inherent instability of address, to think that whatever a body *reads* meaning of, using Derrida's concept of *text*, is its other – in effect *demanding* that there is a (reading) "self". This shifted the thesis' focus on constitutive address to concern *all* demands for meaning, and the variety of situations and relations that re-ensure the *lasting* humanist subject and its various consequences.

As a continuation of this route to develop a complex concept of constitutive address in and through education, I brought in Sellers, who argues a simultaneity of plural meanings *becoming*, fully together, and in particular curriculum and child. In this perspective, normative influences have a role within unique connectivities of becoming. She sees curriculum as *worlding* in this non-linear way, and, as I do, writes *curricular performativity* in ways that apply and connect across much more than our educational foci, with education *in society* interacting as performativity of a humanist curriculum on a particular and general scale.

This introduction allowed a further multifaceted take, and between her and Butler I came to consider a constitutive dynamic as happening in multidirectional, unique *webs* of address. I made use of how Sellers conflates all becoming, as it lets me more intimately encompass what constitutes the singular and the implicit, human and not, in and through education. At the same time, each site of a becoming subject can be seen as both constituting and responding to a multiplicity of demanding others. In particular, I came to appreciate the idea of how this dynamic *still* manages to do the job of maintaining a premising intelligibility of a coherent "self", and its outside/other – and the question of what this feat may imply, ethically.

Before I get to this, I let Laclau provide me with one additional perspective, for a consideration of "sharing" knowledge, competence and values, as a community of teachers. He tells us how singular and plural struggles for coherence are connected; it is fruitful to consider how multiple bodies, in proximity or not, through reiterative citation of teacher meaning (like reflective practice) in an unwilled way *negotiates* an aporetic form of real, however impossible, *equivalence*. Even infinitely varied and vague normative citations, traversing webs of address, are a powerful force of negotiating the many meanings that *teacher* holds, overall. Even more relevant is that the dependent flip-side of this equivalence is ensuring coherence of the "parts", the subjects, the demanded "selves".

Throughout this thesis, ethical violence is located at the site of the "self", directed at the becoming of the other. Yet, with the reappropriation of the concept of address, I came to argue we should see that *all* citation and reading of meaning that reiterates the humanist curriculum, itself carries a general function of ethical violence – regardless of who or what is involved in

each moment. This is the implicit harm in the forceful (and reinforced) intelligibility *as such*, even when uttered to an empty room. *Responsibility* is ultimately only *to* the becoming of (all) *subject* others, but when each citation contributes to *uphold* the tight, discursive-relational quarters of humanist normativity and framing we live and relate in, we are connected, fully.

Again, education as a heavily populated field and practice is key in large populations of subjects becoming as societal-curricular performativity, and accordingly as implicated in normative foreclosure and precarity, but what follows from this thesis argument, in terms of suggesting possible engagements to counter it?

7.1 The irresponsible responsibility

First of all, I argue one aspect of affective self-constitution keeps the curtain of disavowal drawn tighter than everything else in the game of educational reiteration of humanism: the overarching notion of responsibility. For Butler, humanist discourses of responsibility are deeply problematic in that they "shor[e] up the subject, its claims to self-sufficiency, its ... indispensability to the field of its experience" (2005, p. 99); in other words, they foreclose primary relations to alterity, to *otherness*. Without interrupting this demand's role in education, it seems to me, it is rather impossible to make some room for the practice of Responsibility to the other.

This returns me to how I said earlier in this thesis that all becoming teachers have, as most every other body, morality arriving on two levels in each moment. Sites of becoming subjects *as* responses to multiple, simultaneous demands, are not only to be *narrativizable* in terms of norms, where normatively moral values are among them, but also to be *accountable for* oneself *as* a "self". The latter, Butler tells us, should be seen as a prior relation, and is therefore also a premise for specific moral demands and the drive to respond to them. Yet conversely, the

intelligibility that includes that prior relation is just as dependent on the citationality, regardless of aporetic effect, in order to precisely be reproduced *as its premise*. In other words, we should realize this seemingly tidy prior relation as necessarily an unstable relation all the same – as an aspect of the societal-curricular performativity that is infinitely variable, and where moral discourses are heavily involved. Normative moral values are "just" norms, but seem also, in education, to play a particular role in the overall reiteration of humanism, in dis/allowing what kind of subject is im/possible.

> **C: Do you think your curriculum reflects the political mandate where a focus on diversity and inclusion is a societal responsibility?**
>
> **I have used separate books when we've had about diversity as a topic, books with a healthier argument on diversity. There is a broader encouragement for the teachers to see all pupils… to think that inclusion is about more than just cultural or ethnic diversity. It is about working actively for tolerance and respect! In a more modern way.**
>
> **I think it is about experiences and reflections you do along the way. You read with the eyes and experiences you've got! So, it is only so some extent that curriculum might give you any knowledge about inclusion and diversity. It is you who's sort of all the time supposed to develop and learn more! And then books aren't enough, right!? [42]**

This concern is for all kinds of performative citations of what I think could be connected as discourses of responsibility (both in and about education), that are involved in webs of address that include demands to be a recognizable teacher. This for me means the *whole* social/political/ethical demand for what I have called teacher proper; it certainly includes all three discourses so visibly cited here. Normative meanings of responsibly professional, feed into and effectively bolster the primacy of that accountable "self". In effect, because of how multiple becoming meanings interact in performative events, or as Sellers would say they become together in connectivity, they can hardly be fully separated. The issue here is how a web of address that includes becoming as teacher, always involves citations of discourses tied in with responsibility as a key aspect, in a mash-up of morality and professionalism; this permeates the discursive landscape and is unavoidable in the societal-curricular performativity of teachers.

Returning to a well-known issue by now, Butler tells us that "suspending the demand for self-identity or, more particularly, for complete coherence" (2005, p. 42) of that shored up, self-

sufficient, responsible subject, would require never expecting to know the other, which is also in line with the ethics of openness to the other, that permeates Derrida's texts. *Unknowingness* remains with us through to the final pages, but, as I have held previously, the other that is supposedly known, is not necessarily a *subject* for the knowing "I" to carry the violent function. Conversely, the potential for openness to the becoming of the other as I imagine it is certainly about *each* disturbed reiteration of humanism, across webs of address. It is particularly powerful, though, how the meanings of teacher as they tie in with responsible being and doing, together ensures so many affective sites of a coherently accountable teacher "self"; so many citations implicate *the perfectly responsible teacher* in violence.

You're going to have an enormous responsibility as a teacher! But then you will as a teacher also show something to your pupils… how you relate to them, and how they will be able to relate back, to respond to how you are! So, you have to be a good a clear teacher! For your pupils, to create safe spaces for them! It has to be mutual; I mean there has to be openness in the classroom for differences, and… they have to *know* who you are!

I sometimes think… that many teachers treat pupils too much the same! It should be okay to treat pupils differently!

It depends what pupils need, I mean, in terms of additional learning support. To be able to learn, or to develop!

But it is not supposed to be based in the teacher feelings for… those pupils!

No, I mean purely professional, pretty much. Yes. As much as possible.

You can't take the emotions out it. So, you just have to try and… zero them out!

Yes. And talk to other teachers… maybe do hypotheticals… "how would you do this…?" and… get a little dialogue on it! I have been to a school where they do that in groups of three or four. They talk about how to facilitate and adjust, to have professional input about that! Because if you are someone's main teacher you get personally involved! You don't get to be objective no matter how hard you try, and then it's okay to get other opinions. From others who also know that pupil. [43]

For Derrida as well as Butler, and also for Sellers from another vantage, the openness is always already there, but can also be hoped for, and *pointed to*, through writing and speaking. This is appropriate, it seems, in this case also, because indeed responsibility to the Other, in Butler's Levinasian reading, is "not a matter of cultivating a will, but of making use of an unwilled susceptibility as a resource for becoming responsive to the Other" (2005, p. 91). In Butler's argument the connected notions of "autonomy" and the "self's" "taking of responsibility" should be shown, underlined even, as always already destabilized, in order to make use of this

resource of vulnerability, of precariousness in constitutive relations. What I develop in the remaining pages is precisely a suggestion to show, and underline, general precariousness and implication in the framing of others, directed at facilitating interruption of this demand for the responsible teacher in and through teacher education.

7.2 Educational politics of the who – an upsetting approach

For whom may teachers be "responsible for"? With a focus on teacher education, Christina Delgado Vintimilla (2012) returns us to *Giving an Account* and the engagement with "Who are you?" as the primary question of ethics; each address constitutes the other before it is even responded to, and the "who" of the "you", in any foundational or lasting sense, *cannot be answered*. The key relevance of the question, for Butler, is engaging with precisely how and why it is unanswerable, because that lets us think ethics and responsibility in a different way. I agree with Delgado Vintimilla and Graham Giles (2007) that "the explication of the politics of the who 'counters a certain ethical violence, which demands that we manifest and maintain self-identity at all times and require that others do the same' (Butler 2005, p. 42)" (p. 38). In what I take from this, an approach to violence in an *educational* politics of the who, can be about *pointing to* however educational demands for such coherence of "self" and other are getting in the way of openness to the outside of meaning – *of letting the other live*. In Delgado Vintimilla's concern for openness, she tells us that the meanings of

> education, the teacher and the *raison d'être* of them all prevail in the assumed codes of communal systems. (…) [T]eachers learn to see themselves and their practices in the vocabularies or the systems of ideas (…); they must become recognizably competent to others within their educational community. These discourses, (…) [are] of accountability and professionalism, of mastery and certainty, of coherence, harmony, and unity. (…) [They] may guarantee recognizability, [but] undermine the possibility of interrupting or puncturing what is already established. (2012, pp. 9 – 10)

For her, the assumed possibility of communities of teachers is in the way of letting the other live, and she holds that defamiliarization of the powerful myth of the collective and realization of its consequences, is a necessary educational politics of the who.

In Lisa Taylor's (2012) reading of *Frames of War,* she offers an argument on how teacher education may work to counter rather than contribute to framing. As mentioned, Butler insists here that there is no room within ontological individualism to directly make aware our shared precariousness as subjects and the ethics this entails, so we must start from encounters with differential precarity. Taylor's argument calls for teacher education to undermine the altruistic, sovereign teacher "self" that supposedly can save known, suffering others (2012, p. 150). Discursive frames, like those of war, apprentice us in apprehension and non-apprehension of suffering, in differentiation in mourning and ignorance, and it is within this, she reminds us, in "a profoundly pedagogical cultural politics (…) [that] we come to know ourselves as subjects" (p. 143). Her suggestion is a matter of students having to realize that we do not learn about others in neutral ways, but rather that frames work "at the level of sensation, affect, apprehension, perception and subjectivity" (p. 143); this sensate regulation affects everything about how we can think, feel, know and act.

> **I really don't know if I have felt that anything during this study program has been useless!? I don't think so!**
>
> **But then it is pretty difficult to know too, because you mix up much of what you've *experienced*, with what you have learned during classes here! You add it together, and with thoughts around it and stuff.**
>
> **Yes, so it has been a progression, building on each other! So, I have never really seen anything as in conflict with anything else… It has all sort of just clicked into place. [44]**

Taylor tells us about working with her students and going thoroughly through examples and discourses that may open their eyes to radically differential precarity and skewed representations, to make them see privilege and what kinds of power and framing is involved. Theorized as a "pedagogy of grief", their

> research and exercises about the impacts of globalization and war are preceded by our critical analysis of the discourses of Eurocentrism, whiteness, colonialism, eugenics, classical and neoimperialism, heteropatriarchy, and neoliberal capitalism as well as extensive use of the framework of difficult knowledge to observe our own experiences of resistance in difficult learning (p. 149).

This sort of approach to privilege and framing, she tells us, slows down how the students think they can and should have knowledge about someone and be their defender/savior, and even more, really working to see the differential precarity "demands the capacity to bear all that I cannot know about my implication in and formative relation to them and the circumstances of their lives" (p. 146). Engaging with this way of not knowing "demands a particular kind of loss. The loss of the social subject I have become…" (p. 147). It is the loss of any pretension of a "self" they had thought to be autonomous, knowing and unimplicated in the precarity of others. It is to be expected, Taylor says, "that scrutinizing my intimate implication (…) will trigger a crisis in facing the frailty of my own social being" (p. 146), in facing our shared precariousness as embodied social subjects. From such a crisis-like loss and disorientation, grief is posited as an affective resource, to enable a rather disrupting cultural politics; grief can be an "affective grounds" for a critical approach, in pedagogy, to nonviolence.

In the case of her work with students in justice-oriented courses, she writes, "[i]nterrupting their desire to know and help, in the face of moralistic regimes of pristine, nurturing teacher identities, [this] pedagogy of global justice teacher education asks my students to work through the crisis and violent helplessness of unknowingness" (p. 152). Crucially we should not and cannot deny students this sort of response, she concludes, but must rather prepare for the grief and perhaps even aggression, and find ways to allow for ambivalence, tension and flexible stability that are hospitable (p. 151) to affectivity as an ethical, pedagogical tool.

Where Delgado focuses on the myth of the teacher community, and Taylor on frames of privilege and social justice discourses, both are nonetheless concerned with constitutive relations and the unknowable other. These educational politics of the who both oppose discourses and dynamics in education that stand in the way of an ethics that lets the other live, and the contribution of my thesis can be called yet another approach. The *how and why* an other cannot be known has a related answer, on shared precariousness as subjects, but I look at the *reason* for this rather in terms of unique webs of address. I have *pointed to* these webs as the

dynamic where normative meanings are cited, and meanings *become*, together, and the "self" of humanism is reiterated; this is what I argue forecloses openness – *Responsibility* to the human other. I believe Taylor's argument on loss and grief may be brought and translated into this take on education, along with Delgado's insistent focus – through a reappropriation of Laclau's terms. Making use of affective responses to loss of "self" and of community in ways these connect with the concerns of this thesis, offers potential for powerful, interrupting refusals.

7.2.1 The loss of the unimplicated "self" – affective grounds for refusal

When Taylor calls for global justice teacher education to "interrupt circuits of social affect framing our students' apprehension" (2012, p. 149), she is talking about turning the attention of students to "the staggering and mounting global injustice" (p. 149), and to the framing discourses of global privilege. I agree students must encounter both skewed discourses and their framing consequences in order to implicate themselves in the connection, and experience an unknowingness and a loss of "self" to a realization of shared precariousness; this is a usefully affective situation. It may seem that is precisely *because* it is so given that altruism is ethically valued, but I hold that within an ontological individualism, as Butler would say, *any* route to realized precariousness as coherent, lasting subject, and violent implication in the lives of others, in the sense(s) Taylor and I are both talking about, likely imply crisis-like affectivity. Still, the routes for the students to see connections between citing normative discourses, and *how* they are radically implicated in lives of others, are different, as is how and where to make use of the affective response.

> **We are more and more the ones who raise them. They spend more and more time in school. So that we are not only teaching them the subjects! We also teach them how to behave with others! Social competence! We encourage them to be together and cooperate, so that they become socialized!**
>
> **They need to develop social antennas! To know how to be with others! [45]**

The position I have developed in this thesis entails that *anything* involved in maintaining the intelligibility of the "self"/other, and the dynamic driving its constitution, should be included as existing within the same problematic. Performing *as if* an altruistic "self", like the one Taylor critiques, for me connects intimately to all other reiteration of humanism ruling the field(s) of education – carrying the function of violence. The whole paradigm of truth and being, *including* the type of responsibility presumed, and central, in educational norms, ensures both blindness to shared precariousness and to implication in precarization of the lives of others. It is with this different perspective on a very similar ethical concern that I suggest we take with us but extend Taylor's argument and the approach she refers to.

It is necessary, I agree, to work to *implicate* students, and all of us, in the lives and differential precarity of others with a framework on normative discourse and constitutive relationality. Yet, due to how I conceptualize address differently, I imagine that working to grasp how performing the altruistic savior *contributes* to global injustice, should be connected with(in) normative citationality *as such*, impacting lives and relations even at the level of the locally unnoticeable, value neutral and mundane. This also includes the seemingly non-threatening, vague or even "private" performative practices; the demand to respond as a "self" with seemingly innocent or neutral knowledge/values/practices works affectively and violently as well, in the way this keeps ensuring the premising intelligibility that make us all embody so little openness, and so much negative implication in each other's lives.

From the argument I have developed, it follows that the pedagogical approach must be based in a perspective on the power of affect itself, as both central as that drive for coherence in self-constitutive/performative responses to our curriculum of humanism, that very drive that makes the loss of "self" so crisis-like, *and* as grounds to work pedagogically to interrupt the violence this entails. How may we hope to "incite", and make use of such affective response? You may have noticed that I have used the term "upset", to hint toward this crisis-related affect; for me this resonates better than grief. It is a play with word-use as both an adjective used about a range of affect from sad to disappointed to angry, and a word to describe radical change to a situation or system: turning something upside down or inside out.

Aiming toward, or hoping for, this level of radical change, it seems important to expose such discourses and implications Taylor insists on, *in the context of*, and the same pedagogical framework as, what is a proper, responsible, "normal" teacher knowledge and behavior, like for example social psychology, the diagnostic system, or treating pupils according to readings of gender. These fit in under any coherent notion of teacher, and what a teacher knows, says and does – and are as such affectively "achieved". Students need to realize the whole span of this as *interconnected effects across one and the same* web-like dynamic of address, where the whole range of responsible knowledges, values and efforts that makes up education as a field of research and practice share that one function of carrying violence. With the encompassing function this argument on ethics entails, some realized connections *could,* in a whole other sense than Taylors argument, turn into curious and horrified extrapolation.

> **I think values and attitudes are very important! But you as a person come from a different place with different assumptions. We come from different environments, and have grown up with basis in attitudes and values that we may not have a very conscious relation to! You have values and attitudes that you bring to school, and that you automatically transfer to your pupils!**
>
> **(All the others:) Yes!**
>
> **…well the way you are as a person, they may be "infected" by the way you are! I feel.**
>
> **It is about consciousness… that you as a teacher – it is a position of power, and you have to have respect for it, and… you have to know your responsibility! So, when it comes to the pupils' development? …it has a lot to say for self-perception, motivation… confidence. [46]**

What I am saying is that this thesis argument implies that what I imagine as *working to upset*, concerns not only social justice programs. A teacher education pedagogy hoping to upset the (becoming of) students, needs to extend in its framework the concepts of ethics and injustice to involve the whole process of worlding, of societal curricular performativity, that educational demands in humanist terms entail. Students need critical encounters with *both* "commonsensical" and "descriptive" everyday discourses that education makes use of (gender, development, learning, diagnoses, sexual orientation, skin color, identity, intelligence, disability, etc.), *and* specifically curricular ones. So many topics and singular examples of realities, differences, relevance, (d)evaluations, possibilities, shame, or entitlement may not be upsetting in themselves, but an alternative pedagogical framework would *implicate* them, in the sense of how becoming as (proper, responsible) teacher involves both in-the-moment violent

othering addressed to someone's face, as well as the contribution to reiteration of what in general forecloses openness in lives and relations. *This* is the loss of an unimplicated, undivided "self" I imagine should be sought out as a productive crisis.

I further argue that if we are to develop pedagogies that may interrupt to subvert how citationality, that across interconnected webs of address, ensure a "self" as center of meaning, this necessarily involves grasping that this whole problem is also reinforced through reiteration of what Delgado Vintimilla (2012) calls the myth of the collective; to be able to interrupt the reiteration of the humanist curriculum, it must be approached also as troubling *because* it is a reiterative, collective negotiation. This reiteration in the crowded, responsible, knowledge-focused, future-projecting fields of teacher education and teaching, across a plurality of bodies and *text*, carries the function of violence and seems close to impenetrable. For any sort of unraveling to ripple and disturb it, we must pull cleverly on several central threads, and as our becoming is radically connected, there is no pulling alone.

On the other side of that, having students upset about implication in violence in performativity of "regular", responsible teacher, may lead to getting upset about *shared* loss. It is a sharing that is not "among" subjects, but *in* the relational discursive dynamic, the universal *embodiment* of fundamental precariousness. To the extent such a shared precariousness and our implication in lives of others is realized, this is not just about distant others, or pupils. There seems to me in this even an imperative to *not* address (read!) bodies that "share" space in the educational structure of violent implication, *as* coherent and responsible; troubled by implication and loss, working to refuse demands, you also refuse *to* demand – you are too upset. I think this is necessarily a realization that implies less violent reading and becoming *in* each web of address, which also means reading other types of *text* humbly, unsurely, since "self"-assured reading and knowing is part of contributing in reiteration of violence. Responsibility to the other flows through the whole width of reading and constituting meaning, of normative reiteration, even as the end-game is the embodied subject other, and becoming teachers are, in my view, *the* "busiest" complex sites of societal-curricular performativity to interrupt.

To accommodate (and encourage) this is a way, as I imagine it, to be hospitable to the upset response, whether we call it affective resistance, loss, aggression or anger, from being addressed with pedagogies brought to upset (them), that expose their frailty as coherent subjects and the part they play in reiterating the very function and possibility of violence. But it is also to think about it as singular *and* plural upset(ness); an affective ground for non-violent performativity of teacher*s*. I believe that to shake up the absolute dominance of a humanist logic, we must consider how, as part of such a broad approach, to encourage ways of becoming, incoherently, critically, as collective negotiation of a shared "we" *as* upset due solely to shared unknowingness and precariousness, and implication in the precarity of others. As upset(ing) subjects, it is a multidirectional *refusal*, in each moment, of demands to perform *meanings of an us as "responsible"*.

But what could education rather be *about*, without its foundational subject, its community of teachers, its faith in knowledge, its mandated responsibility, and its stake in progress? I insist again on humility and *radical solidarity* based in the upset of shared precariousness, and implication in framing of others. That implies ongoing, upset, reiterative negotiation, *resisting* demands to read, know, think, feel, practice, desire, disregard and relate – in those ways that lean on singular and plural coherence as knowing and knowable subjects. In other words, let us imagine education as a context of indeterminable spaces and relations, instead of the context where, in such concentrated ways, bodies are asked, and likely, to blindly perform the violent curriculum of humanism.

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9. Appendix 1. Consent forms. English and Norwegian

Information and consent (pre-conversation form):

Research topic and aim

This project looks at what teacher students think about the areas of knowledge and values called *knowledge of pupils* and *diversity and inclusion*, and generally about the focus on *reflection* in their education. It aims to contribute to the development of related practices in the education and profession in innovative ways. The dissertation is written within the philosophy of education.

Participant role

Your role involves discussing the research topic with this group, partially facilitated by the researcher. The reason I am conducting a *group conversation* is that your role is to help bring out *different* ways to describe, understand emphasize and connect concepts, approaches and experiences. I assume you will trigger, challenge and support each other's input. Do not be afraid to agree, disagree or generally position yourself in relation to what the others are saying!

The conversation will last about 2 hours. It will be videotaped to ensure possible transcription, because it is difficult to do it correctly from audio alone. Only written material will be used, and your contribution will be fully anonymous. The interview is only one source of material, in addition to curriculum and policy, among other things.

Participation is voluntary, and you can pull out at any time without giving a reason. Personal information and other information that appear will be treated confidentially. The material is stored at a hard drive at the University of Oslo, and only the researcher has access. At the project's end, all personal information about you will be deleted.

I hereby consent to participate in a group interview, and that the material is used in the dissertation of Caro Seland Kirsebom, Ph.D. research fellow at the Institute for Pedagogical research at the University of Oslo.

_____   _____   _____

Name in capital letters   Signature   Place/date

Original form in Norwegian:

Informasjon og samtykke (før samtalen)

Forskningstema og mål

Dette prosjektet ser nærmere på hvordan lærerstudenter tenker om kunnskaps- og holdningsområdene som handler om *elevkunnskap,* og om *mangfold og inkludering,* og generelt om fokuset på *refleksjon* i utdanningen. Prosjektet sikter mot å bidra til å utvikle relaterte praksiser i utdanningen og yrket på innovative måter. Avhandlingen skrives innenfor et utdanningsfilosofisk felt.

Deltagerrolle

Din rolle involverer å diskutere forskningstemaet med gruppen, en samtale som til dels blir ledet av forskeren. Bakgrunnen for gjennomføringen av et *gruppeintervju,* er at deres rolle er å få frem *forskjellige* måter å beskrive, forstå, legge vekt på og forbinde konsepter, tilnærminger og erfaringer. Jeg antar dere vil trigge, utfordre, og støtte hverandres input. Ikke vær redd for å være enige eller uenige eller generelt posisjonere dere selv.

Samtalen vil vare i ca. 2 timer. Den vil bli videofilmet for å gjøre det mulig å transkribere materialet, ettersom det er vanskelig å skrive det ut korrekt etter lydopptak alene. Kun skrevne gjengivelser fra samtalen vil bli brukt, og ditt bidrag vil bli fullstendig anonymisert. Intervjuet er kun én materialkilde, i tillegg til bl.a. pensum og politiske styringsdokumenter.

Deltagelse er frivillig, og du kan trekke deg når som helst uten å oppgi grunn. Personopplysninger og annen informasjon som fremkommer vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. Materialet lagres på en egen harddisk ved Universitetet i Oslo, og kun forskeren har innsyn. Ved prosjektslutt vil alle personopplysninger om deg slettes.

Jeg samtykker til å delta i gruppeintervju, og til at materialet blir brukt i avhandlingen til Caro Seland Kirsebom, Ph.d. stipendiat ved Institutt for Pedagogikk på Universitetet i Oslo:

_____   _____   _____

Blokkbokstaver   Underskrift   Sted/dato

Additional information and new consent form
– *after* the interview:

Thank you very much for your participation!

I offer some additional information now that I could not give before because it would change the conversation, and jeopardize the type of material I am interested in. After having heard this you will have a new opportunity to consent, or not, to me using the material.

Your assumptions about your own role may not coincide with the methodological perspectives that inform the project. Those assumptions, if not explicitly commented on, may lead to you feeling misrepresented or misinterpreted. I hope you can keep this in mind *if* or *when* you read my dissertation in three or four years.

This is a *philosophical* project about language and ethics; it is *not* social science.

I am interested in use of language, or discourses, about the three areas we have talked about, in and around your education, which are present and endorsed both culturally, politically and in the teacher education curriculum. I want to consider what the professional discourses we have talked about may be seen to imply, seen from certain theoretical perspectives.

I plan to engage with two philosophers and develop a thorough theoretical argument about premises and implications of current formal educational concepts, and your more informal relation to this language.

I emphasize: I will not analyze you as a participant. I will not even give you a made-up name or number next to quotes, because they will be used in detached ways.

Whatever I may write about the implications of language, I am not writing about you. It is about completely *common* and *mandated* parts of the teaching profession, in political and curricular terms. I will not attribute motivation, describe you, or compare you. And again, the interview is only one source, in addition to curriculum and policy, among other things.

Your participation is a very important contribution: it makes possible an exciting new approach to ethics and pedagogy! Thank you very much!

I hereby consent to Caro Seland Kirsebom using my part of the conversation in a dissertation:

_____   _____

Signature   Date/place

Caro.kirsebom@iped.uio.no / Phone: 48294349

Caro Seland Kirsebom, Ph.D. research fellow at the Institute for Pedagogical research at the University of Oslo.

Original form in Norwegian:

Tilleggsinformasjon og ny samtykkeerklæring
– *etter* intervjuet:

Tusen takk for din deltagelse!

Dette er tilleggsinformasjon som jeg ikke kunne gi på forhånd, fordi det ville endre samtalen og dermed den type materiale jeg er interessert i. Etter å ha hørt dette får du en ny mulighet til å samtykke, eller ikke, til at jeg bruker materialet.

Dine antagelser om din rolle sammenfaller muligens ikke helt med det metodologiske perspektivet som ligger til grunn for mitt prosjekt. Det er viktig at jeg kommenterer dette tydelig, for at du ikke skal føle deg misrepresentert eller feiltolket. Jeg håper du kan klare å være bevisst på det følgende, *hvis* eller *når* du leser min avhandling om tre-fire år:

Dette er et *filosofisk* prosjekt om språk og etisk teori – *ikke* "beskrivende" samfunnsforskning.

Jeg er interessert i språkbruk, eller *diskurser*, om de tre temaområdene vi har snakket om, i og rundt profesjonsutdanningen, som er *gjennomgående* til stede både kulturelt, politisk og i pensum. Jeg vil utforske hva profesjonsdiskursene vi har snakket om kan sees å innebære, sett fra enkelte teoretiske perspektiver.

Jeg planlegger å engasjere to filosofer, og utvikle et omfattende teoretisk argument om premisser og implikasjoner både i nåværende formelle utdanningsbegreper, og i deres mer uformelle forhold til dette språket.

Jeg understreker at jeg *ikke* skal analysere deg som deltager. Jeg kommer ikke engang til å gi deg et oppfunnet navn eller nummer ved sitater, for de vil bli brukt på frittstående måter.

Uansett hva jeg kan komme til å argumentere om implikasjoner av språk, så handler det ikke om deg. Det handler om fullstendig *vanlige*, og politisk og faglig sett *pålagte*, deler av læreryrket. Jeg vil verken tillegge deg motivasjon, beskrive deg, eller sammenligne deg. Og som sagt, intervjuet er kun én materialkilde, i tillegg til bl.a. pensum og politiske styringsdokumenter.
Din deltagelse er et *svært* viktig bidrag: det muliggjør en spennende ny tilnærming til etikk og pedagogikk! Tusen takk!

Jeg samtykker til at Caro Seland Kirsebom bruker min del av intervjusamtalen i sin avhandling:

_____   _____

Underskrift   Dato/sted

Caro.kirsebom@iped.uio.no / Telefon: 48294349

Caro Seland Kirsebom, Ph.d stipendiat ved Institutt for Pedagogikk på Universitetet i Oslo.

10. Appendix 2. Student utterances as recorded in Norwegian

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[1] (Nr2.)

Elevkunnskap er elevens forutsetning! Det er jo kunnskap om eleven, altså det som *er i* eleven da, altså *det de* kan, og alt utenom også, rett og slett det mer personlige. Og det er læringsstrategier

Du må vite at det er masse som spiller inn! For at den eleven presterer eller ikke presterer som den gjør da. Eller oppfører seg som den gjør.

Og som lærer er du også en del av elevforutsetningene! Fordi du representerer noe i forhold til eleven. Sånn at det blir jo, det er jo forutsetninger i forhold til omgivelser!

Ja for du har jo en måte å være på. Det er ikke alle elever som dét vil være den beste og gunstigste måten å … å være på! Og da må du vite, eller tenke litt gjennom det da, når du jobber med elever. Og se litt på seg selv også. …i sin rolle i hvordan du påvirker eller ikke påvirker eleven.

---

² (Nr21.)

Altså, vi har våre, subjektive meninger, og… det er vanskelig å være objektiv. Vi vil ikke komme inn i lærerjobben som blanke ark! Når det kommer til inkludering! Og jo mer vi på en måte tenker over, og vektlegger, både mangfold og inkludering, så vil vi kanskje lære oss teknikker som gjør oss mer objektive! Som gjør at vi har *mulighet* til å forholde oss mer objektive!

³ (Nr49.)

Altså jeg tenker at elever kommer med ulike erfaringer og kunnskap, og det viktig å kunne være åpen for de refleksjonene de kommer med også! Være åpne til å ta imot det de har å si da! Og oppmuntre dem og motivere dem til å kunne… stå opp for det de sier! Også lære dem å være reflekterende!

⁴ (Nr 41.)

Vi har jo et samfunnsmandat, ikke sant? Fokus på mangfold er viktig! Det er jo vi som har mye av ansvaret, for neste generasjon i samfunnet! Vi skal skape et fremtidig samfunn med folk som er tolerante overfor hverandre, og som er nysgjerrige, og som respekterer en person *der den er*, og på en måte prøve å tilpasse seg den personen!

Ja, og det er viktig for oss, og for dem, at vi har god kunnskap om mangfoldet vi kommer til å møte, det handler jo om at da slipper du å tråkke på andres følelser – det kan være noe som er kjempeviktig for dem. For at du skal kunne møte den personen der den er, så er det nødvendig at du ikke tråkker på noe som blir feil! Jeg føler at det er uvitenhet som skaper konflikt ofte. Og frykt, ikke minst.

Men jeg tror at det er… også som lærere, så er viktig at vi kan *bruke* det mangfoldet. Hvordan kan jeg som lærer bruke det mangfoldet i klasserommet?

Ja for eksempel hvis du har elever som har bakgrunn Somalia, eller… At man da har et større prosjekt i klasserommet, hvor du presentere de ulike kulturene… ja, det er en måte å presentere det ukjente på! Også, ja, ta inn mangfoldet på den måten!

Ja, men det kan jo være skummelt å dra inn elevene i det også – og nå har jeg sikker blitt veldig påvirket - det at vi skal være så forsiktige og alt mulig, men da tenker jeg også… er det med på å fremmedgjøre dem?!

Stille dem ut, som… noe fremmed, som noe vi skal lære om..

...det burde ikke være ubehagelig når du klarer å skape relasjoner! det med å skape et trygt sted å kunne *være* mangfoldig i klassen! Og hvordan skal de ellers lære, hvis du skal gå rundt og være redd hele tiden? Det går ikke! Du kommer ikke frem!

Og hvis du usynliggjør det da… altså du må jo kunne presentere et mangfold på en eller annen måte! Altså de skal jo bli det dannete menneske, og da må de borti sånt! ...for det er en del av livet, de skal ut i et samfunn som krever ganske mye av dem!

⁵ (Nr1.)

Det er bare *kunnskap om* eleven, som har med, bare hvordan den lærer, hvordan sosialt den fungerer. Også i gruppe! Men, ja, det er bare alt man kan vite om en elev! Et barn!

Ja! Og en forutsetning for å være en god lærer! Rett og slett! Å ha elevkunnskap! Hvis ikke du har det, så har du ikke noe forutsetning for å være en god lærer, etter min mening!

⁶ (Nr31.)

Jeg har alltid tenkt at mye av det som står i teorier og lærebøker, om psykologien og i det hele tatt sånn kunnskap om elevene, det … at dette er jo obvious kunnskap! Det er sånn man tenker selv!

Ja! Men det kan jo gi et grunnlag da, til å reflektere! For det er jo mye logisk tenkning! Og så kan du se om du er enig eller kanskje delvis! Og ha noen knagger å henge det på!

Men det er ting som dukker opp, som man kanskje ikke har tenkt på! som man får dypere innsikt i, og kanskje kan bruke på sin egen måte! Jeg tenker litt av det vi har lært her, er å bruke den kunnskapen vi har tilegnet oss – på vår egen måte!

C: er dere oppmuntret til det?

Nei altså... Det er sånn vi tenker, alle sammen tror jeg! det er noen gode poenger vi liker - men så lager man nesten sin egen teori! Men jeg har ikke følt meg oppfordret til det!

Jeg synes ikke høyskolen har vært flink til å vise oss hvordan bruke det i det hele tatt!

Jeg føler det blir enklere å godta teoriene hvis du bare kan gjøre det til ditt, ha friheten til å bruke ting slik du ønsker! Fordi vi er jo ikke like som lærere, og kommer ikke til å bli det!

Vi klarer ikke å være naturlige hvis vi går og tenker "Oj… nå hadde Bruner tenkt at…"

men vi har dem med oss, i oss, og jeg tror at når man er sammen med barnet så ser man hva som funker, eller altså kanskje funker litt fra hver teori..!?

[7] (Nr24.)

Nei, men det kommer litt mer naturlig, for du blir så vant til å prate i løpet av de der refleksjonstimene! Du blir vant til det, og etterpå sitter du gjerne i gruppa, og… prater… og i blant så blir det jo naturlig dialog, på mange ting. Det kommer litt an på, hvis ikke du har en gruppedynamikk som fungerer, så vil jo det bli anstrengt, … jeg føler for min egen del… når jeg sitter på toget på vei hjem, så sitter jeg og tenker over dagen, og… man kan ikke unngå det!

Ja man tenker jo også selv om man ikke prater med noen liksom! Man sitter jo hele tiden og reflekterer, og tenker over…

Jeg pleier å tenke over hvilke elever jeg ikke har snakket så mye med. I refleksjonen. Sånn for min egen del, sånn inni meg. Om jeg har dårlig samvittighet for noe..

[8] (Nr52.)

Det er veldig begrensende at det er så veldig *lærerstyrt*! Det er de som bestemmer om de vil ha det! Ja og hvordan refleksjonen skal foregå!

Og hva som er riktig svar nesten!

Ja! fordi at vi har jo opplevd i klasserommet at noen har prøvd å si noe da, og komme med sine refleksjoner, så har de blitt hakket på, fordi at det er ikke sånn det skal gjøres!

Men jeg kan ikke huske at jeg har lært hvordan jeg skal gjøre det

[9] (Nr23.)

Refleksjon for meg er at man snakker om det man har opplevd, og tenker på det som har skjedd. Hvorfor skjedde det? Man får flere synspunkt. Hva kunne jeg gjort annerledes?

Ja også blir man også litt mer trygg... du blir litt mer komfortabel, du setter ikke like mye press på deg selv da, hele tiden! Fordi at, du kan gjøre ting som du angrer på og går og tenker på, at du skulle gjort annerledes! Men refleksjonen gjør at du henter erfaringer fra det, bruker det til noe konstruktivt!

Ja det rett og slett *letter* litt… Så du blir mer avslappet! Og det er lov å gjør feil! Da er det bare noe å lære av det!

Ja. Og ikke ta det så personlig! Fordi du ser på deg selv mer som et objekt! Eller lærerrollen er mer som et objekt. Ja sånn i forhold til å ta litt sånn avstand fra deg selv. Fordi du skjønner og ser på deg selv utenfra!

Jeg synes det skaper åpenhet, rett og slett! At man blir mye mer avslappet, fordi… det blir så fritt!

[10] (Nr55.)

C: kan vi koble det til temaene vi har snakket om? Er det lagt opp til å reflektere rundt mangfold, for eksempel?

Altså, jeg kan ikke huske at vi har reflektert så mye over det, nei. Men sånn som når vi diskuterer pedagogiske ting da, så kan jo være det kommer et spørsmål, der du *også* trekker inn det med mangfold… om det er med funksjonshemming, eller om en elev med to mødre.

[11] (Nr27.)

Jeg tror det bevisstgjør handlingene dine, rett og slett. Jeg tror det er det det i bunn og grunn gjør. Det bevisstgjør deg i handlingene din i løpet av en dag, på godt og vondt!

C: *gjør* det det, eller *bør* det gjøre det?

Det gjør det, i mitt tilfelle så gjør det det. … kanskje ikke alt! Men, ja!

[12] (Nr17.)

Men mangfold… vi har også hatt om handikapp, og læringsvansker

Det går på en måte ut på, føler jeg, at du skal kunne se mangfoldet, og bruke det som ressurs!Og tenke på de utfordringene du også kan få!

Men også det positive, ja!

Ja men altså, det er ofte sånn at mangfold er omtalt som en ekstra utfordring, som lærer. Men det skjønner jeg når det er snakk om unger med mange forskjellige språklige bakgrunner og sånn. Så, det er ofte sånn der negativ fokus.

Men det er utrolig gøy, hvis du er heldig, når det kommer til det her altså! Det har vært veldig gøy, med mangfold.

[13] (Nr39.)

Mangfold synes jeg er et vanskelig begrep.

Jeg tror det er fordi høyskolen har lagt veldig vanskelige, men veldig tydelige føringer på hva mangfold er! Og de prater om noe veldig spesifikt, men samtidig så er det veldig utydelig!

Jeg tror at det at høyskolen hatt sånn fokus på at det er kulturelt og etnisk, det med mangfold har gjort så jeg har det veldig sånn at jeg tør nesten ikke prate om det, for jeg er redd for å bruke feil begreper og såre noen, eller krenke noen

Ja det skal være veldig korrekt.. det er kjempevanskelig altså!

Det er noe av det mest ulovlige som er!

[14] (Nr26.)

Det blir veldig sånn vurderende positivt og negativt sånn konkret akkurat der og da. Mens ukesloggen, den har vært mer… i forhold til et tema, og personlige erfaringer med det. Men der legger praksisskolene det opp ganske ulikt!

Ja, noen får jo spørsmål de skal svare på, og… noen får liksom sånn "skriv logg!". (Ler)

ja det er veldig ulikt. Men du blir hele tiden, altså… refleksjon er en… ting her, for å si det sånn! (Ler)

Jeg har i hvert fall… tenkt at… første året, så fikk man litt sånn… refleksjon helt opp i halsen, fordi det ble så anstrengt! Du skulle gjøre sånn og sånn, og da hadde vi jo nesten ikke gjort det engang! Vi visste ikke helt hva det gikk ut på! Vi skulle finne ut av det selv, i hovedsak.

Men altså, etter hvert som årene gikk, så har vi jo på en måte lært oss til det, funnet frem til noe som funker.

Det er konkrete ting om undervisningen. Men det er også i forhold til hvordan relasjonen er til elevene .... Men det kommer rett og slett an på dagsformen, for noen dager så føles det som om jeg bare sitter der helt tom og bare ikke klarer å hente noe! Men andre ganger føler jeg meg mer selvsikker som konsekvens av det, ja.

For min del… vi skulle bare ha reflektert. Jeg vet ikke engang hvor det kommer fra… eller hvor jeg har det fra. Jeg husker ikke så mye at vi har hatt om det her. det er bare noe man har gjort. Særlig i praksis. Og særlig i 1. klasse. Men det var jo ganger det var lærerikt og sånn. At man observerer og så skal man reflektere… og særlig se en tendens i det.

[15] (Nr15.)

Jeg synes det var fascinerende – det var en sånn "mangfoldsuke". Og jeg tror arrangørene gikk inn med tanken om at vi tenkte at mangfold er etnisk mangfold… men så tror jeg mange av oss så på et større mangfold! Fordi… hun som var på besøk sa at "å, her var det lite mangfold!" til oss da vi kom inn til forelesningen hennes. Og hun skulle ha om mangfold. Hehe (ikke imponert)

Ja altså, vi er jo mange etniske norske jenter, da! Tilsynelatende.

Men også gamle og unge. Tykke og tynne. Osv osv.

Men det ble jo reaksjoner.

Mellom oss tre også så er det jo ganske stort mangfold også sikkert! Fordi vi er jo like, men vi er jo forskjellige og, ikke sant!

Ja og identiteten din.. Sånn du ser deg selv. hvordan du er i familien. Hvordan du er i klassen… hvordan du er alene. Med alt av dine interesser. Erfaringer…ehm. Kultur. … eller hvilke normer du har levd inn i eller kanskje har tatt avstand fra. og om du føler deg inkludert eller ikke – i all slags sammenhenger… , ja, det er så mye.

Ja. Men den største feilen man kan gjøre er jo å begrense mangfoldet til nasjonalitet da.

Men det er veldig lett å gå i den fellen!

[16] (Nr5.)

Jeg tror også det faglige fra pedagogikken, teorien, kan være sånn sikkerhetsnett… i begynnelsen. Men jo mer erfaring du får, jo friere blir du! i forhold til dine egne elever!

[17] (Nr16.)

Det er jo en veldig synlig del av mangfoldet da. Eller… Kanskje mer sånn "håndfast"... ja hun er derfra og hun er derfra, og de snakker det og det språket.

Ja! Men jeg skjønner litt at vi har det i utdanningen og, for vi…

Vi kommer jo fra et land som… som har hatt, eh, lovfestet antisemittisme. det har jo preget vår historie! Og det er naturlig at man har den delen av mangfold i skolen…

Og så har man jo rettigheter. Med morsmålsundervisning… Det er sikkert litt derfor også.

[18] (Nr22.)

Tilsynelatende kan man jo være veldig forskjellige, men så er man *like* på veldig mange måter! …. Og, at mangfoldet er litt krydder, mens det man er lik på kanskje knytter oss litt mer sammen!

Og alle barna har jo behov for omsorg og trygghet... altså uansett bakgrunn så er jo det essenser som vil gjenspeile seg i barn.

[19] (Nr38.)

... du er jo et menneske du og! Selv om første prioritet er å ta vare på elevene, så må du også bli tatt vare på, hvis du skal kunne undervise, og ta vare på klassen, så er det jo viktig at du føler at du er respektert både av elevene og av kollegaene dine.

Ja, for om din personlighet blir oversett, eller ikke anerkjent eller, altså da er det jo en krenkelse!

Ja fordi da føler du at du som person er ikke bra nok.

[20] (Nr35.)

Jeg føler jeg har utviklet meg gjennom studiet. Det er egne erfaringer og refleksjoner som har mer verdi og mer å si!

Ja det merker jeg veldig i forhold til høyskole og praksis også! Ja de er helt forskjellige ting! Ja at det ikke er sammenheng mellom dem engang! Det føles nyttigere med praksis!

[21] (Nr51.)

En lærer her har vært veldig flink til å bruke caser! Så deler man tanker først, og da kan refleksjonene også komme!

C: Med *dine* holdninger, går du inn og ser på andres handlinger?

Ja. Og det gjelder praksis også. Og i det daglige.

[22] (Nr47.)

Forskjellene og mangfoldet er jo med på å gjøre deg til et unikt individ liksom! Humanisert!

Det trenger ikke å være noe sensasjonelt at du er annerledes!

Ja, men det kommer veldig an på hvordan du selv ser det. Det er så mye som har …å si da, for hvordan *du* tolker det. Det er jo ikke noen andre som.. tenker for deg! Jeg bestemmer hvordan jeg vil tolke deg! Men samtidig… miljøet, og de holdningene jeg har vokst opp blant, har mye å si for hvordan jeg tenker om andre! Og det jeg har lært på skolen! Og negative og positive erfaringer har også vært med på å påvirke hvordan jeg dømmer, eller *ser* andre!

[23] (Nr56.)

Jeg tilføyer kanskje ikke sånn veldig mye… sånn i klasserommet mitt. selv om jeg ikke er fra majoriteten i det klasserommet, så er jeg jo fra majoriteten i storsamfunnet! Norge!

[24] (Nr3.)

C: Temaet i elevkunnskapen som kalles relasjonskompetanse? Har det vært nyttig?

Ja! Det har det

Altså, vi har hatt en *oppgave*, om hvordan man bygger relasjoner. Det har ikke vært mye i pensum, men det har vært pratet om noe på forelesninger, og ute blant enkelte av praksislærerne er det veldig fokus på det. Ikke bare på… dypere nivå, men på nivå så enkelt som… at lær deg navnet til elevene! Fordi bare dét er en tilknytning som gir relasjon, og lar dem føre seg verdsatt.

Og så er vi jo flere sammen i praksis, og vi diskuterer jo mye., så vi får jo ganske høy kunnskap om elevene! Så jeg føler at, det er jo der, i praksis, jeg har lært mest om relasjoner. Og fått prøvd det ut! … hva som funker på den eleven og ikke den!

[25] (Nr20.)

Men hvor mye ressurser skal du putte i et klasserom, for… det blir også… det kan gå litt på hele prinsippet altså for inkludering da. Det at hvis du gjør så tydelige skiller mellom elevene, kan ha tilbakevirkende effekt!

Det kan være en fordel å bare tenke eller si "ja sånn er det bare"!

Ja, man må prøve å bare gjøre det så naturlig som mulig, tenker jeg. med inkludering og sånn. At man ikke skal sette fingeren på at "du er sånn" men det er helt greit! med hver minste ting da, fordi da kan man lage problemer i stedet!

[26] (Nr40.)

Jeg tør nesten ikke å spørre "er du muslim?". da føler jeg at jeg gjør… ja!?

Ja, men at tenker jeg at du vet at du er en god person! Og aldri ville mene noe vondt! Og det er en døråpner da, i seg selv. ... og det å ha en nysgjerrighet, det er jo bare en fin ting! Det er jo sånn du lærer andre å kjenne, enten det er etnisk eller religiøst, eller… seksuell orientering! Og der er nysgjerrigheten med på å skape toleranse! Og kunnskap! … og det er derfor synes jeg det er så dumt med det der at man skal være politisk korrekt, og… noe av det beste jeg vet er å reise rundt og møte nye kulturer, og mennesker, og, ja jeg er kjempenysgjerrig! Men jeg holder tilbake fordi jeg føler at det blir galt, fordi det er så mye fokus på det å tråkke galt, og hvor galt det kan bli!

Altså… intensjonen din, den er jo ikke noe negativ. Og måten du stiller spørsmål, har mye å si!

Ja, men jeg kan ha sagt feil. Jeg har opplevd det mange ganger.

[27] (Nr30.)

Ja! Fagformidler og omsorgsperson. Fordi, altså, alle er jo forskjellige! Og det er viktig at spesielt en lærer ser… egenskapene hos barn! Respekterer dem! Og ut fra de egenskapene til barnet, eller eleven, bygger trygge læringsmiljøer! Det har mye å si for eleven sin utvikling også, hva læreren viser dem om hvilken oppfatning de har av dem! Jeg tror det har veldig mye å si for selvbilde og selvfølelsen, og det har jo veldig mye å si for læringen!

[28] (Nr8.)

Til eksamen må du kunne skille de ulike teoriene om læring og utvikling, og trekke frem hovedpunktene og... så det lagt opp til at vi skal reflektere og snakke rundt det. Men det er ikke noe fasit, fra skolen, for det er rett og slett opp til oss!

Du får lov til å tenke litt fritt, fordi den konstruktive refleksjonen, den skal *være i deg*! Så, hjelper de deg videre.

[29] (Nr48.)

Refleksjon er å tenke over det du har sett eller gjort eller hørt! At du er åpen for å forandre mening, eller… At du på en måte er villig til å ta inn inntrykk, og prosessere dem.

At du kan tenke over det du gjør selv – egne meninger, at det har en grunn liksom, at du klarer å faktisk forsvare eller argumentere for hvorfor du gjør som du gjør, eller hvorfor du mener som du mener!

[30] (Nr7.)

Vi hadde jo mest om læringsteorier sånn det første året. Da hadde vi ganske mye diskusjoner. Og da var alltid sånn at vi kom frem til at det beste er en blanding! Man kan ta litt fra det og litt fra det og… men det er ikke optimalt å ta bare én, og holde seg til den!

[31] (Nr34.)

Det er viktig å se barnet! kanskje utfordringer, eller personlige egenskaper... eller det fine ved barnet! Bare anerkjenne som individ!

...det å vise hver enkelt at "hei jeg ser deg, jeg forstår deg!" det er ikke lett!

[32] (Nr4.)

C: når du er med en elev, og så tenker du etter om kunnskap for å relatere det til eleven...?

Det er mye psykologi. alt fra hvordan fakter, hvordan eleven oppfører seg i forhold til andre. Sosiale spill.

Man må jo prate med dem, og prøve og bli litt mer kjent med dem, på et personlig nivå også.

Det er jo idealet. Men, jeg tror ikke det er noen spesiell kunnskap man henter opp der og da! Det blir sånn bare erfaring man legger seg litt på, også er det personligheten vår... Altså det vi har lært i ped er egentlig bare for å argumentere for at man tar seg tid til å snakke med eleven

Det er litt.. common sense, egentlig, men nå har vi noen knagger å på en måte henge det på! Og vi har noen teoretikere å vise til, hvis at det er noen som skal krangle på noe!

Ja. ikke bare det men for meg så er det en veldig trygg forankring, og kunne kanskje lese meg opp på ting som jeg kanskje ikke har noen forutsetning for å kunne *lære i* skolen.

³³ (Nr13.)

Ja, elevene blir jo… mer og mer *individer*… om du kan si det på den måten! De *finner* seg selv mer og mer jo eldre de blir! Så de blir jo mer, hva skal jeg si, seg selv! De skaper seg selv mer, og… du er jo der! Og du er en del av den prosessen!

³⁴ (Nr9.)

Altså, du gjør jo ting på impuls. jeg tror ikke det er vi kommer til å tenke veldig bevisst over pedagogikken… eller elevkunnskapen, i klasseromssituasjonen…

Det er jo derfor det er veldig bra med praksis! For da får man tid til å roe ned, og ta ting steg for steg for å reflektere på hvordan timen gikk. Så det er jo veldig fint… og.. og nå har vi jo hatt det meste av den refleksjonen før da, i hvert fall. Så får vi håpe at .. eh at den blir med oss, så slipper vi å bruke så mye tid på det. Fordi den bare ér der, på en måte! Kanskje.

³⁵ (Nr54.)

Vi har jo fått beskjed om å ikke be elevene tegne julaften. Og da er vi tilbake til det med at vi må være så forsiktige med alt. Hva kan vi egentlig gjøre, annet enn å sitte og lese i boka liksom!

Vi kan ikke gjøre noen ting.

Ja, så hva er vitsen da, altså jeg blir oppgitt jeg! Jeg tenker at hva skal jeg egentlig gjøre da!

...ja og samtidig så skal jeg være så "kreativ", og "veldig motiverende".

så spørsmålet blir hva kan jeg som lærer egentlig gjøre da? Vi trår så forsiktig at ting blir *usynlig*, altså ikke-eksisterende!

Ja, og elevene speiler jo det! det er et veldig sårt tema … og vi påvirker dem igjen da, at vi tar bort nysgjerrigheten, og så gir vi dem sperrer!

Vi skal skape det dannede mennesket, men hvordan blir det med alle de syv kvalitetene til det dannede mennesket hvis vi ikke får lov til å gjøre noe?

Vi får det redde mennesket!

Det er veldig, veldig skummelt altså. Hvis det skal gå i den retningen.

³⁶ (Nr50.)

C: men hva er forskjellen på å tenke over noe og reflektere over noe?

…ehm jeg vet ikke... Reflektere, da går du liksom mer inn på deg selv og situasjonen og analyserer og så eventuelt gjør endringer, men å tenke på noe da kan man jo sitte og gruble og alt mulig, men… ikke nødvendigvis at man endrer seg!

Man kan jo finne ut at jeg handlet riktig da, men man kan som regel finne måter man kunne gjort noe annerledes!

C: Men hvordan kan du vurdere deg selv?

Ja. Altså, det er jo det å ha evnen til å være selvreflektert! ehm…

Det er jo litt det å prøve å se det fra andres ståsted da! Også se hvordan, ja, hvis jeg hadde hatt de holdningene i stedet for, hvordan ville jeg da tenkt og gjort!?

Ja!

C: Klarer dere det?

I noen situasjoner synes jeg det er veldig lett å tenke over at ja hvis jeg hadde vært sånn og sånn så kunne jeg gjort sånn og sånn. Men andre ganger synes jeg det er kjempevanskelig.

[37] (Nr46.)

… vi hadde en oppgave som skulle skrives innenfor mangfold. Og da husker jeg at i praksisgruppen, og med praksislæreren, så var første reaksjon at… "hvordan skal vi få gjort den oppgaven, det er ingen elever i den klassen med en annen etnisk bakgrunn! Vi får ikke gjort oppgaven!" ...så tenker jeg etterpå er at det kommer av at det har vært sånn fokus på det på høyskolen.

Så synes jeg at vi har sittet og hatt det gjennom et helt år, men etterpå så… hva sitter vi igjen med?

En redsel for å tråkke feil

Derfor tenker jeg det er enda viktigere at vi klarer å fortelle våre elever igjen, altså snakke om det – hva er mangfold!? Fordi vi som voksne sitter her og legge ord på hva som er mangfold!

[38] (Nr25.)

Refleksjon er viktig, men jeg føler at den blir best hvis den kommer spontant. Ikke sånn som da vi hadde de der refleksjonsdagene i praksis, for da ble det veldig anstrengt! ..særlig i begynnelsen når alt er nytt! Og det er vanskelig å sette ord på! Så.. Men det kommer mer naturlig etter hvert!

Skriftlige refleksjoner synes jeg er veldig vanskelig! … sitte og skrive sånne refleksjonslogger! Det er mye bedre og sitte og prate! Det er bedre når det kommer sånn av seg selv!

[39] (Nr32.)

Jeg tror egentlig ikke det er noen forskjell mht trinnene. For du må jo hele tiden bygge en relasjon. Og la oss si du får en ny elev i femte, sjette klasse. Så er det jo ditt ansvar å få den eleven til å føle seg viktig, verdsatt og inkludert!

…fordi, som vi har nevnt, det med å få antipatier og sånn, det er veldig skummelt. Og det kan ødelegge mye da, for utviklingen til den eleven. ja, så relasjoner er hele tiden viktig,

Det er jo kanskje litt mer behov for sånn der omsorg og sånne ting når de er små, men samtidig så er det er at når de begynner og nærme seg ungdomsskolealder – så skjer det noe med hjernen som ja at de blir veldig bevisste på seg selv. Og da er det jo veldig viktig å på en måte allerede ha en tidlig relasjon.

 Og det er den utviklingen jeg tror du legger grunnlag for, uansett hvordan lærer du er. Og er med på å forme grunnleggende ting! Selvoppfatning, og ja hvilke forventninger en elev kan ha til en lærer også! Så det er ekstremt viktig! Det med *omsorg*, og å være *tilstede*!

[40] (Nr6.)

Det er kanskje verre når det kommer til andre faglige… ting. Men pedagogikken er noe de fleste egentlig kan lære seg til. Mye av det i hvert fall. Med erfaring i skolen bare.

Ja, men da er det ikke sikkert de blir helt klar over *hvorfor* de gjør som de gjør, på en måte!

Det blir intuitivt for oss.

[41] (Nr28.)

C: Hva føler dere er forskjellen på å tenke på noe og reflektere på noe?

Ja, altså, når du tenker på noe så behøver det ikke nødvendigvis å være bevisstgjøring! Du kan jo tenke uten at det setter noe spesielt merke på deg der og da, det kan bare flyte gjennom deg… mens hvis du reflekterer så blir det bevisstgjøring av en handling eller en tanke eller en idé, eller et eller annet sånt noe, som du får eventuelt konstruktivt endret på.

[42] (Nr45.)

C: Synes dere pensum reflekterer det politisk mandatet med fokus på mangfold og inkludering som et samfunnsansvar?

Jeg har brukt egne bøker, når vi har hatt om mangfold som tema på høyskolen... med et sunnere forhold til… mangfold… Det oppfordres bredere til at læreren skal se alle elever… tenke inkludering, at det gjelder flere enn bare kulturelt eller etnisk mangfold. Det er det med å jobbe aktivt for… toleranse og respekt! På en mer sånn moderne måte.

Jeg tenker det kommer an på erfaringer og refleksjoner du gjør underveis. Du leser jo med de øynene og de erfaringene du har! så det er jo kun til en viss grad at pensum kanskje kan gi deg noe kunnskap om inkludering og mangfold. Det er jo du som på en måte hele tiden skal utvikle deg og også lære mer! Og da er det ikke tilstrekkelig med bøker, ikke sant!

[43] (Nr11.)

Som lærer vil du jo ha et veldig ansvar! Men så vil jo du som lærer også… vise noe til elevene dine… hvordan du forholder deg til dem, og hvordan de vil kunne forholde seg til deg tilbake – responderer på hvordan du er! Så du må være god og tydelig klasseleder! For elevene dine. Skape trygge… rom, for dem! Det må være gjensidig, altså det må være åpenhet i klassrommet for både forskjeller og… de må *vite* hvem du er da!

Eh… jeg synes noen ganger at det blir… at veldig mange lærere behandler elevene sine litt for likt! Det skal være lov til å behandle elever forskjellig!

Det kommer jo an på hva elevene trenger da, av tilpasset opplæring. for å lære, eller for å kunne utvikle seg!

Men det skal på en måte ikke komme på bakgrunn av lærerens følelser for… de elevene!

Nei, jeg mener rent faglig, omtrent! Ja, mest mulig.

En kan ikke bare ta bort det med følelsene! Så det blir jo bare å… prøve å nulle dem ut!

Ja, og prate med andre lærere… kanskje sette opp hypotetiske ting… "hvordan ville du gjort det her?" og … få en liten dialog på det! Jeg har vært på en skole hvor de har grupper på tre og fire som gjør det. De prater om hvordan man kan tilrettelegge, for å få faglig input! For når man er hovedlærer så blir man så personlig engasjert! At du *blir* ikke objektiv uansett hvor mye du prøver, og da er det greit å få andres meninger. Som kjenner eleven på en annen måte.

[44] (Nr12.)

Jeg vet ikke om jeg faktisk har følt at noe på studiet har vært unyttig!? Jeg tror ikke det!

Men så er det jo ganske vanskelig å vite, fordi man blander jo mye av det som man har *erfart*, og det som man lærer i timene! Man legger jo det litt sammen, og med tanker rundt det og sånn.

Ja så har det jo blitt en progresjon, og det har bygget veldig på hverandre! sånn at… jeg har aldri liksom opplevd noe *motstridende…* Det har liksom bare klikket på plass.

[45] (Nr33.)

Vi blir jo mer og mer oppdragere. De tilbringer jo mer og mer tid i skolen. Så det blir jo til at vi lærer dem jo ikke bare fag! Altså vi lærer dem jo også hvordan de skal oppføre seg mot andre! Sosial kompetanse! Og oppfordrer til samspill, sånn at de sosialiserer seg!

.De trenger å utvikle sosiale antenner. For at de skal klare å omgås andre.

[46] (Nr36.)

Jeg tenker at verdier og holdninger er veldig viktig! Men du som person kommer jo med helt andre forutsetninger! vi kommer fra ulike miljøer, og har vokst opp på grunnlag av holdninger og verdier som vi kanskje ikke har noe så bevisst forhold til. Du har jo verdier og holdninger som du tar med deg til skolen, og som du automatisk kommer til å overføre til elevene dine!

The others: yes!

…altså på måten du er som person, at kanskje de kan bli "smittet" av måten du er! Føler jeg.

Det handler om en bevissthet… altså at du som lærer – det er jo en maktposisjon, den må du ha respekt for, og… du må vite ansvaret ditt! Så når det gjelder elevenes utvikling? …det har mye å si for selvoppfatning, motivasjon… trygghet på seg selv.